Plato | Philebus - Full audiobook with accompanying text (AudioEbook)

Philebus well then pro Tarkus considered just what the thesis is that you are now taking over from Philebus and what how thesis is that you are going to argue against if you find that you do not agree with it shall we summarize them both yes let's do that Philebus holds that what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves to be pleased and delighted and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing we contend that not these but knowing understanding and remembering and what belongs with them right opinion and true calculations are better

than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them those who can get the maximum benefit possible from having them both those now alive and future generations isn't that how we present our respective positions for Labour's absolutely Socrates do you agree Pro Tarkus to take over this thesis that's now offered you I'm afraid I have to fear for Labour's has given up on us so we must do everything possible to get through somehow to the truth about these matters we certainly must come on then here is a further point we need to agree on

what is that that each of us will be trying to prove some possession or state of the soul to be the one that can render life happy for all human beings isn't that so quite so you that it is pleasure we that it is knowledge that is so what if it should turn out that there is another possession better than either of them would the result not be that if it turns out to be more closely related to pleasure we will both lose out against the life that firmly possesses that but the life of pleasure

will defeat the life of knowledge yes and if it is closer to knowledge then knowledge wins over pleasure and pleasure losses do you accept this as agreed it seems agree to me but also to Philebus Philebus what do you say to my mind pleasure wins and always will win no matter what but you must see for yourself for Tarkus but now you have handed over the argument to us for Labour's you can no longer control the agreements we make with Socrates nor our disagreements you are right i absolve myself of all responsibility and now call

the goddess herself as my witness we will be your witnesses to that you did say what you are now saying as to what follows Socrates let us go ahead and try to push through to a conclusion with Philebus consent or not we must do our best making our start with the goddess herself this fellow claims that though she is called Aphrodite her truest name is pleasure certainly I always feel a more than human dread over what names to use for the gods it surpasses the greater fear so now I address Aphrodite by whatever title pleases

her but has to pleasure I know that it is complex and just as I said we must make it our starting point and consider carefully what sort of nature it has if one just goes by the name it is one single thing but in fact it comes in many forms that are in some way even quite unlike each other think about it we say that as a borscht person gets pleasure as well as that a sober minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety again we say that a fool though full of foolish opinions and

hopes gets pleasure but likewise a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom but surely anyone who said in either case that these pleasures are like one another would rightly be regarded as a fool well yes Socrates the pleasures come from opposite things but they are not at all opposed to one another for how could pleasure not be of all things most like pleasure how could that thing not be most like its just as color is most like color really you surprised me colors certainly won't difference Oh far as every one of them is a color

but we all know that black is not only different from white but is in fact it's very opposite and shape is most like shape in the same way for shape is all one in genus but some of its parts are absolutely opposite to one another and others differ in innumerable ways and we will discover many other such cases so don't rely on this argument which makes a unity of all the things that are most opposed I'm afraid we will find there are some pleasures that are contrary to others maybe so but how will this harm

our thesis because you call these unlike things we will say by a different name for you say that all Pleasant things are good now no one contends that Pleasant things are not pleasant but while most of them are bad but some good as we hold you nevertheless call them all good even though you would admit that they are unlike one another if someone pressed the point what is the common element in the good and bad pleasures that allows you to call them all good what are you saying Socrates do you think anyone will agree to

this who begins by laying it down that pleasure is the good do you think he will accept it when you say that some pleasures are good but others are bad but you will grant that they are unlike each other and that some are opposites not in so far as they are pleasures but really for Tarkus this takes us back to the same old point are we then to say that pleasure does not differ from pleasure but all are alike don't the examples just given make the slightest impression on us are we to behave and speak

in just the same way as those who are the most incompetent and at the same time newcomers in such discussions what way do you mean this suppose I imitate you and dare to say in defense of my thesis that the most unlike sing is of all things most like the most unlike then I could say the same thing as you did but this would make us look quite childish and our discussion would founder on the rock let us therefore set it afloat again perhaps we can reach a mutual accommodation if each side accepts a similar

stance toward its candidate just tell me how let me be the one questioned in turn by you about what about wisdom knowledge understanding and all the things that I laid down at the beginning as good when I try to answer the question what is good what my answers suffer the same consequences as your thesis did how so taken altogether the branches of knowledge will seem to be a plurality and some will seem quite unlike others and if some of them turn out in some way actually to be opposites would I be a worthy partner in

a discussion if I dreaded this so much that I would deny that one kind of knowledge can be unlike another that way our whole discussion would come to an end like that of a fairy tale with us kept safe and sound through some absurdity we must not let that happen except the part about our being kept safe and sound but I am rather pleased by the fact that our thesis are on the same footing so let it be agree that there can be many and unlike kinds of pleasures but also many and different kinds of

knowledge well then let us not cover up the difference between your good and mine for talkers but put it right in the middle and braved a possibility that when put to a closer scrutiny it will come to light where the pleasure should be called the good or wisdom or yet a third thing for we are not contending here out of love of victory for my suggestion to win or for yours we ought to act together as allies in support of the truest one we certainly ought to let us then give even stronger support to our

principal by an agreed what principle the one that creates difficulties for everyone for some willingly for some sometimes against their will explain this more clearly it is this principle that has turned up here which somehow has an amazing nature for that the many are one and the one many are amazing statements and can easily be disputed whichever side of the two one may want to defend do you mean this in the sense that someone says that I Pro Tarkus and one by Nature but then also says that there are many Me's and even country ones

when he treats me who am one and the same as tall and short heavy and light and endless other such things Udyr protaras are speaking about those puzzles about the one and many that have become commonplace they are agreed by everybody so to speak to be no longer even worth touching they are considered childish and trivial but a serious impediment to argument if one takes them on no more worthy is the following quibble when someone who first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts ask your agreement that all these parts are identical with that unity but

then exposes you to ridicule because of the monstrosity x' you have to admit that the one is many and indefinitely many and again that the many are only one thing but what are the kinds of such puzzles with respect the same principle do you have in mind Socrates that have not yet admittedly become commonplace when my young friend the one is not taken from the things that come to be or perish have we have just done in our example for that is where the sort of one belongs that we were just discussing which we agreed

is not worthy of scrutiny but when someone tries to posit man as one or oxes one or the beautiful as one and the good as one zealous concerned with divisions of these unities and the like gives rise to controversy in what sense for whether one ought to suppose that there are any such unity is truly in existence then again how they are supposed to be whether each one of them is always one in the same admitting neither of generation nor of destruction and whether it remains most definitely one and the same even though it is

afterwards found again among the things that come to be and are unlimited so that it finds itself as one in the same in one and many things at the same time and must it be treated as dispersed and multiplied or as entirely separated from itself which would seem most impossible of all it is these problems of the one and many but not those others protaras that cause all sorts of difficulties if they are not properly settled but promised progress if they are is this the first task we should try our hands at right now Socrates

so I would say at least take it then that we all here are agreed with you about this as fulfil abus it might be best not to bother him with questions any further but let sleeping dogs lie quite so now where should we make our entry into that complex and wide-ranging battle about this controversial issue is it not best to start here where by making the point that it is through discourse that the same thing Flitz around becoming one and many in all sorts of ways in whatever it may be that is said at any

time both long ago and now and this will never come to an end nor has it just begun but it seems to me that this is an immortal an ageless condition that comes to us with discourse whoever among the young first gets a taste of it is as pleased as if he had found a treasure of wisdom he is quite beside himself with pleasure and revels in moving every statement now turning it to one side and rolling it all up into one then again unrolling it and dividing it up he thereby involves first and former

himself in confusion but then also whatever others happen to be nearby be they younger or older or of the same age sparing neither his father nor his mother nor anyone else who might listen to him he would almost try it on other creatures not only on human being since he would certainly not spare any foreigner if only he could find an interpreter somewhere careful Socrates don't you see what a crowd we are and that we are all young and are you not afraid that we will gang up against you with Philebus if you insult us

still we know what you want to say and if there are some ways and means to remove this kind of disturbance from our discussion in a peaceful way and to show us a better solution to the problem then just go ahead and we will follow you as best we can for the present question is no mean thing Socrates it certainly is not my boys as for Labour's is want to address you indeed there is not nor could there be any way that is finer than the one I have always admired although it has often escaped

me and left me behind alone and helpless what is this way let us have it it is not very difficult to describe but extremely difficult to use for everything in any field of art that has ever been discovered has come to light because of this see what way I have in mind please do tell us it is a gift of the Gods to men or so it seems to me hurled down from heaven by some prometheus along with the most dazzling fire and the people of old superior to us and living in closer proximity to

the gods have bequeathed us this tale that whatever is said to be consists of one and many having in its nature limit and unlimitedness since this is the structure of things we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them and we must search for it as we will indeed find it there and once we have grasped it we must look for two as the case would have it or if not for three or some other number and we must treat every one of those further unities in

the same way until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one many and unlimited but also how many kinds it is for we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the polarity before we know the exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one only then is it permitted to release the each kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go the gods as I have said have left us this legacy of how to inquire and learn and teach one another but nowadays the

clever ones among us make a one haphazardly and a many faster or slower than they should they go straight from the one to the unlimited and emit the intermediates it is these however that make all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each other in dialectical or only in heuristic discourse some of what you said I think I understand in some way Socrates but of some I still need further clarification what I mean is clear in the case of letters and you should take your clue from them since they were part of your

own education how so the sound that comes out of the mouth is one for each and every one of us well then it is also unlimited in number no doubt neither of these two facts alone yet makes us knowledgeable neither that we know its unlimitedness nor its unity but if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds there are and what their nature is that makes every one of us literate very true and the very same thing leads to the knowledge of music how is that sound is also the unit in this art just as

it was in writing yes right we should posit low and high pitch as two kinds and equal pictures a third kind or what would you say just that but you could not yet claim knowledge of music if you knew only this much though if you are ignorant even about that you would be quite incompetent in these matters as one might say certainly but you will be competent my friend once you have learned how many intervals there are in high pitch and low pitch what character they have by what notes the intervals are defined and the

kinds of combinations they form all of which our forebears have discovered and left to us their successes together with the names of these modes of harmony and again the motions of the body display other and similar characteristics of this kind which they say should be measured by numbers and called rhythms and meters so at the same time they have made us realize that every investigation should search for the one and many for when you have mastered these things in this way then you have acquired expertise there and when you have grasped the unity of any

of the other things there are you have become wise about that the boundless multitude however in any and every kind of subject leaves you in boundless ignorance and makes you count for nothing an amount are nothing since you have never worked out the amount and number of anything at all for my part I think that Socrates has explained all this very well Philebus I agree as far as this question itself goes but of what use is all this talk to us and what is its purpose for lay versus Wright Pro Tarkus when he asks us

this question good so please answer him I will do so when I have gone a little further into this subject matter just as someone who has got hold of some unity or others should not as we were saying immediately look for the unlimited kind but first look for some number so the same holds for the reverse case for if he is forced to start out with the unlimited then he should not head straight for the one but should in each case grasp some number that determines every plurality whatever and from all of those finally reached

