Sun-Tzu en Géopolitique reste-t-il d’actualité pour vaincre ?

Is Sun Tzu still relevant for victory in geopolitics? After covering current geopolitical affairs in our previous session, now may be the perfect time to revisit the roots of international relations, which is strategic thinking. We'll talk about a classic author, Sun Tzu, and an even more classic book, The Art of War, to see how this treatise on victory can inspire us today.

Fabrice Ravel, hello. Hello Olivier, and hello everyone. A well-known author and book that most people have come across or read.

Today, let's begin by revisiting its origins, its historical context and author. If you go to war, you've already lost. How could we resist opening a session on Sun Tzu without embracing his thought; adopting it as our own?

I'd like to accentuate that with the expression from a quotation: ‘The art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’. We're clearly delving into a kind of counterintuitive logic, since the a priori dictate is in order to win a war, it would be necessary not to wage war. It's thus a fairly paradoxical situation from the get-go.

Sun Tzu's enduring legacy is projected to be even more significant in 2024, given the increasing number of wars. It appears that this is something of great significance and a strategic mind that requires a reassessment. I've opted for this singular expression to begin my presentation of Sun Tzu because we'll quickly see that the elements that help us define who he is on the one hand and what his works are on the other will converge to give us a particularly cryptic explanation.

First, because regarding Sun Tzu the person, it is believed—with an emphasis on 'believed'— that he lived between the 6th and 5th centuries BC in China. Just so we're clear, the researchers don't agree with each other at all. Also, there is no proof that he really lived.

There's some uncertainty on whether that was the name he went by. There is some ambiguity surrounding the authorship of the book, as to whether he really was its author, or if he had written it alone. In a nutshell, there is little certainty about his identity and life.

It has reached a stage where specialists and researchers are investigating the book to pinpoint the time period it is most closely related to based on the facts it provides. In short, there is a lack of precision. Turning to the book, it is worth noting that it remained virtually unknown in Western culture until 1772.

Yet the extent to which it remained inconspicuous is also noteworthy, as it was introduced by a Jesuit priest, which is remarkable considering the Jesuit approach. The Jesuit Joseph-Marie Amiot is credited for the first translation in the West. It then receded into the shadows of history for a time before truly emerging to the fore in the 20th century.

It's obvious that there is something truly remarkable here. Its aura, foundation, and even influence appear to be directly proportional to our knowledge of the author and the book. It's an ancient book, that's for sure.

Some think it is outdated, too theoretical or open to interpretation. On top of that, when examining the current landscape of information technology and logistics, it's easy to dismiss it as hardly a tool or guide to achieve any sort of victory. That's right.

In other words, we can obviously question the appropriateness of studying such an old text, which may seem so out of touch with the realities we face. From where I stand, there are two useful aspects to ensure the viability of the text from the very outset. We could regard the first aspect as more factual.

That takes us to the second aspect. How can I describe it? It's perhaps more philosophical or more psychological.

We'll see how to qualify this aspect when we come to understand it; yet the idea is that it will give us a much broader perspective than what you would first imagine for a treatise on strategy that would be similar to a treatise on military strategy. First, the factual aspect: Keep in mind that, quite simply, Sun Tzu has been taken up, cited and studied by a huge number of later strategists as a reference. Here are two of them.

First, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart. You may recall, Olivier, our session about whether Liddell Hart could be called the 20th century's top geopolitical strategist. That should serve as a clear indicator of the profound impact that Sun Tzu had on Liddell Hart, particularly during the later stages of his career.

He would also end up admitting that much later in his life. In this regard, a lot of information came together at the same time to confirm this. The Champs-Flammarion 1983 French edition of Sun Tzu's The Art of War contains a foreword by Liddell Hart, who died in 1970, so you might wonder about the dates.

And yet, they are very precise, believe me. Because in fact, it's a reprint of the '72 Flammarion edition, which was a French translation of the original 1963 English version published by Oxford Publications. That said, that brings us to a juncture where, even in the 20th century, it was exceedingly challenging to locate a text that could be regarded as not flawless, but at least a captivating or fitting rendition of Sun Tzu.

