How Worried Is NATO about a U.S. Withdrawal? (Feat. Mark Rutte)

There is a growing rift between what the  broader public thinks about the United States’s future in NATO and what those  within the organization itself believe. Let me give you some numbers to back this up. In an incredibly rigorous and scientific poll, I asked lines on maps enthusiasts whether the  United States withdrawing is a serious concern.

More than 26,000 of you voted,  and 63% of you said yes. The problem is, I could not find a  single person at NATO who shared the same sentiment. Not one.

There were various  caveats that the United States might be less active if Europe did not raise its military  contributions, and what things might look like short of a U. S. withdrawal.

But in  terms of an actual withdrawal, no one. You know, I was worried that you might not believe that such a discrepancy between  the public and elites exists. So I personally asked Secretary  General of NATO Mark Rutte whether the United States is going to withdraw.

He said “it won’t happen. ” And before you think I was speaking metaphorically when I said I asked him …  no, I literally asked him. About 60% of my audience believes  that a U.

S. withdrawal from NATO is a serious concern. What would you say to them?

[Rutte] “Well, it … It won’t happen. ” [Spaniel] Thanks for that Secretary  General! We will get back to you later.

Now, is it possible that NATO is wrong and the  public consensus is right? Sure. Time will tell.

It is worth noting that Rutte’s  comments came before the Oval Office meltdown involving  Trump, Vance, and Zelensky. But the lesson here is not that my  public polls may sometimes actually be convoluted prefaces to questions  that I pose to world leaders— though I guess you need to be  concerned about that from now on. Instead, the lesson is that NATO is intentionally designed to give the United States plenty  of incentive to stay in the organization— because that has been a central  objective of NATO all along.

So even if you are confident in your  own assessment of the situation, it is still worth understanding  why NATO, as an organization, is not as concerned. Thus, we will start today with a brief overview of how NATO’s original purpose  ties into today’s problem. Then we will look at four arguments  against an American departure from NATO: its political benefits to Washington, its military benefits as well, of which there are a ton that  each deserve their own time the literal problem of physically  trying to leave the organization, and finally the difficulty of doing so from  an American domestic legal perspective.

And if you believe that this  is a sign of things to come, then think about these points  as a forewarning for the mess that is about to transpire. Let’s begin with understanding  NATO’s core mission. It is easy to just open up  the North Atlantic Treaty, point to Article 5’s  collective security provision, and call it a day.

But if only something like this were so simple. If we want to understand what really goes on  behind the scenes, we need to travel back in time. Now, NATO has had many Secretaries  General over the decades, but the key to our story for today is the  original: the United Kingdom’s Lord Ismay.

He is best known for his philosophy  that NATO’s key missions were to: one, keep the Soviet Union out; two, keep the Americans in; and three, the keep Germans down. Not only did the man keep his tie on brand, he was also prescient. Regarding the first point, what is old is new again.

Regarding the third point … well, I guess what is old might be new again soon enough. As for the second point, not only is what is old new again, it is also what is generating  our long discuss for today. You see, Ismay served as Winston Churchill’s  chief military assistant during World War II, and he took a central lesson from that conflict.

At the time, Ismay was worried that the United  States would pull a repeat of World War I, and abandon the continent following  the termination of hostilities. Then, once World War III would begin,  just like it did with World War II, the United States would take  its sweet time intervening. Although a lot has changed  since the days of Lord Ismay, the incentives for the United States  to remain in NATO are still present.

And if we are really careful about what has  happened in the news over the last couple of weeks, we still see the consequences of  NATO’s structuring in American rhetoric. You probably heard a ton about Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s trip to  NATO headquarters on February 13. He was flying to Brussels to take part in  NATO’s annual defense ministers summit, which gave Hegseth the opportunity  to meet his 31 counterparts.

It seemed that he came out throwing daggers. “The United States will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship  which encourages dependency. ” “If … troops are deployed as peacekeepers  to Ukraine …, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission.

And they  should not be covered under Article 5. ” “European allies must lead from the front. ” “There will not be U.

