Fall of Sparta

Unlike many other valiant civilisations throughout history, Sparta’s martial reputation has been forever engraved onto the stone of common consciousness. Even the most historically uninterested people are aware of infamous quotes such as ‘This is Sparta!’ and ‘Molon labe!’, but this is just one part of the Spartan story. The popular image of the Spartans stems overwhelmingly from the militaristic polis’ golden age, during which its prowess in war became famous. In theory, such a city that spat in the face of death would almost definitely prefer to go out ‘with a bang, rather than a whimper’, as the saying

goes. So, it was perhaps the cruellest fate of all that the militaristic Spartan civilisation went out with a whimper, perhaps more pitiful than any. Welcome to our video on the slow but stubborn Fall of Sparta and how the great stalwarts of Thermopylae started fading into pitiful irrelevance and then lost their independence. The Spartan diarchy of legend was probably born before the social and political transformations of a quasi-legendary lawmaker from the Archaic Age known as Lycurgus, who likely instituted the rigorous agōgē education and training regime, gerousia elder council and ban on coinage likely instituted by him.

In a series of wars during the misty eighth and seventh centuries BC, Sparta’s kings established total domination over the ‘Helots’ of Messenia. These conflicts, known as the Messenian Wars, established the fellow Greeks – Messenians as Helots – slaves to the fearsome Spartiates, charged with agriculture and providing for their martial masters. This freed the Spartans from needing to produce their own food, which allowed the Spartan male citizenry to focus exclusively on warfare, becoming Hellas’ fighting force par excellence. After securing most of the Peloponnese through conquest or treaty, Sparta's place in history immortalized in the second war

against Achaemenid Persian Empire, this time led by Xerxes, when Leonidas I sacrificed himself and his 300 at Thermopylae in 480 BC. Just a year later, Spartiate hoplites and their Greek allies crushed the Achaemenid field army at Plataea, sending its remnant fleeing back into Asia. It would here, at its highest moment, that the seeds of Sparta's long decline were planted. In 464, Plutarch reports that “the whole city of Sparta was destroyed” by a catastrophic series of earthquakes. Not only did this seismic strike cause death, destruction and dislocation on a massive scale, it also sparked a rebellion

among the oppressed Helots and non-citizen perioikoi of Laconia, known as the Third Messenian War. The rebels were eventually subdued with savage reprisals, but this revolt resulted in even more attrition among the Spartiates, a process known by Herodotus and modern historians as Oliganthropia. To illustrate, Sparta was only able to muster a feeble 1,500 citizen hoplites for its symbolically crucial campaign to assist Doris in 457. From these figures, expert Timothy Doran estimates that there were only 2,250 total Spartan hoplites during this time, a 75% decrease from a total of 8,000 just 30 years earlier in 480BC. The

kings were therefore forced to enlist perioikoi freemen and even Helot slaves during the subsequent Peloponnesian War. Although Sparta eventually gained victory in the war against Athens and established its short hegemony, the polis’ highly stratified society prevented any recovery of citizen hoplite manpower from occurring. If that wasn’t bad enough, Sparta’s severe imperial grip provoked constant unrest within the subjugated polities. By 371 therefore, Lacedemonian mastery over Greece was a fragile house of cards just waiting to be toppled. We will talk about Oliganthropia more, but as we mentioned the year 371, we need to make a short detour.

We have covered the Peloponnesian War in great detail in one of our previous videos. In the aftermath, Sparta was weakened in terms of population, but was the dominant power in Greece. This dominance was used to promote Spartan interests both in the poleis of the former enemies and even in the allied ones. The autonomous nature of Greek poleis and the conflicting geopolitical interests of regional powers like Corinth or former hegemons like Athens led to the first challenge against Spartan hegemony not long after the end of the Peloponnesian War; the intriguing affair that was called the Corinthian

War of 395 - 387 BC. According to Xenophon, cities like Athens and Corinth began to complain against what they saw as Sparta’s increasing militancy and intervention in Greek affairs. As early as the Sparta campaign against Ellis in 402 BC, and then King Agesilaus went on a campaign in Ionia in 398 BC. According to Shalom Perlman, both Thebes and Athens had anti-Spartan factions that were increasing in power; while the motivations of other cities like Argos had traditional rivalries with Sparta. Corinth may seem unusual given their support for Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, but they, too, had

become worried about Sparta over-reaching its hegemony ever since the end of the previous war. However, the immediate excuse for the war came from Persia. During the Spartan campaign, the Satrap Pharnabazus sent forth a man called Timocrates with funds in the four major players; Corinth, Athens, Thebes, and Argos. Gaining the favor of anti-Spartan politicians in all four, he succeeded in enticing the revolt, and the Corinthian War began. Agesilaus re-assembled his troops and began to organize for a return to Greece, to fight the war against the other Hellenic states. Thebes had chosen a dastardly way to incite

war; by having one of their allies, Locris, raid a Spartan ally, Phocis. Thus, they only had to pretend to be shocked when they were asked to help in this raid. As alliances between Thebes and the other anti-Spartan cities began to form, the Spartans who were in Greece organized their counter-insurgency campaign. General Lysander moved first with an army of Phocians and Orchomenians to Haliartus, and had planned to meet the other Spartan king, Pausanias, there with another army composed of allied troops. However, Pausanias was slow in his assembly of troops; thus the impatient Lysander moved on his

own and began to besiege Haliartus. Unbeknownst to him, the Thebans had set up their force nearby and waited until the Spartans began to try to storm the wall. When they saw Haliartus at risk, they dashed forward and routed the Spartans. The battle was fierce, but it ended in victory for the Thebans, as well as the death of Lysander. The death of their commander caused disarray and a hasty retreat on harsher terrain, with the Thebans chasing them. However, when they reached harsh terrain, the Thebans were pushed back by the Spartan allies, who then disbanded and left.

Pausanias arrived later and collected the bodies after negotiating a truce to fully withdraw from Boeotia. Upon his return to Sparta, he was tried for treason and ended up being exiled, leaving one major player in Spartan politics; Agesilaus. The revolt soon began to spread; Athens, Argos, Corinth, and other poleis across southern Hellas officially joined the anti-Spartan League in 395 BC. Skirmishes against pro-Spartan cities occurred throughout the year, as Agesilaus returned. The allies decided to meet and organize themselves in Corinth, an opportunity the Spartans could not miss. Thus, they assembled their 18,000 hoplite troops under the guardian

of the throne, Aristodemos, and marched towards Corinth. With great speed, they arrived at Corinth, forcing the indecisive allies to meet them out on the battlefield in the region of Nemea of Nemean Lion and Herakles fame, before they had managed to organize an order of command. The Spartans had 6,000 of their hoplites, as well as 12,000 allied troops, a small 600 cavalry force, 500 slingers from various allied states, and 300 Cretan Archers. The anti-Spartan allies had 24,000 infantry; 6,000 Athenians, 7,000 Argives, 5,000 Boeotians, 3,000 Corinthians and 3,000 Euboeans, as well as 600 Athenian, 800 Boeotians, 50

Locrian, and 100 Euboean cavalry. The Spartans placed themselves on the right flank, and their allies were put on the left, while the Athenians took their own left flank, and the Boeotians the right, with everyone else in the center. The Battle commenced with both sides moving forward, and all flanks slowly shifting rightward, a standard hoplite tactic to maximize defense using hoplite shields. The Spartans could not see their enemies move, as the terrain was rough and hilly, but when the phalanxes met, they easily managed to move onto, as well as encircle, the Athenian flank and crushed them

in the ensuing battle. They then turned towards the center, where their Thespian allies were fighting the troops from the city of Pellene. The other major allies were fighting Sparta’s Tegean allies, but soon, the Spartans moved toward the rest of the army. The anti-Spartan right flank managed to break through the Spartan-allied left, but were now facing Spartan hoplite tactical mastery. Slowly, but surely, the Argives, then the Corinthians, and then the Boeotians were crushed by the Spartans, and they ended up retreating. While Sparta lost 1,800 men, 2,800 anti-Spartan alliance troops had fallen in a resounding Spartan victory.

Aristodemos sought to capitalize on this by trying to enter Corinth and the march to central Greece, but he was unable to do so, and thus he returned home. Meanwhile, the war in Asia was still underway. While Agesilaus had returned to Greece via the Hellespont, the Spartan fleet commanded by Peisander was still on the western coasts of Asia Minor and was preparing to return via the southern port city of Cnidus. Pharnabazus decided to amass a navy to prevent this, or at the very least, cause mass casualties to the Spartan navy. Thus, he assembled triremes with Greek

mercenaries, Phoenicians, and Cypriots, totalling 95 triremes, and moved towards Cnidus. This navy was commanded by both Pharnabazus as well as a veteran we will remember from our Peloponnesian War series; the Athenian Conon, who had fled to Cyprus after his defeat at Aegospotamoi. We know little of this battle, but what we do know is that the mercenaries formed a vanguard that intercepted the Spartans and fought them for a while. The rest of the Persian fleet arrived and intercepted the Spartans. After a harsh battle, in which Peisander perished defending his ship, the Persians destroyed the Spartan navy,

capturing 50 triremes and destroying others. The few remnants fled the scene and sailed back to Sparta. Conon and Pharnabazus continued sailing north, securing submissions from most Ionian poleis, and sacking the ones that would not submit, like Tenedos. Persia regained control over Ionia through this large naval raid expedition, severing Spartan gains. Agesilaus was marching through northern and central Greece, trying to reach Sparta and take command of the war against Sparta’s enemies. The trek was long, but the real dangers did not begin until he reached Boeotia, where he entered enemy territory. Boeotian states, as well as Thebes

and Argos, had been licking their wounds from the Battle of Nemea and were eager to ensure a victory against the incoming Spartan king. Such a victory would have been both tactically and politically expedient, ensuring a major commander was defeated and hurting Spartan morale. This Battle, the Battle of Coronea, ended up taking place at the foot of Mount Helicon. Agesilaus commanded 15,000 troops, putting himself on the very right flank alongside the Spartans. Next to them were the remnants of Xenophon’s Ten Thousands, many of whom, as we saw in our members-only series, had joined Agesilaus at the

end of their adventure. Then came the Ionian Greeks, some Phocian allies, and then allies from Orchomenos on the left flank. Opposing them were 20,000 troops from Thebes, Argos, and Boeotia; Argos was on the left flank opposite Sparta, the Boeotians were at the center, and the Thebans were on the right opposing the Orchomenians. The two armies slowly moved across the hilly terrain towards each other, until the Thebans took the initiative and charged forward, shouting in their dialect. This did not shift the Spartan formation, which continued to march slowly until the remnants of the Ten Thousand and

