13. Uma lição sobre a mentira

har University Justice go Michael Sand last time we began trying to we began by trying to navigate our way through C moral theory now fully to make sense of cons moral theory in the groundwork requires that we be able to answer three questions how can Duty and autonomy go together what's the great dignity in answering to duty it would seem that these two ideas are opposed Duty and autonomy what's kant's answer to that need someone here to speak up on kant's behalf does he have an answer yes go ahead stand up K believes that you

only act autonomously when you are when you're pursuing something only in the name of Duty and not because of your own circumstances such as like you're only doing something good and moral if you're doing it because of Duty not because something of your own personal gain now why is that acting what's your name mine is Matt Matt why is that acting out of freedom I I hear what you're saying you choose to accept those moral laws in yourself and they're not brought on from outside upon on okay good because acting out of Duty yeah is

following a moral law that you impose on yourself that you impose on yourself that's what makes Duty compatible with freedom yeah okay that's good Matt that is Con answer that's great thank you so K's answer is it is not in so far as I am subject to the law that I have dignity but rather in so far as with regard to that very same law I'm the author and I'm subordinated to that law on that ground that I took it as Matt just said I took it upon myself I will that law so that's why

for Kant acting according to duty and acting freely in the sense of autonomously are one and the same but that raises the question how many moral laws are there because if dignity consists in being governed by a law that I give myself what's to guarantee that my conscience will be the same as your conscience who has account's answer to that yes because a moral law trans is not contingent upon subjective conditions it would transcend all particular differences between people and so would be a universal law and in this respect there would only be one moral

law because it would be Supreme that's exactly right what's your name Kelly Kelly so Kelly Kant believes that if we choose freely out of our own consciences the moral law we're guaranteed to come up with one and the same moral law yes and that's because when I choose it's not me Michael sandal choosing it's not you Kelly choosing for yourself what is it exactly who's doing the choosing who's the subject who's the agent who's doing the choosing reason well reason pure reason pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly well pure

reason is like we were saying before not subject to any external um conditions that may be imposed on it that's great so the reason that does the Willing the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law for yourself yes and that's why it's possible to act autonomously to choose for myself for each of us to choose for ourselves beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law the categorical imperative but then there is one big and

very difficult question left even if you accept everything that Matt and Kelly have said so far how is a categorical imperative possible how is morality possible to answer that question Kant says we need to make a distinction we need to make a distinction between two standpoints two standpoints from which we can make sense of our experience let me try to explain what he means by these two standpoints as an object of experience I belong to the sensible World there my actions are determined by the laws of nature and by the regularities of cause and effect

but as a subject of experience I inhabit an intelligible World here being independent of the laws of nature I am capable of autonomy capable of acting according ording to a law I give myself now Kant says that only from this second standpoint can I regard myself as free for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world is to be free if I were wholly an empirical being as the utilitarians assume if I were a being holy and only subject to the deliverances of my senses to pain and pleasure and hunger and thirst

and appetite if that's all there were to humanity we wouldn't be capable of Freedom K reasons because in that case every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object in that case all choice would be heteronomous Choice governed by the pursuit of some external end when we think of ourselves as free count rights we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will that's the idea of the two standpoints so how are categorical imperative Possible only because the idea of freedom makes me a member of

an intelligible world now Kant admits we aren't only rational beings we don't only inhabit the intelligible world the realm of Freedom if we did if we did then all of our actions would invariably Accord with the autonomy of the will but precisely because we inhabit simultaneously the two standpoints the two Realms the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity precisely because we inhabit both Realms there is always potentially a gap between what we do and what we ought to do between is and ought another way of putting this point and this is the point

with which Kant concludes the groundwork morality is not empirical whatever you see in the world whatever you discover through science can't decide moral questions morality stands at a certain distance from the world from the empirical world and that's why no science could deliver moral truth now I want to test K's moral theory with the hardest possible case a case that he raises the case of the murderer at the door Kant says that lying is wrong we all know that we've discussed why lying is at odds with the categorical imperative a French philosopher Benjamin Kon wrote

an article responding to the groundwork where he said this absolute prohibition on lying is wrong it can't be right what if a murderer came to your door looking for your friend who was hiding in your house and the murderer asked you point blank is your friend in your house Kon says it would be crazy to say that the moral thing to do in that case is to tell the truth kstone says the murderer certainly doesn't deserve the truth and can't Ro a reply Li and Kant stuck by his principle that lying even to the murderer

at the door is wrong and the reason it's wrong he said is once you start taking consequences into account to carve out exceptions to the categorical imperative you've given up the whole moral framework you've become a consequential or maybe a rule utilitarian but most of you and most of K's readers think there's something odd and implausible about this answer I would like to try to defend Kant on this point and then I want to see whether you think that my defense is plausible and I would want to defend him within the spirit of his own