In his foreword, pages 5 to 8 in the French edition I cited, Liddell Hart says that in fact, in the 50s and 60s, his own work had drawn the attention of Chiang Kai-Shek's Chinese officers attention away from Sun Tzu, so much that he had to insist on its importance, advising students to go back to Sun Tzu's fundamentals. This opinion is strikingly authoritative but contains, above all, a strong frame of reference. We can also look at a 2011 book by Bevin Alexander, a US military officer who served in Korea.

The US title is incidentally much better: Sun Tzu at Gettysburg. Gettysburg was a decisive battle in the American Civil War in 1863. The book's subtitle is Ancient Military Wisdom in the Modern War.

One possible answer to today's question lies in this work from 2011, which seems to insist that Sun Tzu is a key author for understanding war. This book looks at the main battles from the long 18th century, from the War of Independence in the United States, right up to the 20th century, which is very interesting because the author is quite simply saying: (something our audience should note) Generals who applied Sun Tzu's precepts, whether out of choice or necessity, with full knowledge or not, have consistently emerged victorious. However, the ones who strayed from these precepts, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or unconsciously, have always suffered defeat.

That consideration is a very important approach within the framework of our question. The same observation is made for certain generals in particular, as Bevin will obviously look at Napoleon, who follows the precepts of Sun Tzu at Austerlitz but then moves away from them and is defeated at Waterloo. Clearly, and factually, it seems that this author shouldn't be overlooked at all.

That brings us to something rather intriguing. I'll try to keep it short and simple. The philosophical or psychological aspect.

To fully address your question, I may need to be bold and mention that the title is just doesn't fit. The title doesn't quite fit, because as soon as you hear 'the art of war', you may first ask —since that's kind of the point of your question— what can we gain from knowing how they scaled walls on ladders in 5th century BC China, or how they used battering rams to breach doors, or even set fire to arsenals? We may reason: In the nuclear age, there's really no point, except that it's really not the art of war, but rather the art of winning, or even the art of convincing.

Because what we'll soon see is that, in reality, we're dealing more with a treatise on politics or even human psychology, than with military tactics. With this perspective, we can understand why such an ancient work would remain so useful in modern times. All the more so now when we look at La Tentation de Mars (The Temptation of Mars), a book written in 2024 by Lebanon's former Minister of Education and Culture, Ghassan Salamé.

This book presents an interesting perspective by suggesting that violence is a natural part of human existence and that while technology is constantly evolving, it seems that human nature remains relatively unchanged. To drive home this point, we could harken back to Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, a 2024 book by Robert Kaplan, an American political science professor. I won't trip up on the subtitle, but on page 68 in my French version, Kaplan quotes Thucydides' writing on the Peloponnesian War, in which regard, he says: human behaviour is always guided by the same aspects: Fear (phobos), self-interest (kerdos), and honour (doxas), which boils down to reputation.

And here, I hasten to add, because there's a slight transcription error in the French translation, because they put doxa, which would be more like wisdom, but it's really doxas, reputation. Fear, self-interest, reputation. Clearly, this is something that can only exist over the centuries.

But this is what allows us, since it was the first clarification, to move on to a second clarification which I think is also essential, because on page 64 in this book, Robert Kaplan describes Chinese philosophy. I should say, rather, that he writes about Chinese philosophy of the 5th or 6th century BC. The crux of his message is that Chinese thought blends impartial analysis with morally infused actions or reactions.

There's a crucial point that should be clarified here. Sun Tzu is frequently misunderstood as promoting lies, deception, and treachery, which of course gives him a totally immoral dimension, whereas in reality, we should understand that he starts from a situation of amorality, one of pure observation, precisely so that he can ascertain the most appropriate response to achieve victory with the least possible death or destruction. That's very important because it sets us apart from the author we usually think of, who comes much later, Machiavelli.

In The Prince, Machiavelli is truly immoral, since he does not hesitate to transgress morality to achieve his ends. You all know: the ends justify the means. Yet above all, and what makes him Machiavellian or Florentine, Machiavelli has no qualms about examining your moral values so that he can exploit them and defeat you more effectively.

I think that's an essential nuance in this regard. It's thus remarkable to realise how, in reality, a treatise based on the human soul and psychology, no matter when it was written, can remain as relevant as ever. It's interesting.