S.  troops deployed to Ukraine. ” “We’re … here today to directly and unambiguously  express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States from being primarily  focused on the security of Europe.

” Perhaps it is not surprising that the  headlines that followed looked like these. However, the public discourse that  followed basically made it seem like the United States was about to wholly abandon  the continent, which is not the full story. In the same speech as the rest of those quotes,  Hegseth also stated, unambiguously, that “the United States remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense  partnership with Europe.

Full stop. ” And he was saying “full stop”  there; it was not me adding it. At the meeting itself, at least  for the public facing parts, he was all smiles as he introduced  himself to the other ministers.

The content of the meeting reflected  that, perhaps best described as a frank conversation that looked for a path  forward while ripping off a bandage. And his point was not about abandoning  Europe. It was a continuation of Trump’s long-running policy that the United States  has to pivot to China, one way or the other.

Yes, one might ask whether now is the right time for such a hard pivot. Certainly that is  the conversation in Kyiv at the moment. Heck, it is controversial  within Republican spheres.

Elbridge Colby, the main architect behind the 2018 National Defense Strategy that  began the pivot, and now currently Trump’s nominee for DoD Undersecretary of Defense  for Policy, had had his nomination held up by Tom Cotton, because Cotton thinks that Colby’s  preoccupation with China makes him too soft on Iran. But the argument from this sector  of the national security community, which extends well-past the Trump administration, is not that the United  States should abandon Europe. Rather, the United States should focus on Asia because it has a comparative  advantage in naval power projection.

And as long as Europe cares about,  say, semiconductor manufacturing, then the continent should also  care about the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, Europe should focus on the  border with Russia because it has a comparative advantage in its geographic  positioning. And Europe can still fall back to Washington on parts of continental  defense better suited for American forces.

And while a smaller American contribution on  the continent might not be ideal for Europe, any European country entangled in  the global economic marketplace benefits from more deterrent power  in the Pacific. It is a tradeoff. Indeed, the more hawkish European  leaders recognize that tradeoff, and how the United States ultimately has to  divide its attention between the two priorities.

That is why you have Mark Rutte saying  regarding a potential American abandonment that [Rutte] It won’t happen—because NATO is there not  only to keep Europe safe but also the U. S. safe.

It is an alliance which has a strong history but  also a very strong future—to make sure that we keep the whole of the alliance safe, one billion  people, the U. S. is over 50% of the NATO economy.

What the U. S. wants us to do and the rest of NATO  is spend more—and the U.

S. is totally right there, because why they spend more than the rest?  But that is a debate that we are having internally.

But there is no question about  the endurance down the generations of NATO. [Spaniel] Now, longtime viewers of this  channel might be thinking to themselves “Hey, shouldn’t we not be listening to  what leaders say, but rather watching what they do? ” And fair point.

But it is worth emphasizing that these  two leaders are saying the same things, even if it often seems like the media discussion  is that they are at each other’s throats. And, sure, Rutte does not speak for Europe,  but he does speak for the organization. Beyond that, there are three other  things to think through here.

One, it is not just Rutte saying this. Nor is  it just Hegseth. It is also literally every single one of the dozens of people that I spoke  to at headquarters, both on and off the record.

I will give you a surprisingly topical tour  of the building in a moment, but for now, one interesting factoid is that the  entire thing is made out of glass. The architect did it as a nod to  the organization’s transparency. And if I can let you in on a dirty little secret, it is that democracies … are … well  … not very good at keeping secrets.

If NATO really was worried about an American  withdrawal, then we would be hearing about it— perhaps not from Rutte, but  via leaks from any number of frustrated European delegates and staff members. We do not have that, though. Instead, we have some heavy headlines that draw  on only half of Hegseth’s comments and plenty of documentation  of Europe’s frustration with the Trump administration’s candor,  which is worth keeping an eye on.

Second is working through contingencies. NATO is not spending time  trying to plan out what the organization looks like without U. S.

membership. To be clear, if the United States withdraws, Europe’s solution does not become  the formation of a new organization. NATO still exists, and member states  are still legally bound to it.