the one let us again make use of letters to explain what this means in what way the way some God or God inspired man discovered that vocal sound is unlimited as tradition in Egypt claims for a certain deity called faileth he was the first to discover that the vowels in that unlimited variety are not one but several and again that there are others that are not voiced but make some kind of noise that they too have a number as a third kind of letters he established the ones we now call mute after this he further

subdivided the ones without sound or mutes down to every single unit in the same fashion he also dealt with the vows and the intermediate and hilly found out the number for each one of them and then he gave all of them together the name letter and as he realized that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them taken by itself without understanding them all he considered that the one link that somehow unifies them all and called it the art of literacy Pro Tarkas understood this even better than what came before

at least how it hangs together but I still find that this explanation now suffers from the same defect as your earlier one you are wondering again what the relevance of it all is for Labour's right that is what I and photographers have been wanting to see for quite a while but have you not already under your nose what you both as you say have long wanted to see how could that be did we not embark on an investigation of knowledge and pleasure to find out which of the two is preferable yes indeed and we do

say that each of them is one right this is the very point in question to which our preceding discussion obliges us to give answer to show how each of them is one and many and how instead of becoming unlimited straight away each one of them acquires some definite number of for it becomes unlimited Socrates has plunged us into a considerable problem for Labour's by leading us around I don't know how in some kind of circle but make up your mind which of us should answer the present question it would seem quite ridiculous that I who

had volunteered to take over the thesis from you as your successor should now hand it back to you because I don't have an answer to this question but it would be even more ridiculous if neither of us could answer it so what do you think we should do Socrates seems to be asking whether there are kinds of pleasures or not and how many there are and what sort they are and the same set of questions applies to knowledge you speak the truth son of Callias unless we are able to do this for every kind of

unity similarity sameness and their opposite in the way that our recent discussion has indicated none of us will ever turn out to be any good at anything I'm afraid that this is so but while it is a great thing for the wise man to know everything the second base is not to be mistaken about oneself it seems to me what prompts me to say that at this point I will tell you you Socrates have granted this meeting to all of us and yourself to boot in order to find out what is the best of all

human possessions now for Labour's advocated that it is pleasure amusement enjoyment and whatever else there is of this kind you on the contrary denied this for all of them but rather proposed those other words we willingly and with good reason keep reminding ourselves of so that they can be tested as they are lying side by side in our memory you claim it seems that the good that should by right be called superior to pleasure at least his reason as well as knowledge intelligence science and everything that is akin to them which must be obtained rather

than fill a basis candidates now after both these conflicting positions have been set up against each other we threatened you in jest that we would not let you go home before the deliberation of these questions had reached its satisfactory limit but since you made a promise and committed yourself to us we therefore insist like children that there is no taking back a gift properly given so give up this way of turning against us in the discussion here what way are you talking about your way of plunging us into difficulties and repeating questions to which we

have at present no proper answer to give you but we should not take it that the aim of our meeting is universal confusion if we cannot solve the problem you must do it for you promised it is up to you to decide whether for this purpose you need to divide off different kinds of pleasure and knowledge or can leave that out if you are able and willing to show some other way to settle the issues of our controversy at least there is no longer anything terrible in store for poor me since you said it this

way for the clause if you are willing takes away all further apprehension in addition some memory has come to my mind that one of the gods seems to have sent me to help us how is that and what about it is a doctrine that once upon a time I heard in a dream or perhaps I was awake that I remember now concerning pleasure and knowledge that neither of the two is the good but that there is some third thing which is different from and superior to both of them but if we can clearly conceive now

that this is the case then pleasure has lost its bid for victory for the good could no longer turn out to be identical with it right right so we will not have to worry any longer I think about the division of the kinds of pleasure but further progress will show this more clearly very well said just push on there are some small matters we ought to agree on first though what are they whether the good is necessarily bound to be perfect or not perfect but surely it must be the most perfect thing of all Socrates

further must the good be sufficient how could it fail to be that this is how it is superior to everything else there is now this point I take it is most necessary to assert of the good that everything that has any notion of it hunts for it and desires to get hold of it and secure it for its very own caring nothing for anything else except for what is connected with the acquisition of some good there is no way of denying this so let us put the life of pleasure in the life of knowledge on

trial and reach some verdict by looking at them separately in what way do you mean let there be neither any knowledge in a life of pleasure nor any pleasure in that of knowledge for if either of the two is good then it must have no need of anything in addition but if one or the other should turn out to be lacking anything then this can definitely no longer be the real good we are looking for how could it be so shall we then use you as our test case to try both of them by all

means then answer me go ahead would you find it acceptable to live your whole life in enjoyment of the greatest pleasures why certainly and would you see yourself in need of anything else if you had secured this all together in no way but look might you not have some need of knowledge intelligence and calculation or anything else that is related to them how so if I had pleasure I would have all-in-all and living like that you can enjoy the greatest pleasures throughout your life why should I not since you would not be in possession of

either reason memory knowledge or true opinion must you not be in ignorance first of all about this very question whether you were enjoying yourself or not given that you were devoid of any kind of intelligence necessarily moreover due to lack of memory it would be impossible for you to remember that you ever enjoyed yourself and for any pleasure to survive from one moment to the next since it would leave no memory but not possessing right judgment you would not realize that you are enjoying yourself even while you do and being unable to calculate you could

not figure out any future pleasures for yourself you would thus not live a human life but the life of a mollusk or of one of those creatures in shells that live in the sea is this what would happen or can we think of any other consequences beside these how could we but is this a life worth choosing Socrates this argument has left me absolutely speechless for the moment even so that has not given to weakness let us in turn rather inspect the life of Reason what kind of life do you have in mind whether any

one of us would choose to live in possession of every kind of intelligence reasoned knowledge and memory of all things while having no part neither large nor small of pleasure or pain living in total insensitivity of anything of that kind to me at least neither of these two forms of life seems worthy of choice nor would it to anyone else I presume but what about a combination of both photography's a life that results from a mixture of the two you mean a mixture of pleasure with reason and intelligence right those are the ingredients I mean

everybody would certainly prefer this life to either of the other two without exception do we realize what the upshot of this new development in our discussion is certainly that over the three lives offered to us two are not sufficient or worthy of choice for either man or animal as far as they are concerned is it then not clear at least that neither the one nor the other contained the good since otherwise it would be sufficient perfect and worthy of choice for any of the plants and animals that can sustain them throughout their lifetime and if

any one among us should choose otherwise then he would do so involuntarily in opposition to what is by nature truly choice worthy from ignorance or someone for Genet necessity he certainly looks that way enough has been said it seems to me to prove that Philebus is goddess and the good cannot be regarded as one nor is your reason the good Socrates and the same complaint applies to it it may apply to mayuri's and Philebus but certainly not the true the divine reason I should think it is in quite a different condition but now I'm not

arguing that reason ought to get first prize over and against the combined life we have rather to look and make up our minds about the second prize how to dispose of it one of us may want to give credit for the combined life to reason making it responsible the other to pleasure thus neither of the two would be the good but it could be assumed that one or the other of them is its cause but I would be even more ready to contained against Philebus that whatever the ingredient in the mixed life may be that

makes it choice worthy and good reason is more closely related to that thing and more like it than pleasure and if this can be upheld neither first nor second prize could really ever be claimed for pleasure she will in fact not even get as much as third prize if we can put some trust in my insight for now by now it seems to me indeed that pleasure has been defeated as if knocked down by your present argument Socrates in her fight for victory she has fallen and as for reason we may say that it wisely

did not compete for first prize for it would have suffered the same fate but if pleasure were also deprived of second prize she would definitely be somewhat dishonoured in the eyes of her own lovers nor would she seem as fair to them as before what then had we not better leave her alone now rather than subject her to the most exacting test and give her pain by such an examination you talk nonsense Socrates why because I said the impossible giving pain to pleasure not only that but because you don't realize that not one almaas would

let you go before you have carried the discussion of these questions to its end a ho dear pro Tarkus then a long discussion lies ahead of us and not exactly an easy one either at this point for it seems that in the battle about the second prize for reason a different device will be needed different armament as it were from that news in our previous discussion though it may partly be the same are we to proceed of course let us be very careful about the starting point we take what kind of starting point let us

make a division of everything that actually exists now in the universe into two kinds or if this seems preferable into three could you explain on what principle by taking up some of what has been said before like what we agreed earlier that the god had revealed a division of what is into the unlimited and the limit certainly let us now take these as two of the kinds while treating the one that results from the mixture of these two as our third kind but I must look like quite a fool with my distinctions in two kinds

and enumerations what are you driving at that we seem to be in need of yet a fourth kind tell us what it is look at the cause of this combination of those two together and posited as my fourth kind in addition to those three might you know also be in need of a fifth kind that provides for their separation perhaps but I don't think so at least for now but if it turns out that I needed I gather you will bear with me if I should search for a fifth kind gladly let us take up

three of the four and since we observe that two of them both are split up and dispersed into many let's make an effort to collect those into a unity again in order to study how each of them is in fact one and many if you could explain all that more clearly I might be able to follow you what I mean is this the two kinds are the ones are referred to just now unlimited and what has limit that the unlimited in a way is many I will try to explain now the treatment of what has

limit will have to wait a little longer let it wait attention then the matter I am asking you to attend to is difficult and controversial but attend to it nevertheless check first in the case of the hotter and the colder weather you can conceive of a limit or whether the more and less do not rather reside in these kinds and while they reside in them do not permit the attainment of any end for once and end has been reached they will both have been ended as well very true we are agreed then that the hotter

and the colder always contain them more and less quite definitely our argument forces us to conclude that these things never have an end and since they are endless they turn out to be entirely unlimited quite strongly so Socrates you have grasped this rather well pro Tarkus and remind me rightly with your pronouncement of strongly that hit an equally its counterpart gently of the same caliber as the more or less wherever they apply they prevent everything from adopting a definite quantity by imposing on all actions the qualification stronger relative to gentler or the reverse they procure

a more and less while doing away with all definite quantity we are saying now in effect that if they do not abolish definite quantity but let quantity and measurement take a foothold in the domain of the more and less the strong and mild they will be driven out of their own territory for once they take on a definite quantity they would no longer be hotter and colder the hotter and equally the colder are always in flux and never remain while definite quantity means standstill and the end of all progression the upshot of this argument is

that the hotter together with its opposite turn out to be unlimited that's seems to be its result Socrates although as you said yourself it is difficult to follow in these matters but if they are repeated again and again perhaps both questioner and respondent may end up in a satisfactory state of agreement a good idea let us carry it out but consider whether to avoid the needless length of going through a complete survey of all cases the following indication may serve to mark out the nature of the unlimited what indication do you have in mind whatever

seems to us to become more and less or susceptible to strong and mild or to too much and all of that kind all that we ought to subsume under the genus of the unlimited as its unity this is in compliance with the principle we agreed on before that for whatever is dispersed and split up into a multitude we must try to work out its unifying nature as far as we can if you remember I do remember but look now at what does not admit of these qualifications but rather their opposites first of all the equal

and equality and after the equal things like double and all that is related as number to number or measure to measure if we subdue more these together under the heading of limit we would seem to do a fair job or what do you say a very fair job Socrates very well then but what nature shall we ascribe to the third kind the one that is the mixture of the two you will have to answer that question for me I think a god rather if any of them should listen to my prayers so say your prayer

