Iran’s Nuclear Proliferation in Defiance of Global Concerns - Jerusalem Studio 903

[Music] Shalom and welcome to Jerusalem Studio some 45 days before Joe Biden's movers vacate the White House for the new tenant who returns to the place he reluctantly left four years ago the looming Trump presidency has an evident impact on Middle Eastern Dynamics a major topic as always is the Iranian nuclear project Trump's record is known in tan but so is his expressed wish to return a new page and reach a fresh deal which will block the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons in exchange for lifting the sanctions which curtail the Iranian economy in anticipation of

that policy and mindful of the Personnel choices that Trump made in Staffing his administration Iran has been making a crude effort to hoard enriched feile material and ignore its obligations to allow monitoring and inspections of its facilities this will supposedly give it a better hand once the card game with Trump resumes how effective is this tactic and is there a risk that from uh or excuse me is there risk that from bargaining Iran could shift to breakout and Achieve an initial nuclear weapon posture to analyze it we're joined by Professor David olbright founder and president

of the institute for Science and International Security welcome sir good to be here it's a pleasure also joining us from Central Israel is Dr uad Who uh is a former National Security adviser here in Israel as well as a mad division Chief it's a pleasure to have you Uzi good to meet here thank you and with me in the studio of course our tv7 editor at large Mr Amir Oren Amir set the stage for us so there is an obvious escalation in rhetoric uh especially following the iaea uh censoring uh Iran um for its various

scenes mostly scenes of omission rather than commission but as we are on the eve of uh the U Trump presidency it is obvious that uh Iran is trying to take his measure by threatening perhaps bluffing um saying um quite uh expressly publicly that it will uh enrich more uranium to a higher level uh will U uh fix more facilities with extra equipment perhaps even um convince the supreme leader to change his fatwa whether there is such a fatwa or not is an open question uh forbidding uh nuclear weapons it seems like uh an opening um

tactic an opening Min if you will in uh the expectation that Trump once in office will offer it an olive branch well Professor Albright I'd like to start with you uh you're a distinguished scientist who've been following this and Publishing on this extensively for years uh on and and I I'd like uh to take this opportunity to ask you to characterize the current state of Iran's nuclear proliferation amid a reality in which the international atomic energy agency including its uh in the latest reports by Secretary General Rafael Grossi uh explicitly note that they don't have

enough information to uh fill in the blank so to speak uh to speak uh in light of uh so many years in which the Islamic Republic has been in breach of its obligations not only Under The Joint comprehensive plan of action but also under the nuclear proliferation treaty I think one of the most concrete signs of the lack of the inspector's ability to see what's going on is is that it has no idea how many centrifuges are being made it used to be able to monitor that and there's been a series of surprises over the

last six to nine months where Iran deploys many more centrifuges than were expected and we're going and it's just threatened to do that again and so you have to worry that what there's a a large number of centrifuges we don't see that could be reserved for some secret site and so that lack of transparency is one of the most concrete indicators that that the inspectors cannot do their job now beyond that they can't do their job to to basically say um does Iran have a nuclear weapons program they have to every quarter say we don't

know um and that and that when they do work on it have concrete evidence of they call on declared nuclear material um that was associated with a former nuclear weapons program they get nowhere and so so what we've ended up with is a situation where currently Iran could break out and make enough weapon grade uranium very quickly um we estimated The Institute you in as little as a week uh and then produce uh several more quantities of weapon grade uranium um in that same month and so you have a you have a situation where Iran

no longer faces any kind of bottleneck on producing weapon grade uranium it can essentially make much more than it ever dreamed of making back when it had a very active nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s now we're all kind of probing into the dark at least in the public sphere how quickly could could they weaponize that weapon grade uranium into a weapon and at my Institute again we think they could make a crude device and this as this little as six months maybe even a little shorter it's not going to be delivered by a

missile but that they it could be enough to establish a status as a nuclear power and and and force everyone to kind of rethink their their strategies on Iran and put tremendous pressure I would just say on Israel to strike before there's a weapon and uh and work got a strategy to do that so I think we're in a very very dangerous situation and and uh and no way to predict what's going to happen absolutely very alarming indeed uh Dr I'd like to hear your take on this particularly also uh since Israel has retrieved much