Ionians felt they were close enough to move forward. They charged in the center flank and managed to rout the Boeotian forces, cutting through them with relative ease. The Argives, seeing the onslaught in the center, took the very calm decision to turn around, run like chickens towards Helicon and flee the battlefield. The Thebans, for their part, continued their charge and broke through the enemy flank, interrupting the Greek mercenaries who had thought the battle was over and were attempting to honor Agesilaus as their great commander. The Spartans and their allies scrambled once more and moved towards their

baggage train, already being raided by the Thebans. Agesilaus took his phalanx and charged towards the Thebans, managing to crush onto them and inflict heavy casualties, while also wounding himself in the process. The Thebans shifted to a retreat during the bloodbath and broke out of the fight, being chased by the Spartans until they reached Helicon and fled. In Xenophon’s very pro-Spartan account, Agesilaus is said to have saved some of his enemies who had fled into a nearby temple from the wrath of his troops, a sign of the magnanimity the Athenian saw in his favored royal. As

Agesilaus was returning to Sparta, the Persians were once again trying to pull a gambit by giving direct aid to Sparta’s enemies. They seized Melos and Kythera with their fleet, and used the newly captured supply lines to send aid to Corinth and Athens. In fact, Conon returned to his hometown favored by Athena, and, in a grandstanding move with Persian funds, convinced the Athenians to reconstruct their famous Long Walls. Persia also found new allies when a democratic coup was launched in Corinth, and the oligarchs were expelled to Sparta, from where they launched a counter-offensive and seized the

strategic port of Lechaeum, which was the most important one for Corinth. This enticed the Corinthian democrats to continue the war, while Athens began to raid some Aegean islands and re-establish colonies there. A Spartan embassy was sent to Persia to sort things out, but a counter-embassy from Athens and other allies arrived. The Satrap they had gone to, Tiribazus, was considering an alliance with Sparta to balance between the various Hellenic states, but after treachery by Conon, the peace conference ended unceremoniously and without results. Tiribazus’s replacement, Struthas, chose to remain anti-Spartan, and the war continued. Soon, the conflict

in Corinth and the standoff in Lechaeum began to boil over. Constant raids by the Oligarchs of Corinth and the Spartans caused the Democrats to fight back. Athens dispatched an expeditionary force to help the Corinthians, while Agesilaus began to move out of Sparta with an expeditionary force to join the Corinthian oligarchs in Lechaeum. Agesilaus left a part of his force there and then moved out to raid and capture various strategic locations. Athens and Corinth would take advantage of this, but in a rather hilarious manner. One of the allies of the Spartans, the Amyclaeans, had a custom

of going to their polis for a religious festival of Hyacintheia, named after Apollo’s lover-turned-hyacinth, Hyacinthus, no matter where they were. This is, in fact, why they were left at Lechaeum, so they could easily march home and back. The Spartan commander, whose name is unknown to us, allowed them to go and then dispatched a force of 600 infantry and an unknown size of infantry to escort them back home. This they did far away from the walls of the city, but then the infantry was split from the cavalry near Sicyon, with infantry going towards Lechaeum and the

cavalry escorting the Amyclaeans. As the infantry marched back, they walked too close to Corinth, and were detected by the Athenians who were in the city; Callias and Iphicrates, the former commanding infantry and the latter the peltasts. The two commanders had the hoplites march out and await to reinforce in the event of danger and then sent the peltasts out to fire projectiles at the Spartans. The ensuing rain of javelins caused heavy damage to the hoplites, who began to scramble to defend themselves. The Spartans sent some quick hoplites and chased after the Athenians, causing their retreat. This

proved to be a temporary arrangement, as the Spartans began to fall back after failing to reach them. The peltasts turned back and started to throw javelins once more. Spartans died and then retaliated with new troops, only to face heavier casualties from javelins. The cavalry from Sparta arrived during this time, and they were sent to protect the hoplites, but the peltasts managed to repel the attack once more, cornering them on a hill. The Athenians attacked once more, breaking the formation, with some Spartans falling into the ocean and being saved by boat. The result was a Spartan

defeat and 250 men dead, with an unknown casualty rate from the Athenian side. Agesilaus was forced to return to Lechaeum, and his raids across Corinth were to cease. Iphicrates raided the northern Peloponnese and eventually captured all of Agesilaus’s gains. The war continued as Argos managed to merge itself with Corinth after sending troops and seizing their acropolis. Agesilaus continued to raid Argive regional settlements during 391 - 390 BC, and eventually defeated and secured peace with the Acarnanians. On the naval front, they regained the Gulf of Corinth under their control and also sent naval garrisons to various

Aegean islands to secure their allegiance. Thrasybulus, one of their naval commanders, even went to the Hellespont and raided some islands to recapture them before dying of natural causes. Athens sent Iphicrates to raid from their own territories in Hellespont, and some skirmishes between him and Anaxibius, the new naval commander and veteran of Xenophon’s Ten Thousand, took place, but for which we know little about. Eventually, Iphicrates ambushed Anaxibius near Antandrus, killing him. The last battles of the war took place near Aegina, where the Athenians tried repeatedly and failed to capture Aegina, with Sparta conducting raids on Peiraeus

from there. Eventually, in 387 BC, peace was reached between Persia and Sparta. By then, Athens had begun to aid Persia’s upstart kings in Egypt and Cyprus, and Persia had decided to intervene to restore a balance of power in Hellas that would leave their own territories alone. Sparta agreed that all of Asia Minor and Cyprus were to be Persian, and then used Persian threats of invasion to coerce peace in the other city-states. Sparta agreed to the autonomy of all Greek states, but with them as enforcers of peace across all of Hellas. Thebes disbanded its Boeotian League,

and Argos surrendered Corinth to Sparta. It had been a Pyrrhic victory for Sparta, brought upon by Persian aid. Thus, it was a sign of things to come and of the dangers that lay ahead for the Lacedaemonians, as their own way of conduct with other city-states would cause much dissatisfaction. As we saw in the previous section, Sparta unceremoniously interfered in the affairs of the rest of the Greeks, overthrew democracy where it could, put its oligarch supporters in power, and stationed garrisons there. Thebes was one of the cities, whose democratic government was toppled by Sparta and replaced

by the oligarchs friendly to the Lacedemonians. In 379 BC, the supporters of democracy found refuge and help in Athens which was getting back on its feet after the heavy defeat in the Peloponnesian War. With the Athenian support, Theban democrats returned home, killed the oligarchs and expelled the Spartan garrison. This sequence of events led to the Boeotian War in 378 BC. Thebes was joined in this conflict by Athens and the Boeotian league, while the Spartans were supported by the cities of the Peloponnesian League. In 376 and 375 BC Athenians defeated the Spartan navy at Naxos and

then Alyzeia, dashing any Lacedemonian hopes to have a naval dominance in Greece. In the same year, talented Theban general amassed his infantry to defeat the considerably bigger Spartan army at Tegyra. By 371 BC all peace attempts failed and an army of Spartans and Peloponnesians under the command of the Spartan king Cleombrotus invaded Boeotia with the aim of subjugating it and restoring oligarchic rule in Thebes. Cleombrotus led an offensive along a mountainous road along the seashore and his attack surprised the enemy. The troops of the Boeotian League under the leadership of another talented general, Epaminondas, set

up a fortified camp on a hill near Leuktra. Soon Cleombrotus camped nearby, with a 2-kilometer-wide plain dividing two sides. The Spartans had ten thousand hoplites and a thousand horsemen, while the Theban-Boeotian army had six thousand infantry and 1500 cavalry. The Spartans not only had numerical superiority, but the core of their army consisted of Spartiates - full citizens of Sparta who received extremely high-quality military training. The Theban advantage was their more numerous and better trained cavalry and the brilliant commander Epaminondas. On August 5, Epaminondas decided to give battle and ordered the troops to form into formation.

Cleombrotus, in turn, commanded his army to get into formation. The Spartans lined up in the classic Greek phalanx of twelve ranks. The right, honorary wing was occupied by the Spartans themselves, led by Cleombrotus; the Peloponnesian allies lined up on the left wing. The cavalry took the place in front of the line. Thus, Cleombrotus expected to conduct a classic battle of the phalanxes, in which the stronger right wing of each of the phalanxes would defeat the weaker left, and then the victorious wings would fight each other. The numerical superiority and the training of the Spartans would

make the victory a foregone conclusion if all went according to the plan. However, Epaminondas was about to change the rules forever. On his right flank he placed a phalanx of only eight ranks, but on his left, opposite Cleombrotus and the Spartans, a column fifty shields deep was formed up - the “embalon”. It was buoyed by the elite unit of the Thebans - the “Sacred Band” – a unit of 150 gay male couples under the command of Epaminondas’s closest friend and comrade-in-arms - Pelopidas. Embalon was placed in front of the rest of the Theban battle formation

and was supposed to be the first to begin the battle. The Theban line was also covered by cavalry. Epaminondas's plan was simple, but completely innovative for the Greek world. “Embalon” was supposed to break into the Spartan phalanx, defeat the best part of the army led by the king, after which it would not be difficult to finish off the Spartan allies. The main risk of this tactic was the threat of the attack column being flanked by a wider Spartan phalanx. As this was the eve of the festival of Apollo – Gymnopaedia, which the Spartans loved to

celebrate, Cleombrotus was not eager mood to give battle on that day. Epaminondas, deciding to take advantage of this, ordered his army to move towards the camp, making it clear to the enemy that he did not intend to fight. The Spartans who saw this also began to leave their battle formations and went to their camp. At this moment, the Theban cavalry struck an unexpected blow and attacked their Spartan counterparts. Retreating, the Spartan horsemen confused the ranks of their phalanx, primarily the right flank. Still, the Theban cavalry was not going to attack the Spartan phalanx no matter

how disorganized it was, and the horsemen retreated to the left flank of their formation. Realizing that the battle is going to happen, the Spartan infantry turned towards the enemy trying to get into proper formation on the march. As the short cavalry battle still covered the plain with dust, the Spartans knew very little about enemy’s formation, so the plan was still the same – to use the numerical advantage to outflank the narrower Theban formation. So the Spartan right started to bend in order to envelop Epaminondas’ left. At that moment, the Theban shock column crashed into the

Spartan battle formation, as the ancients put it, “like a trireme with its ram.” The threat of encirclement of the Thebans was averted by the swift attack of the Sacred Band led by Pelopidas, who came face to face with King Cleombrotus and his squad, trying to strike the flank of the “embalon”. The Lacedaemonians alone took the blow of the Boeotians; the superiority in soldiers was entirely on the side of the Thebans, since the allies of Sparta had not yet entered the battle. In a fierce battle, Cleombrotus was mortally wounded and many Spartans fell defending the king.