and wait for the result I am waiting and indeed I have the feeling that one of the Gods is favorably disposed to us now pro Tarkus what do you mean by that and what evidence have you I certainly will tell you but you follow closely what I say just go on we cooled something hotter and colder just now didn't we yes now add drier and wetter to them and more and less faster and slower shorter and whatever else we have previously collected together as the one kind that has the nature of taking on the more

and less you mean the nature of the unlimited yes now take the next step and mix with it the class of the limit which one the very one we have so far emitted to collect together the class that has the character of limit although we ought to have given unity to it just as we collected together the unlimited kind but perhaps it will come to the same thing even now if through the collection of these two kinds the unity of the former kind becomes conspicuous to what kind do you mean and how is this supposed

to work the kind that contains equal and double and whatever else puts an end to the conflicts there are among opposites making them commensurate and harmonious by imposing a definite number on them I understand I have the impression that you are saying that from such a mixture in each case certain generations result your impression is correct then go on with your explanation is it not true that in sickness the right combination of the opposites establishes the state of health certainly and does not the same happen in the case of the high and the low the

fast and the slow which belong to the unlimited is it not the presence of these factors in them which forges a limit and thereby creates the different kind of music in their perfection beautiful and once engendered in frost and heat limit takes away their excesses and unlimitedness and establishes moderation and harmony in that domain quiet and when the unlimited and what has limit are mixed together we are blessed with seasons and all sorts of fine things of that kind who could doubt it and there are countless other things I have to pass by in silence

with health there come beauty and strength and again in our soul there is a host of other excellent quality it is the goddess herself fair Philebus who recognizes how excess and the overabundance of our wickedness allow for no limit in our pleasures and their fulfillment and she therefore imposes law and order as a limit on them and while he may complain that this ruins them are by contrast call it their salvation how does this strike you pro Tarkus this fits my own intuition Socrates these then are the three kinds I spoke of if you see

what I mean I think I've got it it seems to me that you are referring to the unlimited as one kind to the limit within things as the other second kind but I still do not sufficiently understand what you mean by the third you are simply overwhelmed by the abundance of the third kind my admirable friend although the class of the unlimited also displays a multiplicity it preserved at least the appearance of unity since it was marked out by the common character of the more and less that is true about the limit on the other

hand we did not trouble ourselves neither that it has plurality nor whether it is won by nature why should we have done so no reason but see what I mean by the third kind I treat all the joint offspring of the other two kinds as a unity are coming into being created through the measures imposed by the limit I understand but now we have to look at the fourth kind we mentioned earlier in addition to these three let this be our joint investigation see now whether you think it necessary that everything that comes to be

comes to be through some cause certainly as far as I can see how can anything come to be without one and is it not the case that there is no difference between the nature of what makes and the cause except in name so that the maker and the cause would rightly be called one right but what about what is made and what comes into being we will not find the same situation that they also do not differ except in name exactly and isn't it the case that what makes is always leading in the order of

nature while a thing made follows since it comes into being through it right therefore the cause and what is subservient to the cause in a process of coming to be a rule so different and not the same how should they be it follows then that what comes to be and that from which it is produced represent all three kinds very true we therefore declare that the craftsman who produces all these must be the fourth kind the cause since it has been demonstrated sufficiently that it differs from the others it certainly is different now that the

four kinds have been distinguished it seems right to go through them one by one for memories sake of course as the first I count the unlimited limit as a second afterwards in third place comes the being which is mixed and generated out of those two and no mistake is made if the cause of this mixture and generation is counted as number four how could there be one now let's see what is going to be our next point after this and what concern of ours got us to this point was it not this we were wondering

where the second prize should be awarded to pleasure auto knowledge wasn't that it it was indeed on the basis of our fourfold distinction we may now perhaps be in a better position to come to a decision about the first than the second prize the issue that started our whole debate perhaps let us continue then we declared the life that combines pleasure and knowledge the winner didn't we we did should we not take a look at this life and see what it is and to which kind it belongs nothing to prevent us we will I think

assign it to the third kind for it is not a mixture of just two elements but of the sword where all that is unlimited is tied down by limit it would seem right then to make our victorious form of life part of that kind very right that is settled then but how about your kind of life for Labour's which is pleasant and unmixed to which of the established kind should it by right to be assigned but before you make your pronouncement answer me the following question just tell me do pleasure and pain have a limit

or are they of the sort that had mid the more and less certainly the sort that admit the more Socrates for how could pleasure be all that is good if it were not by nature boundless in plenty and increase nor would on the other hand pain be all that is bad for Labour's so we have to search for something beside its unlimited character that would bestow one pleasures a share of the good but take note that pleasure is thereby assigned to the boundless as to assigning intelligence knowledge and reason to one of our aforesaid kinds

how can we avoid the danger of blasphemy protaras and Philebus a lot seems to hinge on whether or not we give the right answer to this question really now you are extolling your own God Socrates just as you extol that goddess of yours for Labour's but the question needs an answer nevertheless Socrates is right in this for Labour's we must obey Him didn't you choose to speak instead of me quiet but now I am at a loss and I entreat you Socrates to act as our spokesman so that we do not miss state the case

of your candidate and thus introduce a false note into the discussion your obedient servant pro Tarkus especially since it is not a very difficult task but did my playful exhortation really confuse you as for Labour's claims when I asked - what kind reason and knowledge belonged it certainly did Socrates it is easy to settle nevertheless for all the wise are agreed in true self exaltation that reason is how King both over heaven and earth and perhaps they are justified but let us go into the discussion of this class itself at greater length if you have

no objections discuss it in whichever way you like Socrates and don't be apologetic about long winded Ness we will not lose patience well said let us proceed by taking up this question what question whether we hold the view that the universe and this whole world order are ruled by unreason an irregularity as chance would have it or whether they are not rather as our forebears taught us governed by reason and by the order of a wonderful intelligence how can you even think of a comparison here Socrates what you suggest now is downright in pious I

would say the only account that can do justice to the wonderful spectacle presented by the cosmic order of Sun Moon and stars and the revolution of the whole heaven is that reason arranges it all and I for my part would never waver in saying or believing it is this what you want us to do that we should not only conform to the view of earlier thinkers who professed this as the truth repeating without any risk what others have said but that we should share their risk and blame if some formidable opponent denies it and argues

that disorder rules how could I fail to want it well then now face up to the consequences of this position that we have to come to terms with please tell me we somehow discern that what makes up the nature of the bodies of all animals fire water and air and earth as storm-battered sailors say are part of their composition very much so we are indeed battered by difficulties in our discussion come now and realise that the following applies to all constituents that belong to us what is it that the amount of each of these elements

in us is small and insignificant that it does not possess in the very least the purity or the power that is worthy of its nature take one example as an illustration representative for all there is something called fire that belongs to us and then again there is fire in the universe no doubt and is not the fire that belongs to us small in amount feeble and poor while the fire in the universe overwhelms us by its size and beauty and by the display of all its power what you say is very true but what about

this is the fire in the universe generated nourished and ruled by the fire that belongs to us or is it not quite the reverse that your heat and mine and that in every animal oh all this to the cosmic fire it is not even worth answering that question right and I guess you will give the same answer about the earth here in the animals when it is compared to the earth in the universe and likewise about the other elements I mentioned a little earlier is that your answer who could answer differently without seeming insane no

one at all but now see what follows - the combination of all these elements taken as a unit we give the name body don't we certainly now realize that the same holds in the case of what we call the ordered universe it will turn out to be a body in the same sense since it is composed of the same elements what you say is undeniable does the body of the universe as a whole provide for the sustenance of what his body in our sphere or is it the reverse and the universe possesses and derives all

the goods enumerated from ours that too is a question not worth asking Socrates but what about the following is this also a question not worth asking tell me what the question is of the body that belongs to us will we not say that it has a soul quite obviously that is what we will say but where does it come from unless the body of the universe which has the same properties as ours but more beautiful in all respects happens to possess a soul clearly from nowhere else we surely cannot maintain this assumption with respect to

our four classes limit the unlimited their mixture and their cause which is present in everything that this cause is recognized as all-encompassing wisdom since among us it imports the soul and provides training for the body and medicine for its ailments and in other cases order and restitution but that it should fail to be responsible for the same things on a large scale in the whole universe things that are in addition beautiful and pure for the contrivance of what has so fair and wonderful a nature that would make no sense at all but if that is

inconceivable we had better pursue the alternative account and affirm as we have said often that there is plenty of the unlimited in the universe as well as sufficient limit and that there is above them a certain cause of no small significance that orders and coordinates the years seasons and months and which has every right to the title of wisdom and reason the greatest right but there could be no wisdom and reason without a soul certainly not you will therefore say that in the nature of Zeus there is the soul of a king as well as

a king's reason in virtue of this power displayed by the cause while paying tribute for other fine qualities in the other divinities in conformity with the names by which they like to be addressed very much so do not think that we have engaged in an idle discussion here Pro Tarkus for it comes as a support for the thinkers of old who held the view that reason is forever the ruler over the universe it certainly does it also has provided an answer to my query that reason belongs to that kind which is the cause of everything

but that was one of our four kinds so there you already have the solution to our problem in your hands I have indeed and quiet to my satisfaction although at first I did not realize that you were answering sometimes joking is a relief from seriousness well said by now dear friend we have arrived at a satisfactory explanation of the class that reason belongs to and what power it has quite so and as to pleasure it became apparent quite a while ago what class it belongs to definitely let us firmly keep it in mind about both

of them that reason is akin to cause and is part of that family while pleasure itself is unlimited and belongs to the kind that in and by itself neither possesses nor will ever possess a beginning middle or end we will keep it in mind how could we help it after this we must next find out in what kind of thing each of them resides and what kind of condition makes them come to be when they do let us take pleasure first for just as we searched for the class it belongs to first so we start

our present investigation with it but again we will not be able to provide a satisfactory examination of pleasure if we do not study it together with pain if that is the direction we have to take then let's go that way do you share my view about their generation what view pleasure and pain seemed to me by nature to arise together in the common kind could you remind us once again Socrates which of those you mentioned you called the common kind as far as I can see my most esteemed friend that is noble of you by

the common kind we meant the one that was number three on our list of four you mean the one you introduced after the unlimited and the limited the one that included health and also harmony I believe excellently stated but now try to put your mind to this as much as possible just go on what I claim is that when we find the harmony in living creatures disrupted there will at the same time be a dis integration of their nature and a rise of pain what you say is very plausible but if the reverse happens and

harmony is regained and the former nature restored we have to say that pleasure arises if we must pronounce only a few words on the weightiest matters in the shortest possible time I believe that you are right Socrates but why don't we try to be more explicit about this very well is it not child's play to understand the most ordinary and well-known cases what cases do you mean hunger I take it is a case of disintegration and pain yes and eating the corresponding refilling is a pleasure yes but first is once again a destruction and pain

while the process that fills what is dried out with liquid is pleasure and further unnatural separation and dissolution the affection caused by he'd his pain while the natural restoration of cooling down is pleasure very much though and the unnatural coagulation of the fluids in an animal through the freezing his pain while the natural process of their dissolution or redistribution his pleasure to cut matters short see whether the following account seems acceptable to you when the natural combination of limit and unlimited Ness that forms a live organism as I explained before is destroyed this destruction is