You've mentioned the Jesuits, the Florentines. In other words, some very fine minds. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this book is to understand the underlying logic that emerges.

What we can learn from that? I believe there are three very important lessons. The first is that the first central logic in Sun Tzu's thinking, on which everything is based, is the mastery of information.

The second is to build on this mastery of information, the ability to quash any resistance through seduction, on the one hand, and if that's not possible, through the art of divide and conquer, on the other. And finally, the third is that if we're still unsuccessful, we can opt for an indirect approach which, because it's a surprise, must necessarily lead to victory. I'm going to repeat my first question in a slightly roundabout way.

If we look at the mastery of information, we can also say that the work is out of date with information technology, control and management of communication flows. You'd assume neutralisation of the respective enemies, wouldn't you? Right.

And yet, Sun Tzu's thinking remains essential in this regard. Why? For three main reasons.

Firstly, information overload shouldn't be mistaken for good information. Secondly, we're going to need very precise information. This information must be very precise so we can build the strategy we need in relation to this information.

The third reason is that we need to work constantly and systematically on the information so that the strategy we develop can be as effective as possible. What does an overview of these three reasons show us? It's true, of course, with the rise of all these technologies, particularly over the last ten years or so, in 2024, for the first time in human history, we'll be faced with a problem that is.

the opposite of information For a very long time, we searched for information. Today, we need to escape the drowning effects of information overload. Moreover, the best way to hide essential information is to hide it among a pile of 300, 400 or 500 items of information that have absolutely no interest.

The first difficulty is that the overwhelming majority of information is futile, even useless. We need to start trying to find this information, in particular by practising strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence is a method we highlighted during two of our previous sessions a few years ago.

There's also a second essential step. The information needs to be very precise. Why?

Because I should be able to clearly identify adversaries, enemies and competitors. There's one more thing to understand: for Sun Tzu, information is not the most important thing, it's the only thing that counts. Because in fact, my entire strategy will be built on the information I acquire.

Besides, if I know myself and all my opponents, I'll lead without a fight, without ever taking any risks. It's clear that everything hinges on this aspect. Finally, there is a clear preference for prioritising this information based on its importance.

For this reason, ongoing research is essential to discern the varying levels of influence held by different information sources. Like I said at the beginning, it's a tempting thought: tell me who you are so that I know better how to beat you. And maybe if I know who you are, I'll know how to seduce you.

That's Sun Tzu's second logic: how to demobilise the opponent through the art of seduction, which seems completely intuitive with the title of The Art of War, since it's not about conducting military operations, but a way of defusing the conflict. Yes. While it may first seem a bit surprising, you then realise it's really a logical extension of this thinking, because the idea is first of all to ensure that the potential adversary or competitor (because here we should understand that we're one step ahead, which is essential to bear in mind), the potential competitor or adversary, must be disarmed.

Our audience should bear this in mind, because I think it will lead us to something quite astonishing. Because in reality, we must. .

. If possible, there would be three stages. In the first one, Sun Tzu wants (the word 'wants' is important) to bring you to him.

I'll bring you to me. Put simply, I will obliterate any resistance because you'll soon wish to be just like me. And that's really interesting, because we can now make concrete implications.

This is soft power as described by the American theorist Joseph Nye in the 1990s. It entails a State or a civilisation that manages to create an appetite for its lifestyle, fashion, cuisine and even national sports —we can easily see how this works with American culture— or it could be more like an education or relationship with society, the Confucius Institutes in relation to China, or it could be linked, you may recall, how intellectuals were attracted to the USSR, in which regard Marxist perspectives and the establishment of People's Republics proved to be quite alluring. These clear-cut cases are really victories without fighting, because in any case, my appeal is so strong that I must ensure that are inspired to emulate me, not confront me.

If that fails, an alternative strategy is to use information to undermine my adversary. In other words, seeking to fracture their unity. The classic Sun Tzu quote: If they are united, divide them.

We get it. Supreme excellence in the art of war consists in dividing the adversary without fighting him, but also in diminishing his will without fighting him. The third stage may be even more interesting.