A group of elite Spartans managed to push back the Thebans and take away their still-living leader. But, once broken, the integrity of the Spartan phalanx could no longer be restored, and the Thebans, turning to the right, launched a flank attack against the center of the enemy formation. Peloponnesians fled in disarray, stopping only in their camp and the battle was over. Sparta's losses amounted to more than a thousand people. As we can see from the short overview, the Spartan penchant to overextend and interfere in other city’s affairs, as well as the trust in the tactics of

the old on the battlefield led to a heavy defeat, ushering the Theban hegemony. Historians have debated this defeat’s cause for generations, but important among them is clearly Oliganthropia: the replacement of Spartan hoplites in the army with perioikoi and allies who, as Xenophon tells us ‘had little interest in the battle’ and ‘were not even unhappy at the outcome’. At Leuctra, Sparta suffered another 400 of its citizens, out of the 700 who fought in the battle, and 600 perioikoi dead, deteriorating the manpower situation even further. In the aftermath, Thebes invaded Spartan territory, liberating Messenia and its subjugated

Helot population, enclosing the once great military power even further by settling them and other vengeful Messenian exiles in a polis near Mount Ithone. Moreover, Epaminondas assisted the newly independent Arcadian League in building and settling the city of Megalopolis, with the specific purpose of acting as a permanent counterweight to Spartan influence there. Before we continue the narrative of how the Lacedemonians descended ‘from the status of a great Greek power to that of a second-rate provincial squabbler’, we must examine the particulars of ‘Oliganthropia’ in more detail. What exactly caused the replacement of regular citizen-hoplites with ineffective irregulars

in the Spartan army? Which cultural and traditional peculiarities rendered Sparta unable to withstand the heavy blow of Leuctra, when other poleis such as Athens were able to bounce back after similar disasters? A number of factors are presented by historians, but the most prominent is that of wealth polarisation and citizen demotion. Championed by Spartacist Stephen Hodkinson, this theory argues that men born as Spartan citizens were frequently demoted from the highest class in Spartan society due to crop failures or inheriting progressively smaller plots of land, or kleros throughout the generations. Unable to contribute produce enough to the

syssitia due to their insufficient agricultural base, these ‘Similars’ were removed from their prestigious social group. The second cause involves raw population decline - an increased mortality rate caused by warfare, disease and other factors combined with the inability of Spartans to replace their own numbers by birth. Linked to this cause is the next peculiarity that may have played a role - the inheritance laws: only women were allowed to inherit land, making the land requirements needed for citizenship even harder for the male population. Relative to most Greek city states such as Athens, Spartan women were high status

individuals, handling property, wealth, and possessing considerable freedom and power whilst their men were off training and fighting in war. Aristotle even called the men ‘women-ruled’. Much like it did in our modern society, female emancipation in ancient might have led to lower fertility rates in Spartan society. As Timothy Doran explains: ‘Just as restriction of women’s activities encourages them to spend time on reproduction and childcare, conversely their anesis distracts them from this pursuit so vital to the polis’ prosperity.’ Finally, there is so-called ‘Eugenic Exclusivity’ - the failure of the Spartan system to turn outsiders into citizens with

the aim of replenishing manpower. Roman emperor Claudius once pondered this question, concluding that Sparta’s failure to establish a long lasting empire akin to the one he ruled was due to their refusal to integrate foreigners as Rome had. Reasons for this particular elitism are many, but include a reluctance to share and dilute the privileges and status of being a capital S ‘Spartan’, and a quasi-ideological belief that only true Spartan blood could create a strong next generation. Husbands would sooner allow their wives to have children with other strong Spartan men than allow outsiders into the system. It

is likely that no single one of these factors alone resulted in oliganthropia, but some or all of them acting simultaneously. For example, increased citizen mortality caused by declining fortunes in warfare and natural disasters was unable to be made good due to low fertility rates and Spartiate demotion. Then, because of Sparta’s hesitance to admit outsiders into their system, any alternate method of replenishing citizen manpower was closed off... Having discussed the causes of oliganthropia, let us step back into the march of history. After Leuctra, new Theban hegemony set about enacting its Laconian containment policy with a newly

enfranchised wall of allied Arcadian cities. Then, at some point during 369, several hundred disaffected perioikoi revolted and occupied Sparta’s Issorium heights before being deceived into disbanding. The Eurypontid king of Sparta, Agesilaus II then executed the ringleaders, but was then forced to subdue another budding insurrection among Spartiates not long after. During the same year, the king sent out diplomatic feelers to his city's traditional enemy: Athens, seeking an anti Theban agreement. Largely due to their own anxiety concerning Thebes' meteoric rise, they accepted Agesilaus' proposal, further revolutionising the Greek political world. In 368, Agesilaus’ son Archidamus defeated the

Arcadians in the so-called ‘tearless battle’, named so because no Spartans were lost. The king meanwhile spent the years after Leuctra trying to replace the resource base that was Messenia and to get revenge against the Persian, who financed Thebes. To that end, Agesilaus travelled to Asia Minor in 366 and aided the rebel governors Ariobarzanes of Phrygia and Mausolus of Caria in their struggle against Achaemenid king Artaxerxes II. This two-year involvement in the ‘Revolt of the Satraps’ was a profitable endeavor, resulting in Agesilaus returning to Sparta in 364 laden with treasure. Unfortunately for the Thebans, a crack

appeared in the armour of its domination over Greece when the recently created Arcadian League splintered in two over a dispute. The Mantinea-led oligarchic half asked Athens and Sparta for aid, while the democratic segment headed by Tegea10 reached out to Thebes. This internecine squabbling made an upcoming war inevitable. Epaminondas and Agesilaus marched into Arcadia at the head of their respective armies, the former joining forces with its allies at Mantinea. The Lacedemonians set about ravaging the territory of their Tegean enemy, not realising the Theban host was close by. Rather than advancing on Agesilaus directly, the crafty Theban

general circled around and bore down on Sparta itself under cover of darkness, realising the city’s strength was with the king. As a result of this attack, Epaminondas came close to seizing the unwalled heart of his enemy’s polis without resistance. However, Agesilaus either realised Epaminondas’ bold plan by himself or from information given by an allied cavalryman. Whatever the case, the aging Eurypontid monarch sent a warning back to Sparta and then doubled back home himself. Although it is uncertain whether Agesilaus was able to reach Sparta in time or not, his alert meant that the city’s few defenders

- Prince Archidamus in particular, were able to hold Epaminondas back when he launched his assault at daybreak. Fierce fighting continued until the main Lacedemonian army arrived at sunset, upon which the Thebans disengaged and withdrew. Turning back north, Epaminondas marched swiftly in an attempt to surprise the Mantineans, leaving a small contingent of riders to keep the fires going and deceive the Spartans into believing he was still nearby. After covering a significant amount of ground overnight, the Theban force neared Mantinea and almost got inside, but at that moment a 6,000 strong Athenian army arrived to protect it5

Having not been rendered inert for long by the Theban trick, Agesilaus’ Spartan army arrived soon after and backed up their unlikely Athenian allies, together with the Mantineans, Eleians and several lesser contingents from smaller city-states. Overall, this army comprised just over 20,000 hoplites and 2,000 riders. Opposing them under Thebes’ great general were 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, some of whom were the notoriously capable Thessalian's cavalry and skirmishers. The rest of his army was drawn from the greater part of Arcadia, anti-Spartan Peloponnesians, Boeotians, Achaens and other assorted allies from across Greece. The Thebans and Arcadians on Epaminondas’

left faced Spartans and Mantineans directly opposite them, while their Athenian allies faced a force from the perennially anti-Spartan city of Argos. Achaens, Eleians and other weaker polis’ manned Agesilaus’ centre, opposed by the weaker components of Epaminondas’ force, among them Messenians, Locrians and Aenianians. Once both factions were prepared for a traditional Greek hoplite battle, Epaminondas upended the figurative apple cart by ordering his entire army pivot left. His battle line was now a long column, which set about marching away from the field in the direction of a nearby mountain chain. Nearing the foothills, the Theban-allied army appeared

as though it was encamping, thereby lulling the Spartans and their allies into a false sense of security. After subsequently ‘right-facing’ so that the army was in battle array again, Epaminondas redeployed several contingents from both his centre and right to the left, where he was stationed. As at Leuctra a decade before, the left wing was to be Thebes’ hammer to smash the Spartan shield. Desiring a trump card to play if required, Epaminondas also dispatched a small mixed force of Euboean and mercenary infantry to take a hill just behind the enemy position. With the army organised to

his liking, the Theban general ordered an advance on the now-unprepared foe who, on seeing the enemy army closing in on them, hastily set about ‘running to their posts, others forming into line, others bridling horses, and others putting on breastplates, while all were like men who were about to suffer, rather than to inflict harm.’ Refusing his weaker flank, Epaminondas led the Theban left’s hoplite and cavalry ‘on, like a trireme’ . Upon impact, it was apparent that both troops of riders were relatively even in strength, skill and equipment, both fighting each other to a standstill. However, cleverly

intermingled among the horsemen of Thebes were expert Thessalian javelineers and slingers, practiced in their martial craft since childhood. Beset by both their mounted counterparts and assorted missiles from hundreds of light Thessalian infantrymen, the beleaguered and exhausted Athenian cavalry manning Agesilaus’ wing began to flee. Although the victorious Theban horsemen made an attempt to turn in on the segment of phalanx closest to it, a group of mounted Eleians rushed into the breach and briefly managed to reverse the enemy’s progress with heavy casualties. Behind the lines and to their credit, the routed Athenian cavalry ceased their flight and

rallied together, seeking to do something useful. So, noticing the Boeotarch’s dangerous flanking contingent of Euboeans and mercenaries on the hill, the disgraced Athenian horse charged and slew them to a man. As this duel was taking place on the periphery, the strongest hoplite force of both armies - Epaminondas’ Boeotians and Agesilaus II’s Spartans, locked horns with one another on the Theban general’s forward flank. This melee between such elite troops immediately assumed a fierce nature - spears were shattered on shields and by missiles, terrible wounds were inflicted and men embarked on endeavors of great bravery in hopes

of tipping the scales. Despite the Lacedemonians’ diminishment due to oliganthropia and strategic isolation, the Spartan heavy infantrymen at Mantinea proved themselves equal to their Theban adversaries, with both sides grinding one another to a deadly standstill. Realising the clash rested on a knife edge, Epaminondas led his most capable soldiers and charged into the midst of the fighting. It is said that he threw a javelin upon joining battle which struck and wounded Agesilaus. The enemy commander’s intervention weighted the balance, prompting a relatively organised withdrawal of the Spartans from the field of battle. Unfortunately for them, the Theban

hoplites were far too close and continued to push on in the assault, killing many who were present in the enemy’s rear ranks. During the moment of his victory, Epaminondas advanced too far and became isolated. Noticing this, Agesilaus’ turned his army around in a last-gasp effort and attacked the enemy leader’s contingent, showering it with missiles. Although he managed to dodge a few of the incoming projectiles, a Spartiate known as Anticrates thrust a spear or sword into the Boeotarch’s chest, mortally wounding him. Despite this blow, Agesilaus was forced to retreat from the field along with the remainder