The other 30 European countries plus Canada are not  going to demolish the Brussels headquarters and spend another 1. 1 billion euros on a new Canada-Europe Treaty Organization building. Friendly reminder that the last time  there was an alliance pronounced “SEATO,” it did not turn out so well.

That said, a U. S. -less NATO would  require significant reshuffling of the organization’s structure.

And if it were  something that seemed plausible to NATO, they would be exerting significant  effort to develop contingency plans. Again, if that were happening, we would be hearing significant leaks about  it. However, we are not hearing such leaks.

And therefore in yet another victory for modus  tollens, NATO is genuinely not worried about it. Now, to be clear, European  leaders are convening a ton of meetings to coordinate continental security. And a bunch of enterprising politicians  are taking a more extreme stance, which certainly good if you  want to establish a brand.

What is most interesting about these comments to me is that they tend to come from  the more hawkish political leaders— those who naturally want to raise defense spending and who find this to be a convenient  political message to get their way. But the actual state-level planning is more  geared toward how Europe can take over the primary role of European security, especially  as it relates to the Ukraine situation. It is not about living in a post-NATO world where  the United States renders Article 5 irrelevant.

Again, we will have to see how the  Oval Office meltdown changes this. The initial reaction—and what is fast becoming a  universal reaction to anything that Trump does— has been a push to increase  European defense spending, with the traditional hawks once  more being the loudest about it. One thing worth putting into context  here is to reemphasize that the Trump Administration views the Ukraine War  as an impediment to its China pivot.

The president just wants to say goodbye to  the conflict, which, for better or worse, helps explain his apparent indifference  regarding the terms that they settle on. Now, the White House’s position seems to  understate the fact that when the war ends, the security situation will not suddenly vanish. Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg does  fully grasp this, and it is part of his publicly available peace plan.

But that seems  to get buried in the rest of the discussion. In any case, all of that is distinct  from the United States cooperating with Europe under Article 5, a  topic that we will get to later. For now, it is worth pointing  out that the other two White House summits earlier in the week  were perfectly normal and cordial, That was true both when Trump was elated to receive an invitation from  the King for a state visit, but also when Macron pushed back against  Trump in their public Oval Office comments.

Trump understands that he is in a stronger  bargaining position vis a vis Ukraine, and he does not really care about  the diplomatic optics of flexing it. However, he also realizes that the United  States still needs Europe’s help in Europe, so he is more cautious on that front. To draw a very rough analogy, remember  when the Bush administration was trying to convince European allies that  an Iraq War would be a good idea?

Well, many of them did not go along with it. The United States instead built  a “coalition of the willing” to fight the war. It was not a signal of  the end of cross-Atlantic relations— though it did result in some silly renamings of food items.

French of freedom fries,  the alliance persisted all the same. Yes, today’s rift is worse than that spell. And,  yes, it is possible that NATO is looking at this incorrectly and will regret its confidence in the  United States remaining a part of the alliance.

But we still have not yet discussed the third reason why Rutte’s message  has inherent credibility. That, of course, is everything  that Lord Ismay was talking about. Look, we are in a world where Trump is  dancing right past every traditionally accepted norm in international relations.

When you plot the ideological  spectrum of the United Nations General Assembly—and I mean this literally— the United States and North Korea are on the exact  opposite poles. But here we are. However, the thing about norms is  that they work well when they are generally a good idea and everyone is  naturally predisposed to following them.

Yet when someone challenges a norm,  it seems at this point that the most common reaction is to shame those  individuals for breaking the norm. The trouble with shame is that “how dare you” is rarely a compelling argument to those who do not understand the  norm or are actively hostile it. Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary general  preceding Mark Rutte, is known for saying that “It is good to have friends.

” And while that may be true, it is  not going to convince skeptics. Thus, we need to spend some time covering  the nuts and bolts of the alliance. So celebrate, because we have a whole second half  of the video to concentrate on that and more.