It consists of removing even the hypothesis of war from your adversary's mind. I can also put this another way: In other words, we should keep our adversaries from first imagining that war is an option and, above all, that they could win. That's very interesting because it means that we would normally be ahead of the game and have discouraged our adversary.

If you have neither seduced nor divided your adversary, at least in terms of identity or unity, you should then seek to anticipate everything he might be tempted to do so that you can curb him even before he becomes aware of the option to be an aggressor or competitor. It's something that suddenly takes on a very special resonance. Doesn't it bring to mind the situation in Ukraine from 24 February 2022?

There's something very interesting in this regard, because Sun Tzu believed that the best way to achieve victory would have been to remove any hint of war from the Russians' minds from the outset and, above all, to prevent the Russians from thinking that this war was winnable. This seems like a particularly timely comment, and we shouldn't overlook that it was made in the light of Finland's experience between 1945 and 1989, evoking the notion of 'Finlandisation', which Henry Kissinger valued highly in his book Diplomacy. Despite the common misconception that it was submission, it was really just adaptation to a situation with a view to gaining time.

Between 1945 and 1989, Finland did not join the EEC or even the European Union because of the Cold War. That was only possible afterwards. The logic of this situation clearly demonstrates how mastering information can effectively disarm the adversary and win the battle before it's even fought.

As you said, we're a step ahead of a conflict situation, but the moment of conflict will come. At that moment, these two logics are thwarted, but a third one emerges. Some critics may argue that if we entertain the possibility of a third hypothesis involving war breaking out, Sun Tzu's logic may not be as strong or consistent as it appears.

However, I find that approach to be overly simplistic. Because in the 13 chapters of The Art of War, Sun Tzu also contemplates the convergence of unfavourable circumstances despite all the precautions and despite all the skill you have put in place. That would then evoke Machiavelli's famous fortuna.

In some scenarios, therefore, war becomes inevitable. You have at least acquired sufficient knowledge to ascertain your opponent's weaknesses and have also had time to prepare the adequate forces to counter your opponent's effect. A key term here is the indirect approach.

In other words, the whole philosophy of Sun Tzu, in this hypothesis, will say: War must be very short and must lead to a minimum of losses. In fact, I think it's important to point out that if you go to war, you've already lost, because even if you win, who do you win? You've already lost so much, spent a fortune for victory and even destroyed your adversary.

But why destroy your adversaries when you can gain so much from his submission to you? War must therefore be brief. Surprise is thus key to a brief war.

To catch you by surprise, I must take an indirect approach. In other words, I should attack when you least expect it, with the means you least expect it and where you least expect it. The double dynamic here renders it very interesting.

I first fix my enemy in place. This is referred to as Zheng, the fixing force. I set the tension, obsess over it, and virtually hypnotise the enemy, usually by trying to do what he expects me to do to make him feel even more confident that he is interpreting the situation correctly.

I then execute a totally surprising, unexpected manoeuvre, usually an overrun on the flank. This is Qi, a sort of pivot manoeuvre that will totally destabilise my opponent. It's also easy to see the analogies with martial arts where you take your opponent's strength and use it against him, such as judo.

I'll share the quintessential modern example: The French campaign in 1940. Let's look closely at the operational plan that Erich von Manstein executed between 10 May 1940 and 22 June 1940, unfortunately for France, the French Army and even WWII, I should add. What do we see?

Firstly, this plan essentially entailed a sort of main wave, a semblance of a main attack in the Benelux countries, which was even more credible because the 1940 Manstein Plan (Fall Gelb) seemed to be a carbon copy of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan, in which the Germans invaded via the Benelux countries. This attack seemed all the more inconceivable because of the existence of the Maginot Line on the French border, which seemed to leave this attack as the only possibility. However, the real attack took place two or three days later in the Ardennes forest, which the French General Staff thought to be impenetrable due to the density of the vegetation and numerous waterways.

What's more, instead of aiming for Paris like in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the Germans sought to divide the French Army in two by moving towards the sea. For a few days, the French patted themselves on the back for what they initially thought was a blunder. Finally, and this is the most important aspect, which clearly combines everything we have been looking at in terms of the indirect approach, the German Army succeeded in applying its essential quality to its opponent's main flaw.