pain while the return towards its own nature this general restoration is pleasure so be it for its scenes to provide at least an outline shall we then accept this as one kind of pleasure and pain what happens in either of these two kinds of processes accepted but now accept also the anticipation by the soul itself of these two kinds of experiences the hope before the actual pleasure will be pleasant and comforting while the expectation of pain would be frightening and painful this turns out then to be a different kind of pleasure and pain namely the

expectation that the soul experiences by itself without the body your assumption is correct in both these cases as I see it at least pleasure and pain will arise pure and unmixed with each other so that it will become apparent as far as pleasure is concerned whether its whole class is to be welcomed or whether there should rather be the privilege of one of the other classes which we have already discussed pleasure and pain may rather turn out to share the predicament of hot and cold and other such things that her welcome at one point but

unwelcome at another because they are not good but it happens that some of them do occasionally assume a beneficial nature you are quite right if you suggest that this must be the direction to take if we want to find a solution to what we are looking for now first then let us take a look together at the following point if it truly holds as we said that there dis integration constitutes pain but restoration is pleasure what kind of state should we ascribe to animals when they are neither destroyed nor restored what kind of condition is

this think about it carefully and tell me is there not every necessity that the animal will at the time experience neither plane nor pleasure neither large nor small that is indeed necessary there is there in such a condition a third one besides the one in which one is pleased or in which one is in pain obviously make an effort to keep this fact in mind for it makes quite a difference for our judgment of pleasure whether remember that there is such a state or not but we had better given a little more consideration if you

don't mind just tell me how you realize that nothing prevents the person who has chosen the life of reason from living in this state you mean without pleasure and pain it was one of the conditions agreed on in our comparison of lives that the person who chooses the life of reason and intelligence must not enjoy pleasures either large or small that was indeed agreed on he may then live in this fashion and perhaps there would be nothing absurd if this life turns out to be the most godlike it is at any rate not likely that

the gods experienced either pleasure or the opposite it is certainly not likely for either of these states would be quite unseemly in their case but this is a question we had better take up again later if it should be relevant to our discussion but let us count it has an additional point in favor of reason in the competition for second prize either if we cannot count it in that for first prize a very good suggestion but now as for the other kind of pleasure of which we said that it belongs to the soul itself it

depends entirely on memory in what way it seems we have first to determine what kind of thing memory is in fact I'm afraid that we will have to determine the nature of perception even before that of memory if the whole subject matter is to become at all clear to us in the right way how do you mean you must realize that some of the various affections of the body are extinguished within the body before they reach the soul leaving it unaffected others penetrate through both body and soul and provoke a kind of upheaval that is

peculiar to each but also common to both of them I realized that are we fully justified if we claim that the soul remains oblivious of those affections that do not penetrate both while it is not a Bolivia's of those that penetrate both of course we are justified but you must not so misunderstand as to suppose I meant that this obliviousness gave rise to any kind of forgetting forgetting is rather the loss of memory but in the case in question here no memory has yet arisen it would be absurd to say that there could be the

process of losing something that neither is nor was in existence wouldn't it quite definitely you only have to make some changes in names then how so instead of saying that the soul is oblivious when it remains unaffected by the disturbances of the body now changed the name of what you so far called obliviousness to that of non perception I understand but when the soul and body are jointly affected and moved by one in the same affection if you call this motion perception you would say nothing out of the way you are right and so we

know by now what we mean by perception certainly so if someone were to call memory the preservation of perception he would be speaking correctly as far as I'm concerned rightly so and do we not hold that recollection differs from memory perhaps does not their difference lioness in what do we not call it recollection when the soul recalls as much as possible by itself without the aid of the body what she had once experienced together with the body or how would you put it I quite agree but on the other hand when after the loss of

memory of either a perception or again a piece of knowledge the soul calls up this memory for itself we also call all these events recollection you are right the point for the sake of which all this has been said is the following what is it that we grasp as fully and clearly as possible the pleasure that the soul experiences without the body as well as the desire and through a clarification of these states the nature of both pleasure and desire will somehow be revealed let us now discuss this as our next issue Socrates it seems

that in our investigation we have to discuss many points about the origin of pleasure and about all its different varieties for it looks as if we will first have to determine what desire is and on what occasion it arises let us determine that then we have nothing to lose we will certainly lose something protaras by discovering what we are looking for now we will lose our ignorance about it you rightly remind us of that fact but now let us try to return to the further pursuit of our subject are we agreed now that hunger and

thirst and many other things of this sort are desires quite an agreement but what is the common feature whose recognition allows us to address all these phenomena which differ so much by the same name heavens that is perhaps not an easy thing to determine Socrates but it must be done nevertheless shall we go back to the same point of departure what point when we say he is thirsty we all have something in mind we do meaning that he is getting empty certainly but first is a desire yes the desire for drink for drink or for

the filling with drink for the filling with drink I think whoever among us is emptied it seems desires the opposite of what he suffers being emptied he desires to be filled that is perfectly obvious but what about this problem if someone is emptied for the first time is there any way he could be in touch with filling either through sensation or memory since he has no experience of it either in the present or ever in the past how should we but we do maintain that he who has a desire desire something naturally he does not

have a desire for what he in fact experiences for he is thirsty and this is a process of emptying his desire is rather of filling yes something in the person who is thirsty must necessarily somehow be in contact with filling necessarily but it is impossible that there should be the body for the body is what is emptied out yes the only option we are left with is that the soul makes contact with the filling and it clearly must do so through memory or could it make contact or anything else clearly through nothing else do we

understand in what conclusions we have to draw from what has been said what are they our argument forces us to conclude that desire is not a matter of the body why is that because it shows that every living creature always strives towards the opposite of its own experience and very much so this impulse then that drives it towards the opposite of its own state signifies that it has memory of that opposite state certainly by pointing out that it is this memory that directs it towards the objects of its desires our argument has established that every

impulse and desire and the rule over the whole animal is the domain of the very much so our argument will then never allow that it is our body that experiences thirst hunger or anything of that sort absolutely not there is yet a further point we have to consider that is connected with the same conditions through our discussion seems to me to indicate that there is a form of life that consists of these conditions what does it consist of and what form of life are you talking about it consists of filling and emptying and all such

processes as are related to both the preservation and the destruction of animals and when one of us is in either of the two conditions he is in pain or again he experiences pleasure depending on the nature of these changes that is indeed what happened but what if someone finds himself in between these two affections what do you mean by in between when he is pained by his condition and remembers the pleasant things that would put an end to the pain but is not yet being filled what about this situation should we claim that he is

then in between these two affections or not we should claim that and should we say that the person is altogether in pain or pleasure by heaven he seems to me to be suffering a two-fold pain one consists in the body's condition the other in the souls desire caused by the expectation how do you mean that there is a twofold pain patacas does it not sometimes happen that one of us is emptied at one particular time but is in clear hope of being filled while as another time he is on the country without hope it certainly

happens and don't you think that he enjoys this hope for replenishment when he remembers while he is simultaneously in pain because he has been emptied at that time necessarily this is in the occasion when a human being and other animals are simultaneously undergoing pain and pleasure it seems so but what if he is without hope of attained any replenishment when he is emptied is not that the situation where this twofold pain occurs which you have just come across and simply taken to be twofold that is quite undeniable Socrates now let us apply the results of

our investigation of these affections to this purpose what is it shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true or false or rather that some of them are true but not others but how could there be false pleasures or pain Socrates well how could there be true or false fears true or false expectations true or false judgments protaras for judgments I certainly would be ready to admit it but not for the other cases what is it you are saying I'm afraid we are stirring up a weighty controversy here you are right but if it

is relevant to what we were discussing before you were the son of that man it ought to be taken up perhaps in that case we have to forego any excursions here or any discussion of whatever side issues are not directly relevant to our topic right but tell me this for I have lived in continued perplexity about the difficulty we have come across now what is your view are there not forced pleasures as well as true ones how should there be do you really want to claim that there is no one who either in a dream

or awake either in madness or any other delusion sometimes believes he is enjoying himself while in reality he is not doing so or believes he is in pain while he is not we all assume that this is indeed the case of goodies but rightly so should we not rather take up the question whether or not this claim is justified we should take it up as I at least would say let us try to achieve more clarity about what we said concerning pleasure and judgment is there something we call judging yes and is there also taking

pleasure yes but there is also what the judgment is about certain and also what the pleasure is about very much so but what makes a judgment whether it judges rightly or not cannot be deprived of really making a judgment how should it and what takes pleasure whether it is rightly pleased or not can obviously never be deprived of really taking pleasure yes that is also the case but what we have to question is how it is that judgment is usually either true or false while pleasure admits only truth even though in both cases there is

equally real judgment and real pleasure we have the question that is it that judgment takes on the additional qualification of true and false and is thus not simply judgment but also has either one of these two qualities would you say that is a point we have to look into yes and furthermore whether quite generally certain things allow extra qualifications while pleasure and pain are simply what they are and do not take on any qualifications about that we also have to come to an agreement obviously for at least it is not difficult to see that they

to take on qualifications for we said earlier that both of them pleasures as well as pains can be great and small and also have intensity we certainly did but if some bad state should attach itself to any of them then we would say that the judgment becomes a bad one and the pleasure becomes bad too Pro tacos naturally Socrates but what if some rightness or the opposite of rightness are added to something would we not call the judgment right if it were right and the pleasure to necessarily and if a mistake is made about the

object of judgment then we say that the judgment that makes that mistake is not right and does not judge rightly how could it but what if we noticed that a pain or pleasure is mistaken in what is pleased or pained about shall we then call it right or proper or give it other names of praise that would be impossible if indeed pleasure should be mistaken as the pleasure is certainly often seems to arise in us not with a right but with a false judgment of course but what we call false in this case at that

point is the judgment Socrates nobody would dream of calling the pleasure itself false you certainly put up a spirited defense for pleasure now protaras not at all I only repeat what I hear is there no difference between the pleasure that goes with ride judgment and knowledge and the kind that often comes to any of us with forced judgment and ignorance there's probably no small difference so let us turn to inspect the difference between them lead on where you like I'll lead you this way what way of our judgment we say that it is sometimes false

and sometimes true it is and as we said just now these are often accompanied by a pleasure and pain I'm talking of true and false judgment that's right and is it not memory and perception that lead to judgment or the attempt to come to a definite judgment as the case may be indeed do we agree that the following must happen here what wouldn't you say that it often happens that someone who cannot get a clear view because he is looking from a distance wants to make up his mind about what he sees I would say

so and might he then not again raise another question for himself what question what could that be that appears to stand near that rock under a tree do you find it plausible that someone might say these words to himself when he sets his eyes on such appearances certainly and might he not afterwards as an answer to his own question say to himself it is a man and in so speaking would get it right no doubt but he might also be mistaken and say that what he sees is a statue the work of some herdsmen very

likely but if you were in company he might actually say out loud to his companion what he had told himself and so what we earlier called judgment would turn into an assertion to be sure whereas if he is alone he entertains this thought by himself and sometimes he may even resume his way for quite a long time with the thought in his mind no doubt but look do you share my view on this what view that how soul in such a situation is comparable to a book how so if memory and perceptions concur with other