And, like I said before, if NATO is wrong about  what the United States will do, let the remainder of this video serve as a forewarning of all of  the ugly mess that will soon be forthcoming. That potential contingency aside, let’s begin  with the political aspects of the situation. To do that properly, we really need  to take a tour of NATO headquarters, understand why it is primarily a political  institution despite its military branding, and how it functions on a day-to-day basis.

Thus, we must fly to Brussels, a relatively  central location among the British, French, and German power polls, land at the airport, and then take a six kilometers  drive down the highway to HQ. Assuming you get through security, that will take you to the main  background image for today’s video. Actually, it is exactly here on the map, and looking back you can see how  it is a cleverly disguised barrier, designed to prevent a car from  trying to speed into the building.

And if you look to the left of the image, and to the southern point  of the headquarters campus, you will find the set of 32 flag  poles, one for each country, and undoubtedly a source of frustration  for the groundskeeper whenever a new country joins the alliance. It is also  where that “NATO Star” sculpture sits. Heading inside, NATO’s main atrium—or “agora”  as they call it—runs roughly north-south.

It is that glass room that we discussed earlier and so frequently appears in  b-roll of the organization. To get in, most leaders will drive through—or more precisely zig-zag around—the  previously-seen security area. But there is little rest, as right inside the  entrance is another set of flags referred to as the NATO “doorstep,” where leaders are liable  to be peppered with questions from reporters.

At least they may take some comfort in  knowing that those flags from earlier are also cleverly designed to obscure the  view of a sniper that may be in the area. In any case, the vast majority of the building’s  floor space consists of these eight wings, conceived of by the architect as the fingers  of two hands coming together to form a shield. Spelled sierra, hotel, India, echo, lima, delta, they house each member state’s delegation.

Countries differ on whether they call their  primary official an ambassador or permanent representative, but the important thing is  that these are top-level political missions. Consequently, what goes on inside of these halls  is not military planning in the traditional sense— for that, you would have to travel  about 86 kilometers southwest to Mons, which is a classified location and I assure  you not a part of the Minecraft universe, but even then the military  side of NATO is fragmented. Actually, that is part of the lesson  here.

NATO does not have a military. It has 31 militaries (sorry, Iceland I  am not going to count your coast guard), and they all have slightly  different political goals— or perhaps now in the case of the Trump  administration, a notably different goal. Thus, what NATO headquarters does on a  day-to-day basis is sort out the political questions that arise when you are dealing with  40-something trillion dollars in total GDP.

This makes the Brussels building  unique among institutions that fit within the Western liberal order. Sure, there are other fora that  ideologically-aligned Western countries take part in, like the United Nations. But this is the place where it is only them. 

Never mind that they are all in the same halls, rather than strewn around the streets of New  York. It is actual face-to-face interaction, not people staring at a screen. Thus, when new political policy among  Western countries needs to be developed, it occurs inside of this building.

When Russia begins encroaching on European  territory, the countermeasures form in this building—well not this one, the glass one. And when a new crisis suddenly upends the world, the first responses are  discussed in this building. In fact, the building architect had this type  of collaboration in mind when designing it.

In addition to the main eight wings  occupied by the 32 delegations, there are four smaller wings that  house NATO’s international staff, and this larger space that holds the main North Atlantic Council meeting room seen here  during the 2025 defense ministerial meeting, as well as the location where one night take a family portrait and begin  analyzing some lines on pants. Solid job from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, but I think Turkey’s permanent representative  to NATO is winning this year’s award. All told, this ends up creating a mini city  of about 3500 people during working hours.

Of course, to support that many people,  you need to have some amenities. Notably, these were not built within each wing. Rather, they were centralized in this part  of the building known as the public square.

It contains a handful of meeting  rooms and some workspaces for the media who have clearance to enter the campus. The press briefing room is in the  center, slightly below ground. It has a library, which, in the opinion of your not-so-subtle narrator, has a  fantastic collection of books.