of his allied army, decisively defeated in the field by Thebes for the second time in a decade. As they withdrew back to Laconia, childless Epaminondas passed away with the words “No, by Zeus, on the contrary I leave behind two daughters, Leuctra and Mantinea, my victories.” This Homeric sentiment wasn’t enough to secure Thebes’ lofty status. Instead of serving as a final triumph which would secure the Boeotian polis’ domination of Greece for the foreseeable future, 362’s Battle of Mantinea instead dissolved its grip completely, producing a war-weary, multipolar Greece with no clear hegemon. After the battle of Mantinea,

there is a significant gap in the writings of Xenophon, our main source of primary information from this era. As such, the fate of Spartan King Agesilaus II immediately after his defeat is unknown. However, the monarch pops up again a short time later on the other side of the Mediterranean, engaged in mercenary work in Egypt against the Achaemenid Empire. During this sellsword tenure, he would pass away on the Libyan coast. He was succeeded by Prince Archidamus, who ascended onto the Eurypontid throne as Archidamus III. By this point, the oliganthropia-ridden body of Spartan citizens was no more

than 1,000 strong. Militarily weakened and thereby unable to assert Sparta’s will through traditional methods, Archidamus turned instead to diplomacy to resolve a prevalent issue. Sparta was currently facing steep fines from the shrine at Delphi, one of Hellas’ most prominent religious authorities, who just so happened to be politically influenced by Sparta’s enemy: Thebes. To get around these fines, the king secretly funneled 15 talents to the city of Phokis6. Using mercenaries hired with this treasure, the Phokians occupied Delphi in 356, beginning the Third Sacred War. This descent into conflict provided an opportunity for the Spartan king Archidamus

to campaign against his Peloponnesian rivals Megalopolis and Argos, with the ultimate aim of re-subjugating Messene. Possessing only a skeleton citizen force reliant on 3,000 pay-dependent mercenaries to back it up, Archidamus’ venture proved a failure, a symbol of how weak the famous fighters of Thermopylae now were. The Third Sacred War gave Sparta’s southern kings a bit of breathing room, but it also opened the gate for the new Argead King of Macedonia - Philip II, father of a certain Alexander, to intervene in Greek affairs. One of Philip II’s first decrees after he became the hegemon of Greece

after Chaeronea was to call on Sparta, whose enfeebled friendship he regarded as dispensable, to renounce its ancient claim to Messenia, something that Archidamus was not prepared to concede. Met by stony Lacedamonian silence, the Macedonian king provided money, mercenaries and a military alliance to Megalopolis and Argos. Thus, Sparta was nearly totally isolated politically, and Archidamus was forced to emulate his father, taking up mercenary service abroad in order to fill Spartan coffers. Fittingly, just as Agesilaus had two decades earlier, Archidamus died on campaign in 338 BC, leaving the Eurypontid throne to his eldest son Agis III. Though

disputed, It is said that on the very same day Agis became king, Macedon crushed a ‘last alliance’ of Greek city-states at Chaeronea, led by Athens and Thebes but not including Sparta. To win a propaganda victory after so unexpectedly becoming the hegemon of Greece, the one-eyed Philip invaded Laconia at the behest of his Hellenic allies in the Peloponnesus. Before entering Spartan territory, the Argead monarch dispatched a message to Agis’ recalcitrant polis, with a message that said, according to the famous Greek biographer Plutarch, ‘If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out” The government of Sparta is

said to have replied defiantly with just one legendary word: “If.” Undaunted by such Laconic bravado, Philip II nevertheless swept through Spartan territory7 virtually unopposed, stripping the vast majority of it away, but not taking the city itself. Agis was left with a tiny, roughly reverse U-shaped region comprising the Eurotas Valley, as well as the Taenarum and Malea Peninsulas. This increased isolation was compounded when Sparta refused to join Philip’s newly formed League of Corinth, again because it recognised Messenian autonomy. This state of affairs was just fine with the king, as he was able to use possible Spartan

resurgence and threat to keep the other Greek poleis on side while he prepared a grand plan to invade the Achaemenid Empire. At the zenith of his military and political power, Philip II was assassinated in Aegai during 336BC before his assault into Asia could begin. However, any hope that Greece’s many city-states had that the brief era of Macedonian unity was at an end quickly died, when Alexander the Great eliminated all of his dynastic rivals and secured the throne. When rumours spread that the king had died on campaign in Illyria, a great Theban-led revolt began among the

cities of Greece in which Sparta took very little part. Unfortunately for the descendants of Epaminondas, Alexander wasn’t dead. When the king returned, he crushed the revolt and utterly annihilated Thebes in 335. Sparta, although probably not too sad at the nightmarish fate of her old enemy, was nevertheless threatened by the brutal showcasing of Macedonian power. Thebes’ destruction also removed a buffer between the Macedonians and whatever actions Sparta took in the Peloponnese: particularly any attempted reconquest of Messenia. Agis III quietly began mustering allies and resources among friendly nearby cities and from further afield. When Alexander the Great

crossed the Hellespont and began his conquest of the Persian Empire8, Agis and Darius III found themselves with the common purpose of stopping Macedon in its tracks. To that end, the Spartans once again accepted the financial support of the ancient foe they had fought at Thermopylae. In 333 BC, following several rounds of negotiation, the Achaemenid Persians made Agis their proxy in Greece. With the help of the Great King’s gold aplenty, Agis III and his brother Agesilaus hired troops from Taenarum’s mercenary markets and conquered the strategically vital island of Crete during the campaigning season of 332. With

that done, the brothers returned to Sparta and spent the winter rallying whatever scant support they could. In spring of the following year, whilst the Macedonian general Antipater was tied up dealing with a rebellion in Thrace, Agis went on the march with just over 10,000 mercenaries, perioikoi and Spartiates, and with them massacred a Macedonian garrison in the Peloponnese9. This ‘victory’ engendered support among sympathetic local states such as Tegea, Elis and Mantinea, who swelled Agis’ force to somewhere between 20 and 30,000. Although Agis led this formidable force, his Spartans only comprised a small portion of it. After

subsequently besieging Megalopolis, Antipater moved down from the north with 40,000 soldiers, smashing Agis III’s army outside the walls and killing 5,300 of its troops as well as the king himself. It is said that when Alexander received reports of the battle at Megalopolis, dismissed it as a ‘battle of mice’. For Sparta though, it was an undeniable catastrophe. Its only active king11 lay dead on the field, along with hundreds more citizens. To make the situation even more critical, still more Spartiates of high rank were taken by Antipater as hostages. In essence, Sparta after 331 was more feeble

than it had ever been. The years following Megalopolis went by with little activity in the burned out Peloponnese, and not even the Hellas-wide Lamian War after Alexander’s death could rouse deflated Sparta to anti-Macedonian action for a second time. During the forthcoming diadochi wars, most of the major factions paid Sparta no attention. At some point in the mid-310s though, the polis built its first fortification in fear of punishment by Cassander: a recognition that agōgē-trained hoplites were no longer sufficient for the city's protection. By necessity, Lacedaemon began exchanging its 'traditionally exceptionalist political profile for one of Hellenistic

normality’. It was into this new world that a young Areus I succeeded Cleomenes II as Agiad king after the latter’s silent 60 year reign. Because the boy was still just a minor, his uncle Cleonymos contested the throne, but Sparta’s gerousia elder council ruled his claim illegitimate. As a consolation prize, Cleonymus was permitted to sail for Italy with 5,000 mercenaries to assist Taras in Magna Graecia. Four years later, Archidamus IV succeeded Eudamidas I as senior dynast, but not much is known about this particular Eurypontid king. He does appear peripherally as the adversary of Demetrius Poliocetes in

294. During that campaign, the maverick Antigonid managed to easily defeat Archidamus’ army, killing 700 men in the process before taking the city itself. After this disaster, the Eurypontid kings of Sparta were once more politically marginalized, allowing the maturing Areus to assert his authority. However, unfortunately for the energetic young king, he was soundly defeated by the rising Aetolian League in 281. Only dynastic chaos in Macedon and the invasion of Greece in 279BC by a large Gallic horde saved the Spartans from dire retribution. Four years later, Cleonymus returned and betrayed his country, joining with the hostile Epirot

king Pyrrhus in hopes that he would be installed on the Lacedamonian throne. Unfortunately for the would-be usurper, Pyrrhus was repelled outside of Sparta by Areus’ valiant son Acrotatus while the Agiad king was off in Crete. The reason behind the siege lay, according to Plutarch, when a Spartan prince serving under Pyrrhus called Cleonymus to be given the throne of Sparta in exchange for an alliance. Eager to achieve this, Pyrrhus assembled his troops and began to move into the Peloponnese. Spartan ambassadors tried to broker a peace as he was marching down in Megalopolis, but Pyrrhus tricked them

by saying that he was here to liberate the region from Macedon. Armed with 25,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 24 elephants, Pyrrhus moved to plunder the Spartan surroundings to the shock of Spartan citizens. They scrambled to build some defenses in the vacuum of personnel due to the campaign in Crete by Areus I. Pyrrhus set up camp outside Sparta and prepared himself for a siege, much to the dismay of Cleonymus who wished to immediately attack. In the meantime, elderly Spartans, both men and women, built trenches with wagons to counter the elephants. The defenders included 2,000 soldiers and