of the data uh related to the Amad program that was active until at least uh reportedly 2003 uh to what degree are the findings of that state uh indicative of Iranian intentions to follow through on its intentions to pursue that uh nuclear weapon capabilities particularly at a time when it is some may say with its back against the wall well the the UT plan was a concrete plan well defined in terms of deadlines and timetable which was to be concluded by the possession of a number of Warheads at a certain date to be deployed in

a position of an operational capacity so that was the plan as it was then uh how the current program is being defined whether there is a a real internal deadline by which they want to accomplish something as concrete as and tangible as finished and assembled bombs and and possibly tested and so forth uh that we don't know at least I don't know so it it leaves us very much in this uh uh situation that Dr alright just stipulated which is highly dangerous because uh uh we must assume I think that they they do have a

plan which would conclude the same way the program was in the past namely in the possession of such weapons but how this is paced is there any flexibility there do they also intend to calibrate the progression uh in that plan in accordance with the kind of Economic and political pressures put in them but whichever way you look at it Israel will certainly have to look at what is happening and assuming that there will be a sense that they are advancing closer and closer uh to to to that tangibility then it has to calculate the Merit

of a preemptive strike which uh it has demonstrated uh some capabilities have been demonstrated it is capable of Mr Owen uh naturally the Islamic Republic is uh quite uh in the understanding that a trump Administration would not allow it to break through without severe consequences uh nevertheless uh this has not necessarily brought it to pull back from its uh ongoing belligerent activities particularly when we're talking about uh the increase of installations of various Cascades but also it is in tandum operating on the Diplomatic sphere to uh try and reignite some sort of diplomatic I don't

know if it's a ploy or not but a diplomatic process with uh the three European powers namely Britain France and Germany uh what are we to take out of that is this uh some sort of signal that should be uh taken seriously well as you remember the uh E3 if Britain is still uh NE uh having it's still European yes but it is not part of the European Union this was the original European Union is not europe3 um they they of course started this whole diplomatic move with some Israeli help when Israel didn't want to

be u in the crossers of Iran and Israel at that time time uh some 20 odd years ago justifiably wanted the world the West uh along with China and Russia uh to take a center stage but um Iran uh is not going to capitulate it wants to capitalize on what it has in order to get sanctions relief and perhaps other um Goods or goodies but the situation now because China and Russia were at loggerheads with the Biden Administration and we don't know what will happen during the next Trump term um what happens and obviously in

all capitals or in the Israeli case in Tel Aviv there are simulations and War gaming going on what happens if uh Iran withdraws from the npt regime and there is no enforcement mechanism now because you need Security Council um work and the United States cannot do it alone we used to think that there is um a superow or big Power uh collaboration against those countries um which will clandestinely get nuclear weapons uh thereby contravening their commitments uh to the IE under the npt regime and therefore there will be some punishment but it is not certain

at all so Iran will probably wait to see uh how um the United States under Trump is engaging Russia and China before it makes uh any bold move indeed uh Dr alright I'd like to hear your take on this as well but beyond that what could you tell potentially in layman's terms uh to uh European diplomats currently engaged what should we focus on uh particularly at a time when the Islamic Republic is seemingly retting up its efforts to position itself even in a more uh uh problematic uh situation in order to start a certain game

of diplomacy once a trump Administration takes office you know I'm afraid I'm a little more pessimistic I mean I I think Iran is is doing what it's often done is the Board of Governors of the IIA censures it they've now asked for a report which will be highly embarrassing to Iran so they escalate excuse me this time they had they're basically installing all the centrifuges uh that they or or let's say enriching in all the centrifuges they had installed um and and then adding more um and they did not start making weapon grade uranium or

leave the nonproliferation treaty but I think I don't I think that they're on an escalatory path that it moves very incrementally and then they just see what happens now one would have expected that by now given the massive violations of Iran on the nuclear deal that the E3 would have snapped back sanctions as they call it under the the old nuclear deal and brought back all the 2015 un Security Council sanctions reimpose the missile and arms embargo and that can be done as as you all know it can be just be done no Russia and