account of morality imagine that someone comes to your door you were asked the question by this murder you're hiding your friend is there a way that you could avoid telling a lie without selling out your friend does anyone have an idea of how you might be able to do that yes stand up I was just going to say if I were to let my friend in my house to hide in the first place I'd probably make a plan with them so I'd be like hey I'll tell the murderer you're here but escape and that's one

of the options mentioned so but I'm not sure that's aan an option H you're still lying though no because he's in the house but he won't be oh I see all right good enough one more try if you just say you don't know where he is because he might not be locked in the closet he might have left the closet you have no clue where he could be so you would say I don't know which wouldn't actually be a lie because you weren't at that very moment looking in the closet exactly so it would be

strictly speaking true yes and yet that possibly deceiving misleading but still true what's your name John John all right John has uh now John may be on to something John you're really offering us the option of a clever evasion that is strictly speaking true this raises the question whether there is a moral difference between an outright lie and a misleading truth from kant's point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie and a misleading truth why is that even though both might have the same consequences but then remember Kant doesn't base

moral on consequences he bases it on formal adherence to the moral law now sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against lying with a white lie what is a white lie it's it's a lie to make well to avoid hurting someone's feelings for example it's a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences now Kant could not Endor a white lie but perhaps he could endorse a misleading truth suppose someone gives you a tie as a gift and you open the box and it's just awful what do you say

thank you thank you you could say thank you but they're waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you what do you think of it you could tell a white Li and say it's beautiful but that wouldn't be permissible from K's point of view could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth you open the box and you say I've never seen a tie like that before thank you you shouldn't have that's good can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged you can what are you thinking of remember

the whole carefully worded denials in the Monica Lewinsky Affair of Bill Clinton now those denials actually became the subject of very explicit debate and argument during the impeachment hearings take a look at the following excerpts from Bill Clinton is there something do you think morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and a misleading carefully couched truth I want to say one thing to the American people I want you to listen to me I'm going to say this again I did not have sexual relations with that woman Miss Linsky I never told anybody to

lie not a single time never these allegations are false did he lie to the American people when he said I never had sex with that woman you know he doesn't believe he did and because of the may I explain Congressman what he said was to the American people that he did not have sexual relations and I understand you're not going to like this Congressman because it you will see it as a a hair splitting evasive answer but in his own mind his definition was not okay I understand that argument okay all right so there you

have the exchange now at the time you may have thought this was just a istic hair splitting exchange between a republican who wanted to impeach Clinton and the lawyer who was trying to defend him but now in the light of Kant do you think there is something morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and an evasion a true but misleading statement I'd like to hear from Defenders of K people who think there is a distinction are you are you ready to defend K well I think when you try to say that lying and

misleading truths are the same thing you're basing it on a consequentialist argument which is that they achieve the same thing but the fact of the matter is you told the truth and you intended that people would believe what you were saying which was the truth which means it is not morally the same as telling a lie and intending that they believe it is the truth even though it's not true good what's your name Diana so Diana says there that KH has a point here and it's a point that might even come to the aid of

Bill Clinton and that is well what about that someone over here for Kant motivation is key so if you give to someone because primarily you want to feel good about yourself K would say that has no moral worth well with this the motivation is the same it's to sort of mislead someone it's to lie it's to sort of throw them off the track and the motivation is the same so there should be no difference okay good so here isn't the motiv motive the same Diana what what do you say to this argument that well the

motive is the same in both cases there is the attempt or at least the hope that one's pursuer will be misled uh well that you could look at it that way but I think that the fact is that your immediate motive is that they should believe you the ultimate consequence of that is that they might be deceived and not find out what was going on but your immediate motive is that they should believe you because you're telling the truth may I help a little why don't you say and what's your name I'm sorry Wesley why

don't you say to Wesley it's not exactly the case that the motive in both cases is to mislead they're hoping they're hoping that the person will be misled by the statement I don't know where they are or I never had sexual relations you're hoping that they will be misled but in the case where you're telling the truth your motive is to mislead while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative I think K's answer would be Diana yes yes you like that I

do okay so I think K answer would be unlike a falsehood unlike a lie a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty and the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of even the work of evasion Diana yes you like okay and so there is something some element of respect for the Dignity of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an outright lie but he didn't and so I think kant's K's Insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion there is a kind of

homage to the Dignity of the moral law that is not present in the outright life and that Wesley is part of the motive it's part of the motive yes I hope he will be misled I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking for my friend instead of the closet I hope that will be the effect I can't control that I can't control the consequences but what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends I hope will unfold to do so in a way that

is consistent with respect for the moral law Wesley I don't think is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out this discussion brings out some of what's at stake what's morally at stake in con notion of the categorical imperative as long as any uh effort is involved I would say that the contract is valid and it should take effect but why what was what morally can you point to for example two people agree to be married and one suddenly calls the other in two minutes say I changed my mind does the uh contract have obligation

on both sides well I'm tempted to say no fine