6,000-7,000 average citizens, both elders and women, and reinforcement messengers were sent to both Areus and to Antigonus in Macedon. Pyrrhus stormed forth with his soldiers, but was repelled by Spartan barrages. He then took his son Ptolemy, as well as some Gauls and Chaonians and dispatched them to find a way around the massive trench. Eventually, they managed to clear out some of the wagons holding the trench together and began to move towards the city. However, the young prince Acrotatus (who incidentally was married to Chilonis, Cleonymus’s ex-wife), took 300 men and moved out of the city, through

a path to the Epirote rear. The attack shocked the Gauls, who ran back to face Acrotatus. A fight began and eventually the Epirotes and Gauls were thrown into the trench. Thus, ended the first day of the siege, rather unsuccessfully for Pyrrhus. The day after, Pyrrhus mustered his troops and began another assault. They began to fill up the trench to move forward, as the Spartans, both men and women, began to throw projectiles at them. Eventually, the Spartans counter-attacked in order to break the Epirote attack. Pyrrhus, ever frustrated, took his horse and dashed over the trench that

was filled. This shocked the Spartans into moving back, but Pyrrhus’s horse was hit by a javelin. This causes chaos amongst his companions, which enabled the Spartans to do a counter-attack with projectiles. The companions and Pyrrhus were forced once more to retreat. The day after, Pyrrhus hoped to come to a negotiated settlement, but two surprises awaited him. One was Antigonus Gonatas, who had sent the mercenary chief Ameinias, with some mercenary troops under his command. The other was Areus I with 2000 men. The two forces relieved the Spartan civilians and provided fresh troops to fight against the

invading Epirotes. Pyrrhus rushed forth for one final onslaught, but with the new personnel, the Spartans managed to push him back. Disgruntled, Pyrrhus ordered a retreat. Pyrrhus would later die during a battle over Argos in 272 BC, and Cleonymus would disappear from the sources.12 Incidentally, this was also a pivotal year in Spartan history, an era of change in which Areus I continued Sparta’s ‘normalization’ into a Hellenistic-style monarchy. He pragmatically disregarded the Lycurgan ban and introduced a silver coin modelled on the image of Alexander the Great using the Athenian weight standard, engraved with Heracles’ image and the

text ‘BASILEOS AREOS’ - ‘Of King Areus’. Such coins were mainly used to pay mercenaries on which the Lacedamonians had become so dependent. Rather than merely an isolated change though, Areus’ domestic policy was in reality part of a larger political game to make Sparta appear a good candidate for alliances with the larger diadochi kingdoms. Specifically, he used this new, Hellenised Spartan style to solicit military and financial aid from Ptolemaic Egypt against their resurgent mutual geopolitical rivals, the Antigonids of Macedon. The needs of the warlike Hellenistic Age dictated that Areus’ kingdom could no longer maintain a threatening

foreign policy posture, which had so often alienated the Arcadians, Messenians, Athenians, and many others against it. So, between 272 and 268, and possibly long before, Areus entered into a diplomatic drive to redeem Sparta’s reputation among its previous enemies. The dividends of such an outward looking policy can be observed in the Athenian assembly’s 268BC ‘Chremonides Decree’. In it, Sparta’s role as Ptolemy II’s chief ally in Greece and the leader in a growing anti-Antigonid alliance is detailed. Not only did the Athenians join this defensive axis, but so did the Achaens, Eleans, Tegeans, Caphyans, Cretans, Phigaleans and others,

some of whom had been long standing foes of Sparta. Little of known of the details, but later that year the half-decade long ‘Chremonidean War’ began between these two opposing factions. Forces of Ptolemy II, Areus I and their allies had some success at first, winning minor victories on land and sea. However, during an attempt to break through an Antigonid garrison on the Acrocorinth in 265, Areus was killed in battle13. With the active monarch of their primary ally dead and his Peloponnesian and Cretan allies unable to cross the Isthmus, the Egyptian-backed coalition was defeated by Antigonus Gonatas

in 262. In the same year, despite Areus’ polito-cultural reforms or because they didn’t go far enough, his Agiad successor Acrotatus II was defeated by Megalopolis alone. He died later that year14. By the time of Sparta’s defeat in the Chremonidean War the Lacedamonians had changed considerably in contrast to their severe reputation in the age of the polis, a trend which classical authors blame on Areus and Acrotatus. The agōgē was in decline or had been entirely discontinued, while an influx of money from Ptolemy II increasingly attracted poets, playwrights and scholars to the city. The militaristic city of

Lycurgus and his successors started to change. And here we have a classic debate between the ancient and modern historians, the former complaining about Sparta becoming less militaristic due to the variety of cultural changes, and participation in entertainment both in the city and in the Greek world, while the latter rightfully claiming that the Spartans were never really isolated from other Greek cities and participated in almost every aspect of the Greek culture save for, maybe, the theatre, and the cities that had theatre likely left a grander legacy than Sparta of the old. In 244BC, Agis IV ascended

to the Eurypontid throne of Sparta15. As standard for a monarch of the age, Agis lived his childhood in luxury and grew into maturity among some of the wealthiest people in Spartan society, such as his grandmother and mother. However at some point prior to becoming king, Agis, apparently disgusted with the extravagance of Areus’ and his successor, turned his back on the path the city was traveling down, declaring publicly that he would rather not possess royal power at all if he couldn’t use that power to restore Sparta’s ‘ancient laws and discipline’. Very quickly, Agis IV discovered that,

while much of the older population was passively content with the status quo, Sparta’s young men energetically emulated his example and began living the harsh ‘Lycurgan’ life once again. First in Agis’ revolutionary crosshairs was the now centuries’ old Spartiate demographic crisis. Continuing the diminutive trend elucidated on earlier by Aristotle, Plutarch tell us that by 244, a pitiful total of 700 citizens remained. Moreover, inequality within the city had become so acute that only 100 of the most opulent of them actually owned any land at all. Although Agis IV sought to reform Spartan life, he preferred instead to

enact change in the traditional, constitutional manner. The king used his immense power and managed to install one of his strongest supporters - Lysander, as ephor in 243 BC. As one of Sparta’s magistrates and administrators, he would serve as Agis’ legislative sword for the next year. At his king’s order, Lysander proposed a bill or ‘rhētra’ aimed at reverting Areus’ Hellenised Sparta to the uniquely austere city-state it had been centuries earlier. To that end, the Agis-sponsored rhetra first decreed that all those who owed money would have their debt wiped. Furthermore, all land within Lacedamonian heartland would be

divided into 4,500 equal plots. These lots would be worked and owned by a renewed citizen body, enlarged by enlisted perioikoi, worthy foreigners - many of whom were probably mercenaries in Spartan service, and demoted Spartiates from previous generations known as ‘Inferiors’. Territory outside of this inner core would be further divided into 15,000 equal segments, to be bestowed upon perioikoi and foreigners who, although not deemed worthy of becoming citizens proper, were physically capable and could bear arms for Sparta in war. Both the 4,500 and 15,000 would be divided into collective military messes - ‘phiditia’ comprising 200 or

400 men each, which would form the base unit for a traditional Spartan life. When Agis IV’s ephor comrade put the king’s agenda forward however, the aristocratic and elderly Gerousia dithered, failing to reach a concrete decision, largely due to the influence of King Leonidas, the second in Sparta’s dual monarchy. In an attempt to rally additional support for his rejuvenating ideas, Agis IV publicly declared that a large portion of his own private estates would be freely contributed towards the redistributive effort. Not only that, the shrewd king also persuaded his mother and grandmother, who were among the wealthiest

individuals in Sparta, to donate their property as well. After a bitter back and forth between the two kings, Leonidas used his political connections in the Gerousia, clients and kinsmen to ensure Agis’ plans wouldn’t even see the light of day. Since it was this elders’ council which set the legislative agenda, Lysander’s defeat by just one vote meant that the reform bill wasn’t even put to the ecclesia. It had, like many other reforms in history been strangled in the cradle by the groups not willing to change. But tenacious Agis was far from defeated. As his return salvo,

Agis’ had Lysander invoke an ancient Spartan law which stated that it was a crime for any ‘descendant of Heracles’ to have children with a foreigner. Unfortunately for him, Leonidas II had done just that when serving as a mercenary at the Seleucid court in his younger years, taking a short-lived non-Greek wife in the process. Fearing for his life amid Agis’ rising tide, Leonidas fled to the sanctuary of a temple of Athena in Sparta, known as the Brazen House. With his opponent politically outmaneuvered and unable to act against the forces of reform, Lysander had the ex-Agiad’s son-in-law

Cleombrotus installed as a pliable royal ally. With Agis IV’s principal political rival out of the way and an obedient puppet installed in his stead, there was nothing stopping the Eurypontid Monarch from carrying out his rhetra reforms and bringing Sparta back unto its past glory. However, the road to reconquering that lost renown was long and shaky, and there were many places in which one could slip and fall on the way. Although Agis had gotten rid of most of his political rivals, his control of Sparta’s government was not yet fully secure. It had been a year since

Lysander, a key supporter of Agis, had been installed as ephor, one of Sparta most senior magistrates. However, after his term had expired and new ephors were elected in 242, it was obvious that they were sympathetic to the deposed Leonidas. When this conclave of ephors accused some of Agis’ supporters of violating the law, the king and his supporters responded by claiming that it was only the ephors role to arbitrate between two disputing kings. Agis, and his puppet-king Cleombrotus, however, were of one mind and so the ephors had no right to interfere. Agis then dismissed the ephors,

the first time such a thing had ever happened in Spartan history, and picked his own supporters as their replacements, including Agesilaus, the king’s maternal uncle. According to Plutarch, Leonidas then attempted to flee all the way to Tegea. En route though, the exiled king and his companions were attacked by some of Agesilaus’ henchmen, dispatched to kill the renegade king without Agis’ approval. Discovering what his ally had attempted, Agis sent his own trusted followers to see off Agesilaus’ thugs and protect Leonidas until he reached Tegea. He did not, however, decisively deal with Agesilaus. This moment of mercy

towards a dangerous political rival and an unruly subordinate illustrates a level of optimistic idealism and possible naivety present within the youthful Agis; it was to prove a mistake that would cost him dearly. As the rhetra was about to be put into action wholesale, Agesilaus once again intervened, warning his young monarch that if both the abolition of debts and land redistribution was undertaken simultaneously, the shock would cause considerable unrest. It would be far better, he argued, to win over the most powerful landowners by a cancellation of their debts first so that they would then be more

amenable to the partition of their lands. It is likely not a coincidence that Agesialus himself was among this group. Despite his uncle’s duplicitous actions, both Agis and Lysander saw wisdom in Agesilaus’ proposal. So, one day during late 242BC, all debt, mortgage or lending records were brought into the Spartan agora, gathered together in a large heap and then set alight. According to Plutarch, while the lenders of money went away sadly, Agesilaus mockingly declared that his eyes ‘had never seen a brighter or purer flame than that.’ With the first stage of Agis’ reforms completed, the Spartan masses

now clamoured for their king’s promised land redistribution. However, the landholding Agesilaus delayed progress at every opportunity making excuses or coming up with some convoluted reason as to why it couldn’t be done. Whether he knew it or not at the time, Agis had been outplayed. Agesilaus and the wealthy landowners had got their benefit from the reforms and, now that they had, they had no interest in fulfilling Agis’ other ambitions. Agis’ position grew even more precarious when he was sent by the ephors to answer a call for aid from Sparta’s ally, the Achaean League against the Aetolians.