China can stop it and but it would what it would do is it would delegitimize Iran's nuclear uh enrichment program again and make it easier to construct a a kind of a positive strategy to pressure Iran and then with the Trump Administration people they could they certainly would support what they've euphemistically called maximum maximum pressure so so I don't I think we're just engaged in the same old thing and and Ron sees a different player tougher one but and I would say a more unpredictable one and that could work for us or against us for

those who want to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons but I think we're not we're by no means in a good place and and the uh EU E3 is unfortunately doing the kind of things it's done so often in the past if Iran makes small concession to our negotiations they they leap on it and the point of it is to ultimately is that it delays uh the E3 reimposing um the Snapback mechanism or I'm sorry not reimposing but imposing the Snapback mechanism under the UN Security Council resolution 2231 which expires next October it just goes

away so there is a clock ticking too and and I think the E3 and the United States need to sit down and work out a very tough policy on Iran to force it in a sense diplomatically and through incentives whatever you want to put on the table but make sure that they step back significantly from the ability to build a bomb uh staying on that same line uh the Europe uh Europeans have asked the uh IAA Board of Governors to provide basically or the the director general or the Secretariat to provide a uh elab at

report uh up until 2025 the spring of 2025 which is just shy several uh months or weeks of uh the expiration date for the Snapback mechanism uh is that a attempt to appease the Iranians to try and bring them back into the fold or uh what what is the the true meaning of this move the E3 has wanted to escalate this uh confrontation faster than the Biden Administration ation and but the body Administration was trying to pull back the E3 which is in a ways rather remarkable um and the what the E3 did was in

a sense grab on what the US had supported through speeches and that's this comprehensive report and but the main purpose of it will be to create a justification for additional action um the problem could be that the I will drag its feet gry is in recent times has been more for negotiations and giving Iran time than for bringing this to a to a head where some hard decisions have to be made so I think the ideal situation is is to take grossy at his what he said at a press conference recently we don't it was

before the resolution passed he said well we have everything we need to write a report there's nothing more so one would hope he would act on what he said and produce a report within the next month or so if he can really if he has everything he needs then just do it and then allow the E3 in the United States with a new president to try to work out the best way Best Way Forward indeed he does also have his own calculations and he did explicitly stress during that same press conference his last that he

uh is not bound by the timeline of any uh expiration dates of uh the uh un Security Council resolution 2231 but Dr Arad I'd like to hear your take on this yeah I think that uh most people here in Israel are uh are awaiting uh the possibility that uh some halt would be given to the current fighting uh near our borders uh both in Gaza and in Lebanon not only in order to resolve whatever outstanding issues presented themselves but so that uh one would be able to concentrate on the Iranian issue which uh as long

as uh these things were taking place here we're diverting isra attention from uh from doing what it should uh whether it should be done unilaterally that's one thing it's always on on on the agenda but at the same time there I think most realize that this should be a join strategy by the E3 by United States uh the expectation is indeed that Trump should enter office that comes close whether there would be some action taken by gry and others in terms of a report that would Galvanize some kind of political International coordination of a strategy

I think that the Israel interest is in seeing all that going ahead uh so that indeed such a strategy should be established with all the relevant Partners who were there uh trying to block the progression of Iran further so that they could coordinate also the measures that they intend to take uh at the moment we've not reached that point here in Israel in which such a attention by Israel is given to the Iranian issue with a single exception that should Iran attempt or make good on its uh threat to take revenge for our attack and

should they do something then is it would be Israel's decision uh to to decide what to do in that context and whether the uh Conor Israeli uh reprisal would also have a nuclear Dimension to it well Mr or there was a side document to the ceas uh fire Arrangement that was outlined by the United States and France uh with regard to Lebanon a document that was actually an agreement between the United States and Israel to redirect their attention to Iran and an American pledge that in the event of an Iranian breakout they would stand by