impressions at a particular occasion then they seemed to me to inscribe words in our soul as it were and if what is written is true then we form a true judgment and a true account of the matter but here what how scribe writes is false then the result will be the opposite of the truth I quite agree and I accept this way of putting it do you also accept that there is another craftsman at work in our soul at the same time what kind of craftsman a painter who follows the scribe and provides illustrations to

his words in the soul how and when do we say he does this work when a person takes his judgments and assertions directly from sight or any other sense perception and then views the images he has formed inside himself corresponding to those judgments and assertions or is not something of this sort that is going on in us quite definitely and are not the pictures of true judgments and assertions true and the pictures of the false ones false certainly if we have been right with what we have said so far let us in addition come to

terms about this question what about whether these experiences are necessarily confined to the past and the present but are not extended into the future they should apply equally to all the tenses past present and future now did we not say before about the pleasures and pains that belong to the soul alone that they might precede those that go through the it would therefore be possible that we have anticipatory pleasures and pains about the future undeniably and are those writings and pictures which come to be in us as we said earlier concerned only with the past

and the present but not with the future decidedly with the future if you say decidedly it is because all of them are really hopes for future times and we are forever brim full of hopes throughout our lifetime quite definitely well in addition to what has been said now also answer this question concerning what isn't a man who is just pious and good in all respects also loved by the gods how could he fail to be but what about someone who is unjust and in all respects evil isn't he that man's opposite of course and it's

not everyone as we just said always full of many hopes certainly there are then assertions in each of us that we call hopes yes but there are also those painted images and someone often envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and of a lot of pleasures as a consequence and in addition he also sees in this inner picture of himself that he is beside himself with delight what else now do we want to say that in the case of good people these pictures are usually true because they are dear to the

gods while quite the opposite usually holds in the case of wicked ones or is this not what we ought to say that is just what we ought to say and wicked people nevertheless have pleasures painted in their minds even though they are somehow false right so wicked people as a rule enjoy fools pleasures but the good among mankind true ones quite necessarily so from what has now been said it follows that there are false pleasures in human souls that are quite ridiculous imitations of true ones and also such pains they certainly are now it was

agreed that whoever judges anything at all is always really judging even if it is not about anything existing in the present past or future right and these were I think the conditions that produce a false judgement and judging falsely weren't they yes but should we not also grant two pleasures and pains a condition that is analogous in these ways in what ways in the sense that whoever has any pleasure at all however ill-founded it maybe really does have pleasure even if sometimes it is not about anything that either is the case or ever was the

case or often or perhaps most of the time refers to anything that ever will be the case that also must necessarily be so and the same account holds in the case of fear anger and everything of that sort namely that all of them can at times be false certainly well do we have any other way of distinguishing between bad and good judgments than their falsity we have no other nor I presume will we find any other way to account for badness in the case of pleasures unless they are false what you say is quite the

opposite of the truth Socrates it is not at all because they are false that we regard pleasures or pains as bad but because there is some other grave and wide-ranging kind of badness involved but let us discuss bad pleasures and what badness there is in their case a little later if we still feel like it now we have to take up false pleasures in another sense and show that there is a great variety that arise and are at work in us this argument will perhaps come in handy later when we have to make our decisions

that may well be so at least if there are any such pleasures there certainly are protaras I at least am convinced but until this is our accepted opinion we cannot leave this conviction unexamined right so let us get ready like athletes to form a line of attack around this problem here we go we did say a short while ago in our discussion as we may recall that when what we call desires are in us then body and soul part company and have each their separate experiences we do remember that was said before and wasn't it

the soul that had desires desires for conditions opposite to the actual ones of the body while it was the body that undergoes the pain or the pleasure of some affection that was indeed so draw your conclusions as to what is going on here you tell me what happens is this under these circumstances pains and pleasures exist side by side and there are simultaneously opposite perceptions of them as we have just made clear yes that is clear but did we not also discuss this point and come to an agreement how to settle it earlier what point

that the two of them both pleasure and pain admit the more and less and belong to the unlimited kind that was what we said what about it do we have any means of making a right decision about these matters where and in what respect in the case where we intend to come to a decision about any of them in such circumstances which one is greater or smaller or which one is more intensive or stronger pain compared to pleasure or pain compared to pain or pleasure - pleasure yes these questions do arise and that is what

we want to decide well then does it happen only to eyesight that seen objects from afar or close by distorts the truth and causes false judgments or does not the same thing happen also in the case of pleasure and pain much more so Socrates but this is the reverse of the result we reached a little earlier what are you referring to earlier it was true and false judgments which affected the respective pleasures and pains with her condition quite right but now it applies to pleasures and pains themselves it is because they are alternately looked at

from close up or far away or simultaneously put side by side that the pleasures seem greater compared to pain and more intensive and pain seem on the contrary moderate in comparison with pleasures it is quite inevitable that such conditions arise under these circumstances but if you take that portion of them by which they appear greater or smaller than they really are and cut it off from each of them as a mere appearance and without real being you will neither admit that this appearance is right nor dare to say that anything connected with this portion of

pleasure or pain is right and true certainly not next in order after these we will find pleasures and pains in animals that are even forcer than these both in appearance and reality if we approach them in this way what are they and what is the way it has now been said repeatedly that it is a destruction of the nature of those entities through combinations and separations through processes of filling and emptying as well as certain kinds of growth and decay that gives rise to pain and suffering distress and whatever else comes to pass that goes

under such a name yes that has often been said but when things are restored to their own nature again this restoration as we established in our agreement among ourselves is pleasure correct but what if nothing of that sort happens to our body what then when could that ever happen Socrates your objection is not to the point for Tarkus how so because you do not prevent me from putting my question to you again what question if in fact nothing of that sort took place I will ask you what would necessarily be the consequence of this for

us you mean if the body is not moved in either direction Socrates that is my question this much is clear Socrates that in such a case there would not be either any pleasure or pain at all very well put but I guess what you meant to say is that we necessarily are always experiencing one or the other as the wise men say for everything is in an eternal flux upward and downward they do say that and what they say seems important how else since they themselves are important people but I do want to avoid this

argument which now assails us I plan to escape that in this way and you'd better make your escape with me just tell me how so be it we will reply to them but as for you answer me this question whether all living creatures in all cases notice it whenever they are affected in some way so that we notice when we grow or experience anything of that sort or whether it is quite otherwise it is indeed quite otherwise almost all of these processes totally escape our notice but then what we just agreed to was not well

spoken that the changes upwards and downwards evoke pleasures and pains how could it but if it is stated in this way it will be better and become unobjectionable in what way that great changes cause pleasures and pains in us while moderate or small ones and gender neither of the two effects that is more correct than the other statement Socrates but if this is correct then we are back with the same kind of life we discussed before what kind the life that we said was painless but also devoid of charm undeniably so we end up with

three kinds of life the life of pleasure the life of pain and the neutral life or what would you say about these matters I would put it in the same way that there are three kinds of life but to be free of pain would not be the same thing as to have pleasure how could it be the same if you hear someone say that it is the most pleasant thing of all to live one's whole life without pain how do you understand the speaker's intention to my understanding he seems to identify pleasure with freedom from

pain now imagine three sorts of things whichever you may like and because these are high sounding names let us call them gold silver and what is neither of the two consider it done is there any way conceivable in which this third kind could turn out to be the same as one of our other two sorts gold or silver how could it that the middle kind of life could turn out to be either Pleasant or painful would be the wrong thing to think if anyone happened to think so and it would be the wrong thing to

say if anyone should say so according to the proper account of the matter no doubt but we do find people who both think so and say so my friend certainly and do they really believe they experience pleasure when they are not in pain they say so at any rate they believed therefore that they are pleased at that time otherwise they would not say that they are it looks that way but they hold a false judgment about pleasure if in fact freedom from pain and pleasure each have a nature of their own but they do have

their own what decisions shall we make that there are three states in us as we said just now or that there are only two pain being an evil in human life and liberation from pain also called pleasure being the good as such but why is it that we are asking ourselves this question now Socrates I don't get the point that is because you don't really understand who the enemies of our four labors here are what enemies do you mean I mean people with a tremendous reputation in natural silence who say that there are no such

things as pleasures at all how selves they hold that everything the followers of four labors called pleasures are nothing but escape from pain do you suggest we should believe them Socrates or what is it you want us to do not that but to use them as see as who make their prophecies not in virtue of any art but in virtue of a certain harshness in their nature it is a nature not without nobility but out of an inordinate hatred that they have conceived against the power of pleasure they refused to acknowledge anything healthy in it

even to the point that they regard it's very attractiveness itself as witchcraft rather than pleasure you may now make use of them for our purposes taking notice of the rest of their complaints that result from their harshness after that you will hear what I for my part regard as true pleasures so that through an examination of these two opposed points of view we can reach a decision about the power of pleasure a fair proposal let us attach ourselves to them as allies and follow their traces in the direction in which their dour argument points us

I think they employ reasoning of this kind starting from some such basic principle if we wanted to know the nature of any character like that of hardness would we get a better understanding if we looked at the hardest kinds of things rather than at what has a low degree of hardness now it is your task pro Tarkas to answer these difficult people just as you answered me gladly and my answer to them will be that I would look at hardness of the first degree but again if we wanted to study the form of pleasure to

see what kind of nature it has in that case we ought not to look at low level pleasures but at those that are said to be the strongest and most intensive everyone would grant you this point now aren't the most immediate and greatest among the pleasures the ones connected with the body as we have often said no doubt and is it the case that pleasures are more intensive or set in with greater intensity when people suffer from an illness then when they are healthy we have to beware of a hasty answer here lest we get

tripped up perhaps you might be inclined to affirm this rather for the healthy people quite likely but what about this are not those pleasures overwhelming which are also preceded by the greatest desires that is certainly true and when people suffer from fever or any such disease aren't they more subject to thirst chill and whatever else continues to affect them through the body though they not feel greater debt privations and also greater pleasures at their replenishment or shall we deny that this is true it seems undeniable as you explained it now very well are we justified

then if we claim that whoever wants to study the greatest pleasures should turn to sickness not health now mind you my question was not whether the very sick have more pleasures than healthy people my concern is rather with the size and intensity of the condition when it takes place our task as we said is to comprehend both what its true nature is and how those conceived of it who deny that there is any such thing as pleasure at all I am following quite well what you say you might as well be its guide protaras now

tell me do you recognize greater pleasures in a life given to excesses I do not say more pleasures but pleasures that exceed by their force and intensity than in a moderate life think carefully about it before you answer I quite understand what you are after I see indeed a huge difference the moderate people somehow always stand under the guidance of the proverbial Maxim nothing too much and obey it but has the foolish people and those given to debauchery the excesses of their pleasures drive them near madness and to shrieks of frenzy good but if this

is how it stands then it is obvious that it is in some vicious state of soul and body and not in virtue that the greatest pleasures as well as the greatest pains have their origin obviously so we must pick out some of them to find out what characteristic of theirs made us call them the greatest necessarily now look at the pleasures that go with these types of melodies what kinds of conditions they are what types do you mean those pleasures of a rather repugnant type which our harsh friends hate above all what kinds for example