There is a barber shop  across from the dry cleaners. You have a coffee shop, which allegedly  had to get a second espresso machine after the Italian delegation complained  that the first one was not good enough. And then there is a large cafeteria  to feed everyone throughout the day.

After hours, the NATO crew can  head north to a second complex, which serves as a recreation center and gym. There is a track and a football field,  which perhaps the United States could, in exchange for staying in the  alliance, change to a football field. Or you can head inside, get in a match of tennis,  or enjoy a potent potable in their lounge area.

The point is that the building’s  design intentionally encourages the delegations to interact with each other. It is difficult to silo one’s self off  inside of a wing. If you want something, you have to walk to the building’s center.

Rather, the socialization gets  the delegations to naturally cross paths and have conversations about the  political problems that they jointly face. This was not as important during the Cold War era, when the politics were simpler and limited  to counterbalancing the Soviet Union. But after the Soviet Union fell apart and  NATO went through a brief identity crisis, the alliance re-emerged as the  bastion of democratic priorities.

That created a greater political  mission for the organization, which is reflected when ground broke  on the current headquarters in 2010. And if you think that the Western liberal order  extends past NATO member states, you are right. But NATO also has that covered.

What you are  looking at is the previous NATO headquarters, flags down as the delegations are no longer  there. It was built as a temporary space in 1967. And in what is a perfectly normal  sense of the word “temporary,” it remained the headquarters  for the following 50 years.

Anyway, it is right across the street  from the current headquarters and—for reasons unclear—is bizarrely the  part of Google Earth blur-fest despite the crystal-clear  image just slightly north. You can see that it is much more sprawling, and  much harder to get those natural interactions. The upshot is that it is still useful.

All  of that excess office space now houses the missions for NATO partner countries—Russia  excluded since 2021. Those who remain are a shouting distance away in case there  needs to be a broader political discussion. Even in a Trump-reoriented world, where the United States is paying closer  attention to China, Washington still needs to politically coordinate with rest of the  Western coalition.

That is what NATO offers. And the United States gets  this for quite a bargain price. Washington contributes just  15.

88% to NATO’s budget, exactly the same portion that Germany does. The other main problems lie on  the military side of things. Actually, remember that we can  subdivide this logic into five parts.

Each could probably be a  full video in its own right, but level me cover for you  the high-level points for now. Let’s start with Article 5, the part that  you are already most likely familiar with. That is the “an attack on one is an  attack against all clause” of the treaty.

Pop quiz: how many times has an ally invoked Article 5? Just once, on October 4, 2001. NATO headquarters has a piece  of mangled metal from the World Trade Center to serve as a reminder.

Actually, it is directly across  from a piece of the Berlin Wall, another reminder of its goal to  never have Europe be divided again. While we will wait to see about the division part, at least in regard to deterrence, the  alliance has been immensely successful. Indeed, if its goal is to deter  attacks on member countries, then one failure over three  quarters of a century is not bad.

Right now, it seems that all of the focus on  deterrent concerns is directed at Europe. And that makes sense, given that the largest land war  on that continent since World War II is ongoing. Nevertheless, it is plausible  that the United States will make it two Article 5 invocations in a row.

Only a few months ago, the mystery  of exploding packages was tied to preparations from Russia to attack U. S. airliners.

Trump is ramping up the rhetoric  against Mexican cartels, and you could imagine one getting some  ideas about a strike on American soil. Then there is China. If the whole point of  the Trump pivot is to crack down on China, then that leaves open the possibility  of China attacking the United States.

As a result, the United States  still has a vested interest in protecting the reciprocal nature of Article 5. To wit, the U. S.

-led coalition  in Afghanistan suffered 3,621 fatalities. 2,461 of them were Americans, meaning that Washington only bore about  two-thirds of the losses despite Europe not being the original target. Almost all of the other fatalities were  either incurred by NATO member countries, or countries that would later become  NATO members.

Note the Swedish flag in the background of this video of the  Secretary General’s visit from 2016. In the case of many Eastern European countries,  they specifically participated as a means to pay it forward to an alliance  that they were not yet a part of. Second on the list is exploiting each state’s comparative advantage in arms production.