Agis marched out to war with a force of young, and mainly poor hoplites. Due to their love of Agis, his down to earth nature and their investment in the success of his new Spartan state, the hoplites marched through the Peloponnese with ironclad discipline, winning the admiration and respect of the other Greeks as they went. Upon their arrival at the Isthmus of Corinth, they took counsel with the strategos of the Achaean League, Aratus, who recommended that they fight a decisive battle at the Peloponnesian bottleneck. Agis agreed. However, for whatever reason, Aratus decided not to fight a

battle at all, dismissing his Spartan allies and sending them home before contact with the Aetolians was even made. Though the reasoning behind Aratus’ decision is now [not?] known, it seems a likely possibility that he was in collusion with Agis’ enemies in Sparta and had deliberately undermined his position. The Achaean League, which was led by powerful landowners, may also have been cautious of Agis’ ideas spreading to their own polities. Whatever the reason, this Achaean snub was both a major blow to Agis’ military prestige and his status. Meanwhile, back home, the situation had grown critical in Agis’

absence, largely thanks to Agesilaus. His rampant delaying of Agis’ reforms and maladministration ultimately cost Agis his political base in the city and, as a result, the opponents of the reforms were able to recall the deposed Leonidas II and restored him to the throne. When the militarily discredited Agis returned to Sparta at the head of a humiliated army, in 241, he found the city and its government turned against him as well. Thus, Agis was forced to flee to sanctuary in the same temple Leonidas had sought refuge in just a few years earlier. He was eventually betrayed

by his friends and thrown into prison by Leonidas’ faction. There, he was given a kangaroo court trial and quickly executed before a popular rising could occur, leaving his new-born son as his heir. Agis had been an idealist, but ultimately proved to be too easily manipulated by figures like Agesilaus and, arguably, not ruthless enough to force the change he wanted. His dream of a reformed Sparta, however, did not die with him and was carried on by an unlikely candidate, Cleomenes the son of Leonidas II. Unlike his conservative father, the highly educated Cleomenes possessed many of Agis’

admirable traits, including magnanimity, ambition, self-restraint and a love of the simple life, however, according to Plutarch, he was also possessed of a mean temper at times. After the death of Agis, Cleomenes had been married to his widow, Agiatis. Despite her bitter hatred for Leonidas for killing her late husband, Agiatis did not carry those feelings to her blameless young new husband. During the extensive amounts of time that the two spent together, Cleomenes frequently asked his new wife about Agis’ memory, personality and, most crucially, his plans for Sparta. The young prince listened to her eagerly, eventually coming

to the conclusion that Agis was correct after all. Sparta and its people needed to change, and it must be forced in that direction if necessary. When Leonidas II finally passed away in 235BC, his son came to the throne as Cleomenes III. Alongside Agiatis, Cleomenes also took a male lover, Xenares, whom he also regularly asked about the late King Agis. What reforms had Agis wished to institute? How did those actions lead to his death? When Xenares realised that Cleomenes wasn’t just curious about Agis’ policies, but wanted to emulate him, the older man scolded him and cut

off their relationship. Cleomenes, however, was now firmly set on taking up the standard of Agis IV and shaking up the existing order by whatever means necessary. In 229BC, in order to drum up more political support for himself, Cleomenes first set out on a number of military operations against the Achaean League. Under the leadership of Aratus, they had continued to expand, holding much of the Peloponnese and even threatening cities on the borders of Sparta. Either through subterfuge or diplomacy, however, Cleomenes was able to quickly qin over a number of the important Arcadian cities of Tegea, Mantinea,

Caphyae and Orchomenus, beginning the so-called ‘Cleomenean War’. Later that year, Cleomenes marched to Belbina, one of the paths into Laconia from the north, and began fortifying it against future Achaean attacks. Rather than attack the fortified Spartan position, Aratus instead led his men out one night and attempted to storm Tegea and Orchomenus, hoping to take them by surprise. Unfortunately for him, the pro-Achaean parties inside those cities failed to open the gates, and he withdrew believing his attempt had gone unnoticed by Agis [agis = cleomenes in this paragraph?]. The Spartan king had, however, discovered the bungled manoeuvre,

and wrote a letter asking Aratus what his objectives were. Aratus tried to cover by replying that he was simply aiming to stop Agis fortifying Belbina. Cleomenes innocently feigning to believe the story, replied: “then write and tell me why you brought along those torches and ladders”. Upon receiving this barb, Aratus is said to have burst out laughing. Surprised, he asked a Spartan exile in his court who exactly this stripeling king was, receiving the foreboding reply “If you have designs upon the Lacedamonians, see that you act quickly, before that young rooster grows his spurs.” After the Athenaeum

fortress at Belbina was completed, Cleomenes took 3,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry to ravage Arcadian territory. He was successfully able to seize a number of important points, such as Methydrium and Argolis, eventually provoking the Achaean League to dispatch a force of 20,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry under the command of a new strategos, Aristomachus, with Aratus advising. Cleomenes came across this significantly larger force near Pallantium and eagerly drew his men up for battle. Aratus, however, was cautious of the Spartan’s boldness and aggressiveness, advising Aristomachus to not risk the army and to retreat. They did so, followed by

much jeering from the Spartan lines. Having won this bloodless victory, Cleomenes spoke to his victorious men, proclaiming that “The Lacedamonians do not ask not how many, but where their enemies are.” In 228, Aratus was reelected as strategos of the Achaean League and immediately embarked on a campaign against Sparta’s ally, Elis, to which the Eleians responded by requesting Cleomenes’ aid. The Spartans marched quickly to their ally, and Cleomenes was able to score a decisive victory over Aratus near Mount Lycaeum as it withdrew from the area, sending it into flight and slaying many of its warriors. Rumours

even spread that the venerable Achaean commander had been killed in the fighting, but the cunning general had survived and, after rallying his army, he made a forced march to the Spartan-aligned Mantinea taking the city. This military reversal began to shake the Spartan’s commitment to the war effort and his popularity at home. Meanwhille, in Sparta, Agis IV’s son and successor, the young Eudamidas III, died suddenly, most likely poisoned. Cleomenes III was therefore forced to return home and recalled Agis’ brother, Archidamus, the now legitimate Eurypontid heir. Shortly after Archidamus’ coronation, however, he too was assassinated. In both

situations, modern historians tend to favour Plutach’s claim that the ephors were behind the murders, however, there are other sources which name Cleomenes himself as being of the conspirators. In either case, an Agiad from the same dynasty as Cleomenes, was installed on the throne instead. With faith in the war-effort shaken and the chaotic succession of his co-monarch, Cleomenes was eager to shore up his position politically and regain his popularity. As a result, he bribed the ephors lavishly to send him on another campaign, while his revered mother Cratesicleia, increased his support among the oligarchs in Sparta, even

going so far as to marry one of the most most influential men. In 227, with the ephors blessing, Cleomenes III led the Spartan army out and occupied Leuctra, where 150 years earlier Sparta’s weakness was first laid bare. The strategos Aratus marched to meet him outside the city, and the two forces arrayed for battle and charged. In the initial hoplite clash, the numerically inferior Spartans were bested by the Achaeans, Cleomenes withdrawing his army across a deep ravine. Aratus, not wanting his men to be caught in this position, ordered them to stop the pursuit. His cavalry commander,

Lydidas, ignored these orders however, and charged after the Spartan forces. Seeing that the cavalry was now stuck in the broken terrain, Cleomenes rallied his men and sent his skirmishers to attack the cavalry, quickly wiping them out and killing Lydiadas. Buoyed this success, Spartan forces followed up their attack with another charge at Aratus’ army, successfully managing to rout and break them. The defeat of Aratus at Leuctra finally gave Cleomenes an unmissable opportunity to begin carrying out Agis’ belated reforms. Under the cover of a follow up campaign against Achaea, the king mustered a small army consisting of

hired mercenaries and, most importantly, many of his political enemies in Sparta. Probably late in 227, Cleomenes once again took to the field with his forces and undertook a purposefully exhausting campaign. Two of the League’s cities - Heraea and Alsaea, were invested and taken relatively quickly, after which Cleomenes marched at double speed towards his besieged ally Orchomenus, resupplying it and tiring out his troops in the process. From there Cleomenes’ Spartan army patrolled the vicinity of Mantinea, ostensibly to defer or detect any Achaean attacks there. In reality, however, this constant movement utterly wore out the field force’s

citizen contingent, who were left to rest in Arcadia at their own request. Cleomenes now put his plan into action. Leaving the majority of his opponents in Arcadia, Cleomenes returned to Sparta with his mercenaries. Once they neared the city, Cleomenes dispatched several of his closest companions and a mercenary escort to deliver their monarch’s report to the ephors, who came together at their traditional five-seated mess table to listen. Then, as the speech was being made, the mercenaries descended on the anti-reform ephors and killing four out of five, the survivor fleeing to a nearby temple for sanctuary, as

well as a dozen other men who came to help the ephors. Cleomenes, it seems, had learnt from Agis IV’s mistake and would be as ruthless as he felt he needed to be. The morning after this politically inspired massacre, Sparta’s revolutionary Agiad king entered the city and immediately published a list of 80 surviving political enemies among the Spartiates who were to be exiled. Then, moving on the ephors’ dwelling, Cleomenes symbolically removed four of the five ephoral chairs and sat down in the one that remained. The message was clear: Sparta’s old system that had survived uninterrupted for

centuries, was dead. Proceeding thereafter to the agora - Sparta’s primary place of assembly, Cleomenes summoned the population and began justifying his brutal coup and just why it was necessary. Invoking Lycurgus, the king argued that the ephors had been initially intended as mere assistants to the kings, and that they had gradually accumulated more and more power for themselves. This, he argued, had been acceptable at the time, because the ephors had, quote “remained within their bounds”. Cleomenes then proceeded to blame the ephors for the deterioration of Sparta, as well as the banishment and execution of certain kings.

Conveniently, Cleomenes failed to mention that the ephors had been intended as a check on the kings power, were the only position of significant power that any Spartan citizen could aspire to, and that they had always had the right to put their kings on trial. Though Cleomenes was quick to try and justify his actions, the simple fact is that, for good or bad, he purged a democratic institution because it was an obstruction. Emulating his dead idol Agis in leading by example, Cleomenes then declared before of the Spartiates that he would be the very first to divide

his estates and donate them to the common pool, quickly followed by his wealthy father in law, friends and then the rest of the citizens, who went along with the flow of events whether they wanted to or not. It seems that despite Cleomenes’ ruthlessness, he was willing to forgive and forget in order to achieve a lasting settlement. Rather than persecuting his enemies, the king reserved a portion of the pooled land for each man he had exiled, vowing to allow them back into Sparta once his ambitions had been achieved. With his land reform fully underway, Cleomenes began

filling up the citizen ranks to 4,000 with so-called ‘inferiors’ (men who had lost their citizen status) and provincial perioikoi. However, rather than equipping them in the traditional hoplite panoply, Cleomenes instead armed and drilled his men in the Macedonian style, equipping them with the longer sarissa pike and smaller shield. The first action Cleomenes’ new Spartan army undertook was a relief mission to Mantinea, whose Achaean-garrisoned citizens had reached out for aid in early 226BC. Making their way to the occupied city at night, the newly-equipped Spartan phalangites easily took the city, expelled its garrison and restored its independence.