It's impressive if you truly grasp the message that conveys. Because the German army's main advantage in 1940 was its speed. The German army had been banned by the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919, and only began rebuilding from March 1935.

The truth is, these tanks were very advanced. Someone we'll look at, General Heinz Guderian, who read Liddell Hart, said that the engine is an armoured vehicle's essential weapon. French tanks were much better armoured and they were virtually all equipped with much more powerful guns, but they remained in the logic of the static fronts of '14–'18.

They were also very slow precisely because of their heavier armour and cannons. Speed was also unnecessary in a war of position. This plan will thus prove to be all the more destabilising.

All the elements were there, because the Germans were going to add speed to the French Army's main weakness, which was its real slowness. That is the quintessential indirect approach. Liddell Hart is the one who will emphasise this the most.

As a young British officer at the end of the First World War, Liddell Hart was struck and mortified by the staggering losses at that front in the trenches, where several thousand men were lost in a single assault on a single day. His primary concern while drafting strategy treatises throughout the 1920s was to discover a method to defeat the enemy without such enormous loss rates. However, his vision would only be confirmed after WWII, with the emergence of mechanised warfare and a renewed focus on Sun Tzu.

The proof of this is in a very interesting book called Stratégie, the French title from 1998, which was actually published in the UK and the USA in 1954. It's quite astonishing that it took nearly 40 years to translate Liddell Hart into French, but the title in English is The Strategy of Indirect Approach. The title differs considerably.

One remarkable aspect of this book is how Liddell Hart covers all the major battles of the last few centuries, but he begins his work with a page containing 21 quotes, Olivier. That alone is unusual. It becomes even more unique in this regard when you tally the Sun Tzu quotes, since 14 of the 21 are from Sun Tzu's The Art of War.

It is now much easier to understand the grip, esteem, and significance that Liddell Hart attributes to it. Here's where it gets totally fascinating: page 70 in the 1998 edition of Stratégie, which comes with a foreword by a French general, makes some unexpectedly bold remarks, because in fact Liddell Hart goes much further. He says: ‘The indirect approach, in fact, is something with a much wider scope of application’.

Because in reality, the indirect approach is not reserved for strategy or geopolitics. Attention should be given here: ‘It's a law of life, it's a philosophical truth’. Wherever the human mind or the human factor is decisive, the indirect approach is decisive, including, and this is more surprising for anyone used to reading this British strategist, who is accustomed to a rather dry reading of military aspects and strategies.

We're not used to seeing it subjected to banter like that, including in politics. That could come up, but in matters of love, and rest assured I'm choosing a more restrained expression than the one Liddell Hart uses on page 70. That suggests the extent to which Sun Tzu's Art of War could be used.

Fabrice, I'd like to take a different tack and ask for a head-on conclusion with a more direct approach. What are the key takeaways from this timeless classic? What a paradox!

There's such an immense paradox, first of all, in a treatise on military strategy containing such precepts that seem to lay out a way that would make it easier for us to find peace or even be capable of winning without having to wage or go to war. I think we can elaborate on this paradox in light of another world renowned strategist often juxtaposed with Sun Tzu, though he may actually be more of a complement than a contrast. We might be even more surprised to discover that he exemplifies how mastering the Art of War is ultimately about triumphing without resorting to battle.

Which brings us to a second paradox, because obviously, in the title of our first question, we understood that some people were wondering whether he was still relevant. We can at least say that he is, and even more so now. Sun Tzu is not obsolete.

He's become more useful than ever. In fact, if we adhere to Sun Tzu's thinking, we should be able to achieve peace and victory without having to wage war or engage in military confrontations. And who can neglect the significance of this lesson in the era of nuclear weapons?

It's clear that this strategy goes far beyond geopolitics, because it can be adapted to all situations involving the human factor. Fabrice, thank you for your concluding message. You hinted at a second classic author.

I'll let our audience guess who he is from this image of this strategist. We won't tell them his name. Maybe they'll recognise him?

And perhaps we'll continue this discussion in another session, thank you, Fabrice. With pleasure and thank you. That wraps up another session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique alongside our mystery author.

Thank you everyone for following us.