Israel to confront that threat and thwart any attempt to do so uh what are we to make out of that we are in a very unique situation of um two presidents governing the United States at the same time we are at the Twilight of the Biden uh president but also the sunrise or the Florida Sunrise of the Trump Administration with world leaders um jetting to Mar Lago wouldn't that be a breach of the Logan act no not uh nobody's going he has immunity so it doesn't matter but uh we haven't seen MBS there yet and

obviously the United States would like to consult with Saudi Arabia before he does uh anything um uh with a lot of significance VAV Iran also uh one of Trump's Marquee pledges is that he is uh going to end all forever Wars is not going to start one so uh saying that he's going to back Israel uh does not mean that uh there will be direct uh American involvement in a war with Iran because it's not going to be a oneoff strike even though um lately when the Israeli Air Force struck aala Target it made sure

that the illustration uh that the IDF spokesperson issued showed that it can hit um a hidden Target 70 M deep in a in a mountain side so it was a signal to Iran that we don't need the Americans we can do it on our own but these these are all very um uh initial um tactics PLO uh we still have to wait until late January early February to know where we are and the fact that Mike pompe did not get any senior job uh may have something to do uh with his being too hawkish for

Trump's taste right now um of course there was some infighting but uh the um upshot is that the leading um proponent of the maximum pressure is not there at least the Iranians can see it this way well with regard to Mike Pompeo I think uh he should speak uh to his other emplo the reasons for not entering into the Trump Administration uh in a future date I'm not going to delve into that since he's a colleague but nevertheless uh I'd like to take this opportunity since we don't have very much time left uh Professor orright

Dr aad in one and a half minutes each whatever you would like to focus on this is your opportunity please Professor orright we'll start with you well one is I'd like to say as an American How Deeply appreciative we are of of of um Israel's commitment to trying to make sure Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons and I think they Israeli government leadership under various prime ministers have been very steadfast in in in in a sense leading the way and and at times walking with the United States president and other times trying to drag him along

and I think we're now entering a time where I think we can walk together and see our leaders walk in the same direction and and and I so I feel in that sense optimistic that that that Iran can be prevented from getting a nuclear weapon and and already president Trump has done something which was surprising is is he kind of reached out to Iran in a way to say look maybe there's a deal at hand um that undercut Iran's hardliners that just wanted to in a sense build the bomb and it introduced a lot of

uncertainty into Iranian calculations and and I think we now until January don't have to worry so much about them racing to get a bomb and and then let's see and I as I said I feel that with Israel and United States working together on this that that Iran can be prevented from building the bomb absolutely drad yes I hope so hope that uh some some of the steps taken and the postures taken would have the effect of deescalate what still may be on an escalatory uh curve uh in that uh relationship uh the fact that

heah as a kind of an insurance uh instrument uh on behalf of the Iranians has been crippled to that effect may have a restraining effect on on Iran and rather than coming to the rescue of Hezbollah uh they should be very cautious not to take this into this Dynamic so I do hope that with a judicious kind of a maneuvering by many of the international group that are confronting Iran wanting to prevent it from going forward on a nuclear uh we would see that having an effect on Iran and that it would probably pursue this

time with real intent uh some kind of a slowing down possibly in the context of a of a deal whether that would take them back in terms of their program uh depends indeed on on the uh the termination of the international group that would be in effect negotiating with it and I hope that this would succeed nobody's sure but certainly the option is there and the potential is also there in any event in uh contrast to the first Trump Administration which had only one and a half years to impose a maximum pressure campaign on the

Iranians this time around uh the Iranians will have to deal with it as the former Iran Envoy of the Trump Administration said namely Brian hook uh from day one uh we will see the maximum pressure campaign imposed upon the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore the calculus uh May uh be different but this is all the time the we for today I'd like to immediately thank Professor Albright Dr Arad and uh Mr Orin for all of your insights and I'd like to thank all of you at home as well until our next Edition from here

in Jerusalem shalom [Music] [Music] for more of tv7 Productions and editorials we invite you to visit our website at www.tv 7news.com.au