Trump is big on savings for the government and  efficiency gains, so he ought to like this part. NATO states deliberately leave some portions of their militaries underdeveloped  or completely non-existent. Here is a bit of a puzzle for you.

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania cover a large portion of the coastline of the Baltic Sea, sometimes now jokingly referred to as the NATO lake. Well, how many submarines do they have? The answer is zero.

None. Perhaps the better question, though, is why. After all, Russia is right there.

Given the rhetoric in Washington, you would be liable to think it is  because they are free riding off others. But nope, that is not it. Let’s take a look at NATO’s 2022 military expenditures by country as a percentage of GDP.

Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia rank third, sixth, and seventh respectively. Finland was not a member of NATO in 2022 and spent 1. 9% that year.

Thus,  it was below what would have been the 2% target threshold as a potential member. However, Finland jumped to 2. 5% in 2023.

The point is that none of these countries  are slouching on defense spending. Something else is going on with the submarines,  or lack thereof, in those countries. The trick is that they share land borders  with Russia—and the lion’s share of them, with Norway only having this tiny bit in the north and Poland having this weird line  with the Kaliningrad exclave.

I guess that Lithuania’s  border does not seem like much, but they view Belarus as Russia in disguise, and figure that the first thing  that happens in a land war with Russia is Russia attacking  with free rein from there. So maybe the de facto border  line should include all this too. As a result, it makes sense for them to spend  all of their resources fortifying the border.

They are the only ones who can because  they are the only ones who live there. Meanwhile, leave it to Sweden, Poland, and Germany, who can cover the water on their behalf. Playing to comparative advantages like that  allows members to specialize in what their militaries are better equipped to accomplish.

Thus, they can spend more on their stronger  categories, save money overall by cutting back on their weaker categories, and  yet end up more powerful despite that. To be clear, among all the NATO countries, the United States benefits the least  from this specialization strategy. That is because the United States tries  to command a full-service military, in large part because Washington wants to  leverage offensive capabilities worldwide, which goes far beyond the NATO mandate.

Still, the United States is cognizant of  the fundamental point. Hegseth’s earlier comments also noted that the United States’s  comparative advantage—and he used that exact phrase, “comparative advantage”—lies in  handling the Indo-Pacific problems. That, in turn, underlies the entire American pivot.

And there remain some things  that the United States is better off deferring to others despite its mass. As a quick example, Washington would  be better off leaving the development of winter weather strategy to  the likes of Norway and Sweden. Moving on, part three’s effect is much  more important for the United States precisely because Washington wants a large  military.

Let’s discuss economies of scale. Modern weapons systems are enormously expensive to produce. However, there is nuance lost  in the absurdity of the price tags given.

Take something like the F-16.  Reliable figures are hard to come by, but a reasonable estimate is that it cost $70 billion to develop. Nevertheless, the per unit  cost to actually produce a single F-16 drops to $80 million.

In other words,  if I ordered one right now, the U. S. government would have to  spend $80 million to produce it.

Thus, if you produced 100 F-16s, the total cost is $78 billion, and the true cost per unit is $780 million—distributing the development  costs over the total production. In contrast, if you produced a thousand of them, the overall cost is $150 billion, and the true cost per unit is $150 million. Not too bad.

Ten times the order, only twice the total  cost. Welcome to economies of scale. Consequently, the real game in modern military  production is lining up as many buyers as you can, from Portugal to Poland.

And it is something that disproportionately  benefits larger countries, which have more expansive resources and can  better absorb the capital outlays. Indeed, we have previously discussed how this is a major problem that Russia has started  to experience due to the war in Ukraine, and it would become a significant problem if  the United States were to ever leave NATO. Sure, it is possible for the United States to  sell weapons outside of the NATO framework.

But part of the reason that you want  to bring everyone under one roof is to facilitate what those production orders look like. Actually, the fourth point on military coordination ties in with this. Any given weapons system has a variety of different branching pathways  that its producer can take.