the relief from itching by rubbing and all of that sort that needs no other remedy but if this condition should befall us what in heaven's name should we call it pleasure or pain that really would seem to be a mixed experience with a bad component Socrates I did not raise this question with the intention of alluding to four labors but without a clarification of these pleasures and of those who cultivate them we could hardly come to any resolution of our problem then let us take up the whole tribe of these pleasures you mean the ones

that have that mix nature right there are mixtures that have their origin in the body and are confined to the body then there are mixtures found in the soul and they are confined to the soul but then we will also find mixtures of pleasures and pains in both soul and body and at one time the combination of both will be called pleasure at other times it will be called pain household when someone undergoes restoration or destruction he experiences two opposed conditions at once he may feel hot while shivering or feel chilled while sweating I suppose

he will then want to retain one of these conditions and get rid of the other but if this so called bittersweet condition is hard to shake it first causes irritation and later on turns into wild excitement a very accurate description now isn't it the case that some of those mixtures contain an even amount of pleasures and pain while there is a preponderance of either of the two in others right take the case we just mentioned of itching and scratching has an example where the pains outweigh the pleasures now when the irritation and infection are inside

and cannot be reached by rubbing and scratching there is only relief on the surface in case they treat these parts by exposing them to fire or its opposite they go from one extreme to the other in their distress they sometimes procure enormous pleasures but sometimes this leads to a state inside that is opposite to that outside with a mixture of pains and pleasures whichever way the balance may turn because this treatment disperses by force what was mixed together or mixes together what was separate so that pains arise besides the pleasures necessarily now in all those

cases where the mixture contains a surplus of pleasure the small admixture of pain gives rise only to a tickle and a mild irritation while the predominant part of pleasure causes contractions of the body to the point of leaping and kicking color changes of all sorts distortion of features and wild palpitations it finally drives the person totally out of his mind said he shouts aloud like a madman very much so and this state causes him and others to say of him that he is almost dying of these pleasures and the more profligate and mindless he is

the more will he pursue them by any means possible and he calls them supreme and considers as the happiest of all mortals whoever lives in continuous enjoyment of them as much as that is possible your description fits exactly the preconception of the common run of people Socrates yes as far as concerns the pleasures that arise when there is a mixture of the external and internal state of the body protaras but take now the cases where the souls contributions are opposed to the bodies when there is pain over and against pleasures or pleasure against pain both

are finally joined in a mixed state we've talked about them earlier and agreed that in these cases it is the deprivation that gives rise to the desire for replenishment and while the expectation is pleasant the deprivation itself is painful when we discuss this we did not make any special mention as we do now of the fact that in the vast number of cases where soul and body are not in agreement the final result is a single mixture that combines pleasure and pain I suspect that you are right but here we are still left with one

further kind of mixture of pleasure and pain tell me what it is the case a common one where the mixture is the product of affections within the soul itself as we said before what was it again that we said take wrath fear longing lamentations love jealousy malice and other things like that don't you regard them as a kind of pain within the soul itself I certainly do and don't we find that they are full of marvelous pleasures or do we need the famous lines as a reminder about wrath that can then bitter even the wise

but much sweeter than soft flowing honey similarly in the case of lamentations and longing aren't there also pleasures mixed in with the pain no need for further reminders in all these cases it must be just as you said and the same happens in those who watch tragedies there is laughter mixed with the weeping if you remember how could I forget now look at our state of mind in comedy don't you realize that it also involves a mixture of pleasure and pain I don't quite see that yet it is indeed not quite so easy to see

that this condition applies under those circumstances it certainly is not to me since it is such an obscure matter let us be the more careful for this will help us to recognize more easily when there is a mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases as well please tell me since we mentioned the word malice do you treat malice as a pain of the soul or what I do on the other hand will not the malicious person display pleasure at his neighbor's misfortunes very much so now ignorance is a vice and so is what we

call stupidity decidedly what conclusions do you draw from this about the nature of the ridiculous you tell me it is in some a kind of vice that derives its name from a special disposition it is among all the vices the one with a character that stands in direct opposition to the one recommended by the famous inscription in Delphi you mean the one that says know thyself Socrates I do the opposite recommendation would obviously be that we not know ourselves at all no doubt go on and make a subdivision of this disposition into three photographers what

do you mean I'm afraid I don't know how to are you saying that it is up to me to make this division now this is indeed what I'm saying but in addition I beg you to do so are there not necessarily three ways in which it is possible not to know oneself what are they the first way concerns money if someone thinks himself richer than he in fact is many people certainly share that condition even more consider themselves taller and handsomer than they in fact are and believe they have other such physical advantages definitely but

an overwhelming number are mistaken about the third kind which belongs to the soul namely virtue and believed that they are superior in virtue although they are not very much so and again among the virtues is it not especially two wisdom that the largest number of people lay claim puffing themselves up with quarrels and force pretensions to would be knowledge undeniably so it would therefore be quite justified to say that all these conditions are bad quite justified so we must continue with our division of ignorance protaras if we want to find out what a strange mixture

of pleasure and pain this comic malice is how would you suggest that we should further subdivide in the case of all those who have such a false opinion about themselves is it not most necessary as it is for all mankind that it be combined either with strength and power or with its opposite necessarily so make this the point of division all those who combined this delusion with weakness and are unable to avenge themselves when they are laughed at you are justified in calling ridiculous but as for those who do have the power and strength to

take revenge if you cool them dangerous and hateful you are getting exactly the right conception about them for ignorant on the side of the strong and powerful is odious and ugly it is harmful even for their neighbors both the ignorance itself and its imitations whatever they may be ignorance on the side of the weak by contrast deserves to be placed among the ridiculous in rank and nature you are right about this division but I'm still not quite clear about where there is a mixture of pleasure and pain in these cases so take first the nature

of malice please explain it contains a kind of unjust pain and pleasure necessarily now if you rejoice about evils that happen to your enemy is there any injustice or malice in your pleasure how should there be but is there any occasion when it is not unjust to be pleased rather than pain to see bad things happen to your friends clearly not but we just agree that ignorant is bad for everyone right let us take now the ignorance of friends which we said came in three versions would be wisdom and would be beauty and the other

sort we just mentioned each of which is ridiculous if week.but odious if strong now are we ready to affirm of our friends stay what we just said namely that it is ridiculous if it is harmless to others very much so but did we not agree that it is bad if it is ignorance we certainly did but if we laugh about it are we pleased or pain by it we are pleased obviously but this pleasure in the face of the misfortunes of friends did we not say that it was the product of malice necessarily our argument

leads to the conclusion that if we laugh at what is ridiculous about our friends by mixing pleasure with malice we thereby mix pleasure with pain for we had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul that laughing is a pleasure and that both occur together on those occasions true the upshot of our discussion then is that in lamentations as well as in tragedies and comedies not only on stage but also in all of life's tragedies and comedies pleasures are mixed with pains and so it is on infinitely other occasions it would be impossible

not to agree with this even for the most ambitious defense of the opposite position Socrates now we had on our list of examples rats longing lamentation fear love jealousy malice and whatever else and we said that in these cases we would discern the mixture that we have already mentioned so frequently right right so we understand and that our whole explanation also applies to longing malice and wrath how could we fail to understand that and there are many other such cases to which it applies a great many now what precisely do you think was the purpose

for which I pointed out to you this mixture in comedy don't you see that it was designed to make it easier to persuade you that there is such a mixture in fear and love and other cases I hope that once you had accepted this you would release me from a protracted discussion of the rest once the main point was understood that there exists the possibility for the without the soul for the soul without the body and for both of them in a joint affection to contain a mixture of pleasure and pain now tell me whether

you will let me go now or whether you will keep us up till midnight one further remark will gain me my release I hope I will gladly give you a full account of the rest tomorrow but for now I want to steer towards the remaining points needed to make the decision for latest demands of us well spoken Socrates discuss the rest any way you like it seems natural somehow that we must proceed from the mixed pleasures to the discussion of the unmixed ones a very good point I will now try to explain them in turn

although I'm not really an agreement with those who hold that all pleasures are merely released from pain I nevertheless treat them as witnesses as I said before to prove that there are certain kinds that only seemed to be pleasures but are not so in reality and furthermore that there are others that have the appearance of enormous size and great variety but which are in truth commingled with pain or with respite from severe pain suffered by soul and body but Socrates what are the kinds of pleasures that one could rightly regard as true those that are

related to so-called pure colors into shapes and to most smells and sounds and in general all those that are based on imperceptible and painless lacks while there fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant but really Socrates what are you talking about what I'm saying may not be entirely clear straight away but I'll try to clarify it by the beauty of a shape I do not mean what the many might presuppose namely that of a living being or of a picture what I mean what the argument demands is rather something straight or round or what is constructed out

of these with a compass rule and square such as plain figures and solids those things I take it are not beautiful in a relative sense as others are but are by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves they provide their own specific pleasures that are not at all comparable to those of rubbing and colours are beautiful in an analogous way and import their own kinds of pleasures do we now understand it better or how do you feel I am really trying to understand Socrates but will you also try to say this more clearly what I

am saying is that those among the smooth and bright sounds that produce one pure note are not beautiful in relation to anything else but in and by themselves and that they are accompanied by their own pleasures which belong to them by nature that much is true then there is also the less divine tribe of pleasures connected with smells but because there is no inevitable pain mixed with them in whatever way or wherever we may come by them for this reason I regard them as the counterpart to those others so if you get my point we

will then treat those as two species of the kinds of pleasures we are looking for I do get your point then let us also add to these the pleasures of learning if indeed we are agreed that there is no such thing as hunger for learning connected with them nor any pains that have their source in a hunger for learning here - I agree with you well then if after such filling with knowledge people lose it again through forgetting do you notice any kinds of pain none that could be called inherent by nature but in our

reflections on this loss when we need it we experience it as a painful loss but my dear we are here concerned only with the natural affections themselves apart from reflection on them then you are right in saying that the lapse of knowledge never causes us any pain then we may say that the pleasures of learning are unmixed with pain and belong not to the masses but only to a very few how could one fail to agree but now that we have properly separated the pure pleasures and those that can right be called impure let's add

to our account the attribution of immoderation to the violent pleasures but moderation in contrast to the others that is to say we will assign those pleasures which display high intensity and violence no matter whether frequently or rarely to the class of the unlimited the more and less which affects both body and soul the other kinds of pleasures we will assign to the class of things that possess measurement quite right Socrates but we have also to look into the following question about them what question the question of their relation to truth what is closer to it

the pure unadulterated and sufficient or the violent motive form an enormous just what you after in asking this question Socrates I want to omit nothing in the investigation of both pleasure and knowledge I want to ask if one part of them is pure and other impure so that both of them may come to trial in their pure form and so make it easier for you and me and all those present to come to a verdict in this trial quite right then let us go on and see whether all items that belong in the pure kind

display the following qualification but let us first pick out one of them and study it which one shall we choose let us take whiteness first if you have no objection that is fine with me now how can there be purity in the case of whiteness and what sort of thing is it is it the greatest quantity or amount or is it rather the complete lack of any admixture that is where there is not the slightest part of any other kind contained in this color it will obviously be the perfectly unadulterated color bright well shall we