Not long after, Cleomenes cut a swathe through Arcadia towards Pherae, intending to draw the Achaeans into a pitched battle or force Aratus to lose face by withdrawing once again. Eventually, Cleomenes was met by the Achaean army near Dyme. The resulting battle is not described in detail in the sources, but Cleomenes and his reformed army are reported to have won decisively, killing and capturing many of the Achaeans. Cleomenes followed up his victory by offering moderate terms of surrender to the Achaeans which they were willing to accept. Before the peace could be finalised, however, Cleomenes fell badly

ill from drinking fouled water and was forced to return to Sparta. Aiming to seize on the moment, Aratus turned to an old enemy, Antigonus III of Macedonia, imploring him to intervene against Cleomenes. By the time that Cleomenes was well enough to hold peace talks with the Achaeans, Aratus’ deal with Antigonus had been confirmed. Though there were some amongst the Achaeans who did not want the Macedonian intervention and were happy to agree to Cleomenes’ terms, Aratus’ actively sabotaged the peace talks, ensuring that the war continued unabated. Aratus had made a dangerous play. His decision to align

with the Macedonians did give him a very powerful military ally, but it also cost him dearly in terms of popularity. Many cities within the Achaean League were in favour of accepting Cleomenes’ terms and instituting similar reforms, rather than throwing their lot in with the expansionist power of Macedonia. Cleomenes himself, who was not particularly interested in instituting reforms in other cities, saw that despite the danger of Macedonian involvement, there was also a chance to take advantage of the chaos in the Achaean League and crush them before their larger ally could intervene. Cleomenes war against the Achaean

League had, so far, been remarkably successful. Much of Arcadia had been brought into the Spartan camp, as had Sparta’s long-term nemesis, Argos, and Cleomenes was even able to besiege the home-city of Aratus, Sicyon. These victories had bolstered Cleomenes’ reputation and position as well as shaking the Achaean League to its core. This same success, however, had also pushed Aratus to take the drastic step of appealing to Antigonus Doson to intervene, conceding the strategically vital Acrocorinth to him to secure the alliance in 224BC. As a result of this, Antigonus’ geopolitical rival, Ptolemy III, who had already been

funding Cleomenes’ war behind the scenes, doubled down on his position hoping to establish Sparta as a counterweight to Macedonia in Southern Greece. With Antigonus moving south from Euboea with a force of roughly 20,000, Cleomenes was forced to abandon his siege of Sicyon and draw up a defensive line around the Acrocorinth. From this strong defensive position, Cleomenes was able to repulse a number of Macedonian assaults inflicting such substantial casualties that Antigonus considered abandoning the assault and relocating. Fortunately for him,, however, an opportunity soon arose. Many cities in the Peloponnese had sided with Cleomenes in part because

they thought that he would institute similar reforms that he had in Sparta, especially the abolition of debts. Cleomenes had never had such idealistic motives, however, a fact that was becoming more and more apparent with time. Frustrated with this lack of action, Argos revolted, siding with the Achaean League once again. Cleomenes quickly sent his father-in-law, Megistonous, with 2,000 men to regain the city, but they were quickly defeated with Megistonous dying in the battle. The loss of Argos meant not only that Cleomenes’ rear was threatened, but also opened the possibility for the Achaean League to use it

as a spring-board for an invasion of Sparta itself. With no other option available, Cleomenes was forced to abandon his position, effectively conceding Corinth to Antigonus. Capitalising on this success, Antigonus proclaimed the creation of an anti-Spartan Hellenic League in the autumn of 224, consisting of the Macedonians, Achaeans, Thessalians, Boeotians and Epirotes. The Macedonian army was well-trained and well-disciplined and, without the advantage of a strong defensive position, Cleomenes was not confident that his new army could fight such a force. He was forced to give more and more ground, Antigonus seizing much of Arcadia in the following months.

The situation may well have grown even worse for Cleomenes when Antiognus conceded land in Asia Minor to Ptolemy III in return for the latter halting all funds to the Spartans[1]. Many of Cleomenes’ hard-won conquests were disappearing in front of his eyes over the course of just a few months. The following year saw Antigonus keeping the pressure on Cleomenes. Tegea was besieged and fell quickly thanks to Macedonian siege expertise, Mantinea, Orchomenus and other strategic cities following suit and being garrisoned by the Macedonians, penning Cleomenes in Laconia. Satisifed with these gains, Antigonus prepared to winter in Aegium

with his mercenaries while sending most of his Macedonians home until the following campaign season. Lack of funds combined with these losses pushed Cleomenes into a desperate situation. Unable to supplement his forces with mercenaries and in dire need of fighting men, he took the extraordinary step of offering Helots the opportunity to buy their freedom and join the army. While this was certainly not the first time that Sparta had resorted to arming this serf-class, it was a measure saved for the most dire of circumstances. The exact number of Helots that were able to take Cleomenes up on

his offer is debated. Plutarch claims that 6,000 bought their freedom, 2,000 of whom were brought into Cleomenes’ army, while other sources suggesting substantially more. Modern historians, such as Paul Cartledge, tend to favour Plutarch’s numbers, noting that Cleomenes would likely not have been able to risk the social upheaval that would have resulted if too many helots were incorporated into the army. With his forces replenished and seeing that Antigonus had sent many of his men home for the winter, Cleomenes attempted a last, bold, play. Taking advantage of the fact that Antigonus was now too far away and

too few in number to stop him in time, Cleomenes feinted as though he was about to plunder Argive territories, but unexpectedly pivoted and descended upon Megalopolis. The city was lightly defended and, with the help of men inside the city, Cleomenes was able to sweep in during the night. The Megalopians, caught by surprise, were nevertheless able to rally together a determined force to fight the Spartans, but it was too little, too late and the city quickly fell to Cleomenes. The city was offered the opportunity to side with Cleomenes, but refused, staying loyal to the Achaeans and

Macedonians. The resulting sack of the city that followed was brutal and was, in Polybius’ words, ‘so savage and ruthless a manner as to preclude the least hope that it might ever be restored’. The sack shocked the Achaean League and Antigonus quickly sent orders to recall the men he had sent home for the winter. This process of regathering the army would take time, however, and in the meantime, the Macedonian king could do little but garrison himself in Argos and wait for his forces to consolidate. Cleomenes, in turn, capitalised on this, ravaging the Argive territory in early

222 and hoping to stir up a revolt against the Macedonians. This did find some minor success, with the Argives imploring Antigonus to do something, but Antigonus was a shrewd commander: he knew that if he could weather the storm, it was only a matter of time before he would be able to go on the offensive once again. The sack of Megalopolis and the campaign against the Argives had been Cleomenes’ last chance to force his enemy on the back foot. Whether through loyalty to Antigonus or sheer dislike of Cleomenes, however, the Achaean-Macedonian alliance held strong and, by

the summer of 222, the Macedonian army had reconstituted itself. From this point, Cleomenes’ fate was sealed, his army being both outnumbered and outmatched. According to Polybius, Antigonus’ army numbered just over 29,000 including 10,000 Macedonian phalangites, 3,000 peltasts, 11,600 from, Illyria, Achaea and other Hellenic allies, 3,000 mercenaries and 1,200 cavalry. In the face of this, Cleomenes had been able to muster a force of roughly 20,000 consisting of Spartans, peroikoi, allies, mercenaries, helots and roughly 600 cavalry. The Macedonian force crossed into Laconia and Cleomenes prepared his forces for a last stand. Barricading many of the Laconian passes,

he gathered his army at Sellasia and prepared for battle. Cleomenes had chosen a strong defensive position consisting of two hills, Euas and Olympus, with a river running between the two. Cleomenes fortified the hills with trenches and palisades and placed his brother Eucleidas, on Euas with the perioikoi, helots and allies, while he took up a position on Olympus with the Spartans and the majority of his mercenaries, the remaining mercenaries and cavalry taking up positions in the low ground beside the river. When Antigonus arrived at the battlefield, he immediately saw how well prepared Cleomenes was and advanced

with caution. He encamped his force behind the river and spent the next few days scouting the area and probing Cleomenes’ defences, searching for weaknesses and seeing how he would respond. It soon became apparent, however, that Cleomenes would not be dislodged from the position; Antigonus would need to confront him head on. Antigonus drew his army up for battle. Opposite Euas, Antigonus stationed the Illyrians and a portion of his phalangites in alternative lines, with Achaeans and other Greek allies behind. In the centre, opposite Cleomenes’ cavalry, Antigonus placed his own horse alongside a further 2,000 allied infantry. Lastly,

he placed himself with his mercenaries and the bulk of his phalangites opposite Cleomenes on Olympus. Antigonus opened the battle with the Illyrians and part of the Achaeans charging Euas. These men seemed to have advanced so quickly, however, that they became too separated from the Macedonian phalangites on their wing, leaving them vulnerable. Seizing this opportunity, Cleomenes’ mercenaries in the centre attacked the exposed rear of Antigonus’ men, pinning them between the Eucleidas’ men at the top, and the mercenaries at the bottom. It seemed as if Antigonus assault was doomed to failure, but a young Megalopian cavalry officer,

Philopoemen, disregarded his orders, gathered what men he could, and charged the Spartan cavalry opposite. Though unable to break their lines, Philopoemen’s attack was enough to divert the Spartan mercenaries away from Euas, allowing the Macedonians on that flank to catch up to their allies. In the face of these fresh troops and sheer weight of numbers, Eucleidas’ men were forced to give ground, eventually being pushed from the summit of the hill. Meanwhile, on the Olympus flank, the fighting was particularly bitter. The mercenary forces of each side clashed first before the battle devolved into a bloody struggle of

the Spartan phalanx against the Macedonian one. The Spartan left collapsed, followed shortly by the centre, and Cleomenes ordered a last desperate push against the Macedonian phalanx, likely hoping to cut down Antigonus himself. The Macedonian line held, however, and Antigonus was able to condense his phalanx, double the ranks, and make a final push that broke the Spartan line. At this point, according to Polybius, the majority of the Spartan army broke, with many being cut down in the rout. The exact losses on both sides are not known. Plutarch reports that only 200 of the 6,000 Spartans survived

the battle, with the majority of the rest of Cleomenes’ forces being cut down. Plutarch is not, however, renowned for giving the most accurate numbers and so these should be taken with a pinch of salt. What can be said with certainty is that Cleomenes was decisively defeated, taking heavy casualties, including the loss of his brother Eucleidas, but that he himself escaped the battle. Cleomenes ran to Gythium, and from there sailed in exile and defeat to the safety of Ptolemy III in Alexandria. With nothing to protect it, Sparta itself was easily taken by Antigonus, the first known