Across countries interested in purchasing  the system, there will be plenty of common ground. More bang for the same buck  will not have anyone complaining. But opinions will differ on  some dimensions.

For example, take ammunition. On a per unit basis, NATO  might produce more of that than anything else. Even such a small item requires  many design choices.

The material, the weight, whether to prioritize stopping  power or rate of fire. The list goes on. And just think about how many more pathways  there are for more complicated weapons systems.

Well, one of the joys of being  the alliance leader is having some agenda setting power over which of those  differing options becomes the standard. Withdrawing from NATO removes the  United States from that position. Worse, it would mean that the United States  would not even have a seat at the table.

Let me go deeper into that ammunition example  to illustrate the consequences of this. Right after NATO formed, a debate  emerged between the United States and the United Kingdom over what type of  rifle ammunition would become the standard. It was a hot topic because World War II  had gutted Europe’s production capacity, and so the allies needed to pool resource to ensure that any country would have  enough in the case of an emergency.

Huh. Limited European capacity in the time of heightened security concerns.  What is old is new again, again.

Two options emerged. The United  States preferred the 7. 62x51mm round, as seen here.

Meanwhile, the  United Kingdom preferred a . 280. Well, the United States went around to each  other ally to lobby for its own standard.

They all got on board, which  forced the United Kingdom’s hand. That is the type of thing that would be  impossible if the United States left NATO today. And just in case you think these types of  coordination issues come up rarely … nope.

NATO literally has an office  dedicated to that purpose, and the number of such standardizations within  the organization are in the four figures. For the final bit under the  military benefits category, and this is a more basic point, we need to  discuss the geography of force multiplication. Yes, the entire premise behind  Europe taking over security affairs regarding Russia and Ukraine  is that they are actually in Europe.

But NATO is a major force multiplier for the  United States. Aside from the physical military support, like what we saw in Afghanistan,  there is the sheer geographic component. Projecting power across long distances is  incredibly difficult.

Just think about how many billions of dollars the United States spends on  its aircraft carriers in support of that mission. Well, Europe is a continental carrier. The  United Stares has more than 30 bases in Europe, which are critical for operations not only  on that continent but also on Africa and in the Middle East.

There is a good chance  you have heard of Ramstein Air Base before, and it is precisely because the United  States gets so much use out of it. Think about the crisis mode that the  Kremlin went through when the Syrian Civil War culminated, and that was  only over two bases in the country. With Europe and the United States, it is more  than an order of magnitude more important.

Anyway, we still have two other  broader categories to consider, and while I do not think they are as important of  factors, they are nevertheless worth discussing. Let’s start with the logistical problems of  leaving NATO—as in literally trying to move out. Forget about all of those other bases  in Europe.

They would be an even worse situation to consider. But trying to leave  just Brussels would be a headache on its own. Remember how the headquarters has eight  main wings that house the delegations?

Almost all of the allies occupy one floor each. Germany? Two floors.

But over here in wing seven, the United States occupies five whole floors. Now, the headquarters are the workspace for  thousands of people. With that, comes a tradeoff You need the floor clear for delegates to mingle,  but you also need to provide services to them.

NATO resolves this problem with the  third and final building on the campus. All incoming goods, from food to office supplies, enter from the north, then travel underground  to seamlessly arrive in the building. While the building has plenty of  personal elevators, each wing only has one freight elevator.

And therein lies the  headaches that come along with moving out. As a point of comparison, it took five  years to plan the move to the new building, and that was going from right across  the street. What you are watching here is just a snapshot of that process—a  timelapse of the taking down the flags and readying the star.

You can see the  new glass building in the background. By contrast, an American NATO departure would not be a 600 meter move. It would  be a 6000 kilometer catastrophe.

My sympathies to the people who have to worry  about protecting the classified documents. As for the actual bases, sure, the United  States could negotiate bilaterally to keep those in operation. But if we have  learned anything from Brexit, it is that negotiating bilateral agreements is a lot more  complicated than having a consistent framework.