not also agree that this is the truest and the most beautiful of all instances of white rather than what is greatest in quantity or amount clearly so we are perfectly justified if we say that a small portion of pure white is to be regarded as whiter than a larger quantity of an impure whiteness and at the same time more beautiful and possessed of more truth perfectly justified well now we don't need to run through many more examples to justify our account of pleasure but this example suffices to prove that in the case of pleasure to

every small and insignificant pleasure that is unadulterated by pain will turn out to be pleasanter truer and more beautiful than a greater quantity and amount of the impure kind quite definitely so and the example is sufficient but what about the following point have we not been told that pleasure is always a process of becoming and that there is no being at all of pleasure there are some subtle thinkers who have tried to pass on this doctrine to us and we ought to be grateful to them what does it mean I will indeed try to explain

it to you my friend pro Tarkus by resuming my questioning you have only to keep on asking suppose there are two kinds of things one kind sufficient to itself the other in need of something else how and what sort of things do you mean the one kind by nature possesses supreme dignity the other is inferior to it express this more clearly please we must have met handsome and noble youths together with their courageous lovers certainly now try to think of another set of two items that corresponds to this pair in all the relevant features that

we just mentioned do I have to repeat my request for the third time please express more clearly what it is you want to say Socrates nothing fanciful at all protaras this is just a playful manner of speaking what is really meant is that all things are either for the sake of something else or they are that for whose sake the other kind comes to be in each case I finally managed to understand it thanks to the many repetitions perhaps my boy we will understand better as the odd and proceeds no doubt so let's take another

pair of what kind take on the one hand the generation of all things on the other there being I also accept this pair from you being in generation excellent now which of the two do you think exists for the others sake shall we say that generation takes place for the sake of being or does being exists for the sake of generation whether what is called being is what it is for the sake of generation is that what you want to know apparently by heavens what a question to ask me you might as well ask tell

me for Tarkus where the Shipbuilding goes on for the sake of ships or whether ships are for the sake of shipbuilding or some such thing that is precisely what I am asking about protaras what keeps you from answering your question yourself socrates nothing providing you take your share in the argument I'm quite determined to I hope that all ingredients as well as all tools and quite generally all materials are always provided for the sake of some process of generation I further hold that every process of generation in turn always takes place for the sake of

some particular being and that all generation taken together takes place for the sake of being as a whole nothing could be clearer now pleasure since it is a process of generation necessarily comes to be for the sake of some being of course but that for the sake of which what comes to be for the sake of something comes to be in each case ought to be put into the class of the things good in themselves while that which comes to be for the sake of something else belongs in another class my friend undeniably but if

pleasure really is a process of generation will we be placing it correctly if we put it in a class different from that of the good that too is undeniable it is true then as I said at the beginning of this argument that we ought to be grateful to the person who indicated to us that there is always only generation of pleasure and that it has no being whatsoever and it is obvious that he will just laugh at those who claim that pleasure is good certainly but this same person will also laugh at those who find

their fulfillment in the processes of generation how so and what sort of people are you alluding to I'm talking of those who cure their hunger and thirst or anything else that is cured by processes of generation they take delight in generation as a pleasure and proclaim that they would not want to live if they were not subject to hunger and thirst and if they could not experience all the other things one might want to mention in connection with such conditions that is very like them but would we not all say that destruction is the opposite

of generation necessarily so whoever makes this choice would choose generation and destruction in preference to that third life which consists of neither pleasure nor pain but is a life of thought in the purest degree possible so a great absurdity seems to appear Socrates if we posit pleasure as good an absurdity indeed especially if we go on to look at it in this way in what way how is this not observed that there should be nothing good or Noble in bodies or anywhere else except in the soul but in the soul pleasures should be the only

good thing so that courage or moderation or reason or any of the other Goods belonging to the soul would be neither good nor noble in addition we would have to call the person who experiences not pleasure but pain bad while he is in pain even if he were the best of all men by contrast we would have to say of whoever is pleased that the greater his pleasure whenever he is pleased the more he excels in virtue all that is as absurd as possible so pretty now let us not undertake to give pleasure every possible

test while going very lightly with reason and knowledge let us rather strike them valiantly all around to see if there is some fault anywhere so we'll learn what is by nature purest in them and seeing this we can use the truest parts of these as well as of pleasure to make our joint decision fair enough among the disciplines to do with knowledge one part is productive the other concerned with education and nurture right just so well let us first find out whether within the manual arts there is one side more closely related to knowledge itself

the other less closely secondly whether we should treat the one as quite pure as far as it goes the other is less pure that is what we ought to do so let us sort out the leading disciplines among them which disciplines and how he to do it if someone were to take away all counting measuring and weighing from the Arts and Crafts the rest might be said to be worthless worthless indeed all who would have left would be conjecture and the training of our senses through experience and routine we would have to rely on our

ability to make the Lucky guesses that many people call art once it has acquired some proficiency through practice and hard work undeniably so this is clear to start with in the case of flute playing the harmonies are found not by measurement but by the hidden mists of training and quite generally music tries to find the measure by observing the vibrating strings so there is a lot of imprecision mixed up in it and a very little reliability very true and will we not discover that medicine agriculture navigation and strategy are in the same condition definitely but

has the building I believe that it owes its superior level of craftsmanship over other disciplines to its frequent use of measures and instruments which give it high accuracy in what way in shipbuilding in house building but also in many other woodworking crafts for it employs straightedge and compass as well as a Mason's rule aligned and an ingenious gadget called a carpenter's square you are quite right Socrates let us then divide the so-called arts into two parts those like music with less precision in their practice and those like building with more precision agreed and let's take

those among them as most accurate that we called primary just now I suppose you mean arithmetic and the other disciplines you mentioned after it that's right but don't you think we have to admit that day to fall into two kinds protaras what two kinds do you mean don't we have to agree first that the arithmetic of the many is one thing and the Philosopher's arithmetic is quite another how could anyone distinguish these two kinds of arithmetic the difference is by no means small photographers first there are those who compute sums of quite an equal units

such as two armies or two ODEs of cattle regardless whether they are tiny or huge by then there are the others who would not follow their example unless it were guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others you explain very well the notable difference among those who make numbers their concern so it stands to reason that there are those two different kinds of arithmetic well then what about the art of calculating and measuring as builders and Merchants use them and the geometry and calculations practiced by philosophers

shall we say there is one sort of each of them or two going by what was said before I ought to vote for the option that they are two of each sort right but do you realize why we have bought up this question here possibly but I would appreciate it if you answered the question yourself the aim of our discussion now seems to be just it was when we first set out to find an analog here to the point we made about pleasure so now we ought to find out whether there is a difference in

purity between different kinds of knowledge in the same way as there was between different kinds of pleasures this obviously was the purpose of our present question but what next have we not discovered before that different subject matters require different arts and that they have different degrees of certainty yes we did it is questionable then whether an art that goes under one name and is commonly treated as one should not rather be treated as two depending on the difference in certainty impurity and if this is so we must also ask whether the art has more precision

in the hands of the philosopher than its counterpart in the hands of the non philosopher that is indeed the question here so what answer shall we give to it protaras Socrates we have come across an amazing difference between the sciences as far as precision is concerned will that facilitate our answer obviously and let it be said that these Sciences are far superior to the other disciplines but that those among them that are animated by the spirit of the true philosophers are infinitely superior yet in precision and truth in their use of measure and number let

us settle for this doctrine and trusting you we will confidently answer those powerful makers of word traps what answer shall we give them that there are two kinds of arithmetic and two kinds of geometry and a great many other science is following in their lead which have the same twofold nature while sharing one name let us give our answer with best wishes to those powerful people as you call them Socrates do we maintain that these kinds of Sciences are the most precise certainly but the power of dialectic would repudiate us if we put any other

science ahead of her what science do we mean by that again clearly everybody would know what side so I am referring to now for our take it that anyone with any share in reason at all would consider the discipline concerned with being and with what is really and forever in every way eternally self same by far the truest of all kinds of knowledge but what is your position how would you decide this question protaras on many occasions Socrates I've heard gorgeous insist that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all

the rest with their own consent not by force and is therefore by far the best of all the arts now I am reluctant to take up a position against either him or you i suspect that at first you wanted to say take up arms but then suppress it in embarrassment you may take this whatever way pleases you but i am to blame for a misunderstanding on your part in what respect what i wanted to find out here my dear friend protaras was not what art or science excels all others by its grandeur by its nobility

or by its usefulness to us our concern here was rather to find which one aims for clarity precision and the highest degree of truth even it is a minor discipline and our benefit is small look at it this way you can avoid making an enemy of gordias so long as he let his art win as far as the actual profit for human life is concerned but as to the discipline I am talking about now what I said earlier about the white also applies in this case even in a small quantity it can be superior and

purity and truth to what is large in quantity but in pure and untrue we must look for this science without concern for its actual benefit or its prestige but see whether it is by its nature a capacity in our soul to love the truth and to do everything for its sake and if thorough reflection and sufficient discussion confirmed this for our part then we can say that it is most likely to possess purity of mind and reason otherwise we would have to look for a higher kind of knowledge than this well thinking it over I

agree that it would be difficult to find any other kind of art or any other signs that is closer to the truth than this one when you gave this answer now did you realize that most of the arts and sciences and those who work at them are in the first place only concerned with opinions and make opinions the center of their search for even if they think they are studying nature you must realize that all their lives they are merely dealing with this world order how it came to be how it is affected and how

it hacks is that how position or not quite so so such a person assumes the task of dealing not with things eternal but with what comes to be will come to be or has come to be undeniably so how could we assert anything definite about these matters with exact truth if it never did possess nor will possess nor now possesses any kind of sameness impossible and how could we ever hope to achieve any kind of certainty about subject matters that do not in themselves possess any certainty I see no way then there can be no

reason or knowledge that attains the highest truth about these subjects at least it does not seem likely we must therefore dismiss entirely you and me and also Gorgas and Philebus but must make this declaration about our investigation what declaration either we will find certainty purity truth and what we may call integrity among the things that are forever in the same state without anything mixed in it or we will find it in what comes as close as possible to it everything else has to be called second-rate and inferior very true would not strict justice demand that

we called the noblest things by the noblest names that's only fair and aren't reason and knowledged names that deserve the highest honor yes so in the most accurate sense and appropriate use they are applied to insights into true reality definitely but these were the very names that I put forward at the beginning for our verdict the very one Socrates good but has the mixture of intelligence and pleasure if one likened our situation to that of builders with ingredients or materials to use in construction this would be a fitting comparison very fitting so next we ought

to try our hands at the mixture definitely but had we not better repeat and remind ourselves of certain points what are they those we kept reminding ourselves of before the proverb fits well here that says that good things deserve repeating twice or even thrice definitely on then by the heavens this is I think the general drift of what we said what was it for labor says that pleasure is the right aim for all living beings and that all should try to strive for it that it is at the same time the good for all things

so that good and pleasant are but two names that really belong to what is by nature one and the same Socrates by contrast affirms that these are not one in the same thing but two just as they are two in name that the good and the pleasant have a different nature and that intelligence has a greater share in the good than pleasure isn't that the matter at issue now just as it was before protaras very much so and now we also agreed on this point now just as we were before what point that the difference