time in history that Sparta had been occupied by a foreign power. Antigonus spared the city, ordering it not to be sacked, and settled for reinstating the ephors, reversing a number of Cleomenes’ reforms, and installing a Theban governor instead of Sparta’s kings. In Egypt, the Ptolemies kept Cleomenes away from politics, and he was eventually put under effective house arrest by Ptolemy IV. In 219, three years after arriving in the city, Cleomenes, according to Plutarch, gathered 13 companions, armed themselves, and tried to instigate a revolt against the new Ptolemaic king. According to Plutarch, Cleomenes was hoping to

die an honourable death. The result was that Cleomenes and his friends roamed the streets of Alexandria, waving swords and scaring the locals, before giving up and killing themselves in the street. If Plutarch’s account is true, it seems rather pitiful and pathetic, rather than honourable, end for the exiled Spartan king. Cleomenes had been a bold and decisive king who seems to have made a genuine attempt at extending the life of Sparta. For a brief moment in history, he seemed to have been able to restore Sparta to a shadow of its past glory, and has been described

as “the last truly great man of Sparta”. At the same time though, it must be recognised that to do this, he destroyed the centuries long government of Sparta, abolishing any semblance of democratic institutions and ultimately making himself an autocrat. Therefore, while it may be reasonable to praise him for the reforms he made, it is worth considering whether he was motivated by an honest desire to better his countrymen, or simply wanted to create a more powerful state for his own ends. The death of Cleomenes resulted in a royal coup in Sparta with the diarchy being restored

with the underaged Agesipolis III on the Agiad throne and Lycurgus on the Eurypontid[2]. While the Social War raged across Greece, Lycurgus tried to take advantage of the situation by retaking a number of towns around Argolis and Messenia. There would be no repeat of Cleomenes’ successes however, the new Macedonian king, Philip V, marching quickly to the Peloponnese to beat back and humiliate the Spartans. Lycurgus was able to survive these defeats, and unrest within Sparta itself, ousting the still young Agesipolis and making himself the sole ruler of Sparta. Little is known about the rest of Lycugus’ reign,

save that he died sometime around 210 and passed the throne to his son Pelops, though the true ruler of Sparta appears to have been a so-called tyrant, Machanidas. Under his command, Sparta once again tried to expand in the Peloponnese, even threatening Argos once more. At Mantinea in 207, they were crushed once again however, this time by an Achaean army led by none other than Philopoemon, the hero of Sellasia. The result was 4,000 dead on the Spartan side, including Machanidas himself, killed by Philopoemon personally. The defeat at Mantinea was something of a rude awakening for Sparta.

Time and time again, she had attempted to establish herself as a major player in the Greek world, and time and again it had resulted in defeat and disaster. It was in this climate that a man called Nabis probably, though not definitely, a member of the Eurypontid line, came to power. Under his rule, Sparta once again saw a series of reforms. A large number of Sparta’s remaining helots and other slaves were emancipated to enlarge the citizen body while resident mercenaries and additional perioikoi were also enfranchised. Nabis also encouraged trade and commercial interconnection with other polities, constructing

a navy to safeguard the seas, granted gifts and boons to religious sanctuaries, all the while improving the city’s infrastructure, including walls and water supply. Overall, it was as Cartledge describes it, a period of modernisation, that moved Sparta closer to other contemporary Hellenistic states. Nabis continued Sparta’s now long-held policy of being anti-Achaean and anti-Macedonian, which in turn brought him into an alliance with Rome, currently embroiled in the Second Punic War against Carthage and Macedonia. By 204, with his domestic situation secure and military bolstered, Nabis once again tried to push beyond Laconia’s borders in a series of

border wars with the Achaean League but, once again, was ultimately beaten back after a decsive defeat by the formidable Philopoemon near Tegea in 200. Despite this set back, the start of Second Macedonian War presented Nabis with a golden opportunity. The Achaean League, previously an ally of Macedonia, defected to the Romans, but Argos refused to follow suit, seceded from the League, and joined Philip. To try and assure Argive autonomy from the Achaeans, Philip then granted sovereignty over Argos to Nabis in 197, securing the deal with a marriage alliance. Unfortunately for the Macedonian king, Nabis, with Machiavellian

ruthlessness, went over to the winning Roman side almost immediately after receiving Philip’s gift. The Roman commander in Greece and, soon-to-be-victor of Cynoscephalae - Titus Quinctius Flamininus, received 600 Cretan mercenaries from Nabis as a token of their new alliance. In 196, Flamininus made his famous declaration ‘freedom’ for the Greek states from Macedonian hegemony. Though widely welcomed at the time, it soon became clear that this ‘freedom’ was something of a façade, with Roman soldiers garrisoning the so called ‘fetters of Greece’; Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinth. Unrest in Aetolia, Thessaly and a looming threat from the Seleucid Antiochus III

all contributed to Rome wanting to keep a firm hold over Greece. The question then was how could the Romans keep Legions in Greece while maintain the pretence of bringing the Greek freedom? Nabis, whose occupation of Argos was a clear affront to Flamininus’ proclaimed freedom, was an ideal scapegoat. A cunning politician, Flamininus did not declare war on Nabis in the name of Rome, however, but rather gathered a collation of Hellenic states at Corinth to declare war as a coalition. The force that gathered to attack Nabis consisted of Hellenistic states from the Greek mainland to Pergamum, all

wanting to curry favour with Rome. In total, they numbered some 50,000 including two veteran Romen legions, as well as almost 100 ships. They were also, notably, joined by a number of Spartan exiles, including Agesipolis, the Agiad king who had been ousted as a minor by Lycurgus. Nabis, for his part, had 10,000 Spartans, as well as 3,000 mercenaries serving for him, as well as 2,000 Cretan allied troops who wished for their alliance to continue. The Romans and their allies entered the region and set up camp in Sellasia. He decided to pre-empt the Roman attack, which had

commenced earlier in 195 BC, by sending auxiliary troops and attacking said camp in Sellasia, before they retreated back into Sparta. The Romans retaliated by moving through Mount Menelaus, subject to attacks by Nabis’s mercenaries, but moved into Amyclae and began a raiding campaign. On the coastal front, various cities began to surrender to Lucius Quinctius, and soon, the anti-Spartan alliance found out about Gytheum’s position as a hub for Spartan naval supplies. Assembling three fleets, one of King Eumenes, one of the Rhodian allies, and a Roman naval fleet, they descended upon Gytheum, while the land troops began a

land siege. Using recently constructed siege engines, the naval fleet rained hell on the city walls. There were two commanders in Gytheum; Dexagoridas, and Gorgopas. The former, seeing that the situation was desperate, decided to sneak a message to the Romans that he was willing to surrender. However, before he could negotiate a surrender, Gorgopas intercepted his message, confronted Dexagoridas and then murdered him with his own hands. Thus, the siege continued until 4,000 troops arrived as reinforcements for the Romans under Flaminius. Gorgopas then, reversing his previous hardline course, decided to surrender and negotiated his way out and into

Sparta. Rome and her allies then turned towards Sparta to besiege it. Nabis was debating the best way forward, as he had received 3,000 allies from Argos from Pythagoras, his brother-in-law, but decided to offer peace to Flaminius; give back any deserters and prisoners and withdraw from Argos. The Roman answer was a resounding No, with their own terms; that Sparta was to surrender Argos fully rather than just withdrawing their troops, giving Laconia autonomy, and even cease any alliances with Crete, all in exchange for six months of a truce. The Spartans decided to prepare for a siege, as

Rome and their allies began to move towards the city of Ares. 50,000 troops arrived outside of Sparta, and then fought the Spartans outside the city. The Romans managed to push the Spartans back into the city, and then began to attack the gates. Spartan troops threw missiles, which crashed against the sturdy Roman shields, doing little damage. Eventually, the Romans and their allies broke through the gates and took the walls of the city, only to find themselves in the outskirts of the city. As Nabis began to flee further into the city, Pythagoras began his scorched earth policy

by burning some of the outskirt buildings to slow down the Romans. The fiery remains were hurled against the Romans, who lost many men and decided to retreat. Flaminius regrouped his troops, and then organised a counter-offensive. He attacked once more and pushed the Spartans into the inner city, besieging and fighting them for three days, before Nabis sent Pythagoras with an offer to surrender. Flaminius, initially reluctant to accept Pythagoras, eventually relented and negotiated peace under his previous terms. In less than a year, Nabis was forced to sign a treaty that conceded all his territories outside Laconia and

that granted autonomy to many of the most important cities within Laconian, including the rich coastal perioikic harbour of Gythium. He was however, spared the restoration of the Laconian exiles and was allowed to remain in power. In 192, while Rome and her allies were distracted with a war with the Seleucid Empire, Nabis briefly retook Gythium, but was once again quickly beaten back by Philopoemon and forced back to Sparta. Nabis appealed to his Aetolian allies for assistance, who sent 1,000 men in response. Nabis’ luck, however, had finally run out. Considered an unreliable ally, his the Aetolians betrayed

and assassinated him. Furious at this betrayal, the vengeful Lacedamonians slaughtered Alexamenus and all his 1,000 in a final gasp of energy. Seizing upon the disorder among his myriad enemies, Philopoemon and the Achaeans seized control of the city for himself, ‘persuading’ or forcing the remaining Spartan leadership to join his Achaean League. With Nabis’ death and the city taken, the independence of Sparta, which had endured for centuries against Persians, Macedonians and other Greeks, was finally extinguished in the summer of 192. Her decline had been slow and painful. Since Leuctra in 371, Sparta had enjoyed brief moments of

resurgence, only to be beaten down time and again, its sphere of influence eroding gradually over time. Indeed, after Leuctra, it could be said that any idea of ‘Sparta’ in a Lycurgan sense was impossible. An almost fanatical adherence to a centuries old constitution and tradition resulted in an inevitable decline of the population and state. At the same time, this conservatism paralysed any attempt to reform this society through legislative means, as Agis IV had planned. Instead, meaningful change could only be made by effectively destroying the system as Cleomenes III did. In terms of foreign policy, Sparta seemed

almost blindly incapable of recognising her diminished role in Hellenic affairs. Though sporadically successful in establishing herself as a local power, Sparta’s wars ultimately brought it into conflict with foes it simply could not match, such as Macedonia and Rome. As historian Kenneth Harl has pointed out, a post-Peloponnesian War Sparta faced many of the same problems as Rome did in her early days; a drastic and crippling class separation and a power-base founded upon allies. But unlike the notoriously adaptable Romans, Sparta was simply too rigid. It could not make the changes necessary to arrest decline, such as generously

incorporating conquered peoples or integrating allies into the dominant culture to halt the oliganthropia process, and when reforms were attempted, they were either halted prematurely or too little, too late. The Spartans are renowned for their stand at Thermopylae, after which a famous epitaph was written for them: “Go tell the Spartans, passerby, that here obedient to Spartan law, we lie” a quote which in many ways can be applied to the entirety of Spartan society overall. More videos on ancient Greek history are on the way, so make sure you have subscribed and pressed the bell button. Recently we

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