Then again, Brexit did happen… Finally, we have the legal issues that come with  an attempted withdrawal. And I am focusing on the domestic side because, from NATO’s perspective,  there is no real issue over in Europe. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty  says that “After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may  cease to be a Party one year after.

” Funny to note: anyone withdrawing must tell  the United States to get the process started, so Washington would have to tell  itself that it is happening. Where things get more complicated  is with internal U. S.

politics. Toward the end of the Biden administration,  both Congress and the president began worrying that a second Trump term  might see a withdrawal attempt. As a result, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 included a clause that a  U.

S. withdrawal would require either a two-thirds confirmation from  the Senate or an act of Congress. There are some question marks there, though.

The U. S. Constitution states that  the Senate must ratify treaties, but that the executive branch negotiates them.

Does “negotiate” include withdrawal? There is no specific language on the subject. Toward the end of the first Trump administration, the White House Legal Council issued an  opinion regarding a different treaty that withdrawal is solely the executive’s authority. 

The same logic would apply to a NATO withdrawal. However, White House legal opinions are not law. In contrast, the Congressional act is a  law.

But that is not the end of the story. Trump is certainly capable of challenging the law at the Supreme Court—and a  politically right Court at that. All of this is to say that any  attempt to formally withdraw from NATO will immediately result in a legal challenge.

Even if the Supreme Court rejects  Trump’s bid and breaking a Senate filibuster is impossible, there  is a second tier of concern here. Trump may not withdraw, but perhaps  he will effectively abandon it. And if the President is not participating, the  United States may well not even be there.

This is a complex topic that  I will have to dedicate a full video to soon. For now, here is the short version. We are indeed seeing some motions that enfeeble  Article 5, with Washington skeptical of continuing the enhanced forward presence program  to put more U.

S. troops in Europe, images from which you have been watching. Well, Article 5’s “an attack against one  is an attack against all clause” can only be fully successful when opponents  believe that it will be enforced.

And that kicks the question to how the Kremlin is interpreting all of this.  Good luck figuring that out. The closest historical analogue to this  was France’s withdrawal from NATO’s Supreme Allied Command, which separated France’s  military from NATO’s military integration.

That included expelling NATO military  forces from French territory, which came with the side effect of forcing  NATO to move from its Paris headquarters— despite its absolutely stunning backdrop to that allegedly temporary site in Brussels. Still, NATO is not much worried about  the prospects of such a middle option. Notably, France withdrew in part because it  wanted more independent military latitude and in part due to complaints that American decision  making was far too dominant within the alliance.

Well, I suppose that latter part is  telling—if France was upset by U. S. dominance, then perhaps Washington disproportionately  benefits from NATO despite the lion’s share of defense spending coming  from the Western Atlantic.

In other words, Trump need not worry about  whatever angle the Dutch or anyone else is trying to operate from. The United  States is still the heavy hitter. Anyway, France returned to NATO’s  Supreme Allies Command in 2009.

I suppose that it is a double  lesson—a country can withdraw from NATO’s command structure because it wants  more independence without endangering Article 5, and also that the whole thing  probably is not a good idea. To sum up today’s massive knowledge drop, there would be a giant mess for all parties  involved if the United States pulled out of NATO. The Trump administration’s main complaint is that Europe does not contribute  enough to collective defense.

Europe is aware of this and has been  taking active steps to close the gap. So maybe a U. S.

withdrawal would be a  serious concern if the threat is ignored. But NATO is betting that Europe and the  United States will never walk down that road. Well, that is it for me today.

See you next time. Wait, you thought that this was  going to end without a discussion of two amazing books? Well, to borrow a phrase [Rutte] It’s won’t happen.

[Spaniel] Indeed, here the  books are in all of their glory. Check the video description for  more information about them. You can also watch my Q&A video  about the Oval Office meltdown if you want to hear more about how it  interconnects to NATO’s position.

And if you enjoyed today’s video, please like, share, and subscribe, and I will  see you next time. Take care.