between the nature of the good and everything else is this what is it any creature that was in permanent possession of it entirely and in every way would never be in need of anything else but would live in perfect self-sufficiency is that right it is right but didn't we try to give them a separate trial in our discussion assigning each of them a life of its own so that pleasure would remain unmixed with intelligence and again intelligence would not have the tiniest bit of pleasure that's what we did did either of the two seemed to

ourself sufficient at that time for anyone how could it if some mistake was made and anyone now has the opportunity to take it up again and correct it let him put memory intelligence knowledge and the true opinion into one class and ask himself whether anybody would choose to bossess or require anything else without that class most particularly whether he would want pleasure as much and as intensive as it can be without the true opinion that he enjoys it without recognizing what kind of experience it is he has without memory of this affection for any length

of time and let him put reason to the same test whether anyone would prefer to have it without any kind of pleasure even a very short-lived one rather than with some pleasures provided that he does not want all pleasures without intelligence rather than with some fraction of it neither of them will do Socrates and there is no need to raise the same question so often so now of these two would be perfect worthy of choice for all and the supreme good how could they the good therefore must be taken up precisely or at least in

outline so that as we said before we know to whom we will give the second prize you are right have we not discovered at least a road that leads towards the good what road it's as if when you are looking for somebody you first find out where he actually lives that would be a major step towards finding him no doubt similarly here there is this argument which has now indicated to us just as it did at the beginning of our discussion that we ought not to seek the good in the unmixed life but in the

mixed one quite but there is more hope that what we are looking for will show itself in a well-mixed life rather than an appalling mixed one much more so let us pray to the gods for assistance when we perform our Mitch Jabra Tarkus whether it be diagnosis or Hephaestus or any other deity who is in charge of presiding over such mixtures by all means we stand like cut bearers before the fountains the fountain of pleasure comparable to honey and the sobering fountain of intelligence free of wine like sober healthy water and we have to see

how to make a perfect mixture of the two certainly but let's look first into this with our mixture be as good as it can be if we mix every kind of pleasure with every kind of intelligence maybe it is not without risk however but now I have an idea how we might procure a safer mixture tell us what it is didn't we find that one pleasure turned out to be truer than another just as one art was more precise than another definitely but there was also a difference between different Sciences since one kind deals with

a subject matter that comes to be and perishes the other is concerned with what is free of that the eternal and self same since we made truth our criterion the latter kind appeared to be the true one that was certainly so if we took from each sort the segments that possess most truth and mix them together with this mixture provide us with the most desirable life or would we also need less true ones we should do it this way it seems to me suppose then there is a person who understands what justice itself is and

can give the appropriate definitions and possesses the same kind of comprehension about all the rest of what there is let that be presupposed will he be sufficiently versed in science if he knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself but cannot recognize this human sphere and these our circles using even in-house building those other yardsticks and those circles we would find ourselves in a rather ridiculous position if we were confined entirely to those divine kinds of knowledge Socrates what are you saying what we at the same time to include the inexact

and impure science of the false yardstick and circle and add it to the mixture yes necessarily so if any one of us ever wants to find his own way home but what about music what we also to mix in the kind of which we said a little earlier that it is full of lucky hits and imitation but lacks purity it seems necessary to me if in fact our life is supposed to be at least some sort of life do you want me then to yield like a doorkeeper to the pushing and shoving of a crowd

and to throw open the doors and let the flood of all sorts of knowledge in the inferior kind mingling with the pure I for my part can't see what damage it would do to accept all the other kinds of knowledge as long as we have those of the highest kind shall I then let the lot of them flow into the vessel like homers very poetical commingling of mountain Glen's absolutely in they go but now we have to return again to the fountain of pleasure we cannot any longer carry out our original intention of first mixing

only the true parts of each of them together our love for every kind of knowledge has made us let them all in together before any of the pleasures what you say is true now it is time for us to decide about pleasures to whether we ought to admit the whole tribe in their cases or whether we should at first admit the true ones only it is much safer if we let the true in first let them in them but what next if some turn out to be necessary should we not mix them in also as

we did in the other case no reason why not at least if they really are necessary but hadn't decided that it was innocuous or even been official to spend our lives in the pursuit of all the arts and crafts we may now come to the same conclusion about the pleasures if it is beneficial and harmless to live our lives enjoying all the pleasures then we should mix them all in so what are we to say in their case and what are we to do we should not turn to ourselves with this question for Tarkus but

to the pleasures themselves as well as to the different kinds of knowledge and find out how they feel about each other by putting the question in this way what way my friends whether you ought to be called pleasures or some other name would you prefer to live together with every kind of knowledge or rather to live without it entirely to this I think they cannot help giving this answer what answer what has been said already it is neither possible nor beneficial for one tribe to remain alone in isolation and unmixed we were preferred to live

side by side with that best kind of knowledge the kind that understands not only all other things but also each one of us as far as that is possible an excellent answer we will reply to them with justice but after that we have to raise the question with intelligence and reason do you have any need for any association with the pleasures that is how we would address reason and knowledge what kinds of pleasures they might ask in return very likely our discussion would then continue as follows will he have any need to associate with the

strongest and most intensive pleasures in addition to the true pleasures we will ask them why on earth should we need them Socrates they might reply they are a tremendous impediment to us since they infect the souls in which they dwell with madness or even prevent our own development altogether furthermore they totally destroy most of our offspring since neglect leads to forgetfulness but has that our true and pure pleasures you mentioned those regard as our kin and besides also add the pleasures of health and of temperance and all those that commit themselves to virtue as to

their deity and follow it around everywhere but to forge an association between reason and those pleasures that are forever involved with foolishness and other kinds of vice would be totally unreasonable for anyone who aims at the best and most stable mixture all blend this is true particularly if he wants to discover in this mixture what the good is in man and in the universe and to get some vision of the nature of the good itself when reason makes this the fence for herself as well as for memory and right opinion shall we not admit that

she has spoken reasonably and in accord with her own standards absolutely but see whether the following is also necessary and without it not a single thing could come to be what is it wherever we do not mix in truth nothing could truly come to be nor remain in existence once it had come to be how should it in no way but now if there is anything else missing in our mixture it is up to you and for Labour's to say so to me at least it seems that our discussion has arrived at the design of

what might be called an incorporeal order that rules harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul count me as one who shares that opinion Socrates would there be some justification to our claim that we are by now standing on the very threshold of the good and of the house of every member of its family it would seem so to me at least what ingredient in the mixture ought we to regard as the most valuable and at the same time as the fact oh that makes it precious to all mankind once we have found it we

will inquire further whether it is more closely related and akin to pleasure or to reason in nature as a whole you are right this would certainly be very useful in bringing us closer to our final verdict but it is certainly not difficult to see what factored in each mixture it is that makes it either most valuable or worth nothing at all what do you mean there is not a single human being who does not know it know what that any kind of mixture that does not in some way or other possess measure or the nature

of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself for there will be no blending in such cases at all but really an unconnected medley the ruin of whatever happens to be contained in it very true but now we notice that the force of the good has taken refuge in an alliance with the nature of the beautiful for measure and proportion manifests themselves in all areas as beauty and virtue are undeniably but we did say that truth is also included along with them in our mixture indeed well then if we cannot capture the

good in one form we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three beauty proportion and truth let us affirm that these things should by right be treated as a unity and be held responsible for what is in the mixture for its goodness is what makes the mixture itself for good one very well stated anyone should by now be able to judge between pleasure and intelligence which of the two is more closely related to the supreme good and more valuable among gods and men even if it is obvious it is better to

make it explicit in our discussion so now let us judge each one of the three in relation to pleasure and reason for we have to see for which of those two we want to grant closer kinship to each of them you mean to beauty truth and measure yes take up truth first protaras and holding it in front of you look at all three reason truth and pleasure then after withholding judgment for a long time give your answer with it for you pleasure or reason is more akin to truth what need is there for any length

of time I think there is an enormous difference for pleasure is the greatest impostor of all by general account and in connection with the pleasures of love which seemed to be the greatest of all even perjury is pardoned by the gods pleasures are perhaps rather like children who do not possess the least bit of reason reason by contrast either is the same as truth or of all things it is the most like it and most true next look at measure in the same way and see whether pleasure possesses more of it than intelligence or intelligence

more than pleasure once again you are setting me a task I am well prepared for I don't think that one could find anything that is more outside all measure then pleasure an excessive joy while nothing more measured than reason and knowledge could ever be found well argued but now go on to the third criterion does reason contain more Beauty than the tribe of pleasures in our estimate the reason is more beautiful than pleasure or is it the other way round why Socrates no one awake or dreaming could ever see intelligence and reason to be ugly

no one could ever have conceived of them as becoming or being ugly or that they ever will be right in the case of pleasures by contrast when we see anyone actively engaged in them especially those that are most intense we notice that their effect is quite ridiculous if not outright obscene we become quite ashamed ourselves and hide them as much as possible from sight and we confine such activities to the night as if they like must not witness such things so you will announce everywhere both by sending messengers and saying it in person to those

present that pleasure is not a property of the first rank nor a gain of the second but at the first comes what is somehow connected with measure the measured and the timely and whatever else is to be considered similar that seems at least to be the upshot of discussion now the second rent goes to the world proportioned and beautiful the perfect the self-sufficient and whatever else belongs in that family that seems right if you give the third-ranked as I divine to reason and intelligence you cannot stray far from the truth perhaps nor again if besides

these three you give fourth place to those things that we defined as the souls own properties to the sciences and the arts and what we called right opinions since they are most closely related to the good then pleasure at least maybe so the fifth kind will be those pleasures we set apart and defined as painless we call them the soul's own pure pleasures since they are attached to the sciences some of them even to sense perception perhaps with the sixth generation the well-ordered song may find its end says Orpheus so it seems that how discussion

to has found its end at the determination of the sixth ranking there remains nothing further to do for us except to give a final touch to what has been said we have to do that come on then the third libation goes to Zeus the Savior let us call the same argument to witness for the third time which one Philebus declares that every pleasure of any kind is the good by the third libation you appear to mean as you just stated that we have to repeat the argument all over from the beginning yes but let's also

hear what follows in view of all the considerations laid out here and out of distaste for fillet versus position pronounced by countless others on many occasions I maintain that reason is far superior to pleasure and more beneficial for human life that is correct suspecting that there are many other goods I said that if something turned out to be better than these two then I would fight on the side of reason for the second prize against pleasure so that pleasure would be deprived even on the second thank you did say that afterwards it became most sufficiently

clear that neither of those two would suffice very true and did it not become clear at this point in our discussion that both reason and pleasure had lost any claim that one or the other would be the good itself since they were lacking in autonomy and in the power of self-sufficiency and perfection exactly then when a third competitor showed up superior to either of them it became apparent that reason was infinitely more closely related and akin to the character of the victor undeniably and did not pleasure turnout to receive fifth position according to the verdict

we reached in our discussion apparently but not first place even if all the cattle and horses and the rest of the animals gave testimony by following pleasure now many people accept their testimony as the sea is do that of the birds and judge that pleasures are most effective in securing the happy life they even believe that the animal passions are more authoritative witnesses than is the love of argument that is constantly revealed under the guidance of the philosophic muse we are all agreed now that what you said is as true as possible Socrates so will

you let me go now there is a little missing Socrates surely you will not give up before we do but I will remind you of what is left