The Korean War 1950-53 (4K Documentary)

Only five years after the end of the Second  World War, the major nations of the world are once again up in arms. As nuclear weapon-fuelled  Cold War tensions grow between East and West, the Korean Peninsula will play host to its first  major hot conflict. Initially a struggle between two opposing Korean states, within months a global  UN coalition and an emerging Chinese juggernaut are fighting it out in a war that will see both  sides approach the brink of victory - and defeat.

The Japanese defeat in WWII and the Second  Sino-Japanese War ends 35 years of Japanese control over the Korean Peninsula. Soviet  forces advanced through Manchuria and landed in Korea in August 1945, while the US occupies  Japan from September. Both agree to divide Korea along the 38th Parallel and assume  occupation duties in the north and south.

The line is to be temporary and b oth sides  withdraw as agreed in 1948, but they leave behind new states aligned with their governments.  In the south, the former exiled provisional government president DrSyngmAn Rhee announces  the Republic of Korea in August . In September, former anti-Japanese leader and Soviet Army  Major Kim Il-Sung announces the Communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the  north.

Both Koreas claim the entire peninsula, and neither side rules out reunification by force. Fighting is already underway. The north directs an insurgency in the south, which is strongly  repressed by Rhee, and both sides launch border raids.

Often these are conducted by police units,  but both states develop official armies under the guidance of their former occupiers : the Korean  People’s Army, or KPA, in the north and – the Republic of Korea Army (or ROK) Army in the south,  ROK forces are generally more aggressive and initially have the upper-hand . Rhee justifies  ROK attacks as retaliation for northern ones: “We are responsible for the protections of the  lives and property of our people; and when the Korean Communists come over the 38th Parallel and  destroy us, we cannot sit still and allow them to harm us without resistance. ” (Wada 23) Overall, the US has little interest in Korea.

US Far East Commander General Douglas  MacArthur has vague orders regarding Korea, and some in Washington are concerned  about Rhee’s democratic credentials . With military tension and pressure for unification  mounting, Kim Il-Sung approaches the Soviet Union for permission to launch a unification invasion.  Stalin is reluctant, since he’s focused on Europe, and suggests the North expands the insurgency. 

He refuses a formal alliance with the north, but does send equipment, including tanks.  Kim is disappointed, but also makes it clear he will seek assistance elsewhere.  Soviet ambassador Terenty Shtykov recalls: “Kim Il Sung said he cannot start the attack on  his own because he is a disciplined communist and Comrade Stalin’s instructions are the law to him. 

Kim said if he cannot meet Comrade Stalin now, he intends to see Mao Zedong. . .

Kim Il Sung  was a bit drunk after the party and spoke in an excited fashion, but it was not accidental  that he began the conversation. ” (Wada 52) The newly proclaimed Communist People’s Republic  of China is more receptive to Kim. Thousands of Koreans fought with communist forces in the  Chinese Civil War, and Mao Zedong releases them to the KPA – granting it 28,000 seasoned troops . 

Kim promises a rapid campaign, and by January 1950 Stalin gives his permission – but makes it clear  the Soviet Union will not intervene directly. Stalin likely approves the North  Korean attack because he thinks the US will not intervene. What he  doesn’t know is that in April 1950, US policy paper NSC-68 commits America to rolling  back Communist aggression across the globe.

In June 1950, the KPA has around 223,000 troops –  including 100,000 border police - about 150 tanks, mostly T-34/85s, and 132 aircraft that are mostly  older Soviet models. Roughly half of the KPA invasion force are Korean veterans of the Chinese  civil war. Meanwhile, the ROK Army has around 87,500 troops, with only 35,000 along the border. 

It has no tanks, and few anti-tank weapons. At 4am on June 25, 1950, the KPA invades aided  by artillery and deception tactics. North Korea later claims they are responding to a Southern  invasion, but there is little evidence for this.

With their mostly invulnerable armour in the  lead, KPA spearheads head south , supported by amphibious landings. Korea’s narrow geography  means KPA forces are concentrated on three invasion routes into the south. The only major  resistance is towards (Cheuchun) Chuncheon and Seoul, but when the ROK 2nd Division fails  to counterattack with the 7th Division, the capital’s defence crumbles.

By June 28,  ROK units retreat and Rhee abandons Seoul. Given Rhee’s unpopularity with some south  Koreans, the KPA is not entirely welcome: “The soldiers were speaking in their hard  [northern] accent, but to us they were compatriots who spoke the same language, had the same customs,  and had Korean blood in their veins. .

. They seemed like long-lost brothers who had finally some home  from some far-away place. Seeing them talk quietly and laugh, no one was frightened.

” (Wada 80) In the retreat, ROK forces prematurely destroy bridges across the Han River, trapping around  44,000 ROK troops to its north. By July 30, the ROK Army can account for only 22,000 troops. The US is surprised, since they hadn’t anticipated an attack and expected South Korea to  perform better.

Following the invasion, the US takes immediate action - but not in  Korea. President Harry Truman fears a wider Communist offensive, and orders the US Seventh  Fleet into the Taiwanese Straits, protecting the Nationalist Chinese regime of Chiang Kai-shek  in Taiwan. The move outrages Communist China, who were likely preparing an invasion.

The US appeals to the United Nations and leads a resolution to send armed  assistance to South Korea. Critically, the Soviet Union is not present at the vote, as  it is boycotting the Security Council over a lack of recognition for Communist China. So, the USSR  doesn’t use its veto and the resolution passes.

A broad group of states now pledge  themselves to the first UN Command. Eventually, by 1954, 22 countries will  provide troops or medical support, including Britain and Canada, but also  Ethiopia, Columbia and Luxembourg. Another early supporter is Turkey, which  is concerned about Soviet threats: “While we fight here together with the UN  troops, we feel that we are defending our own country.

. . some people in our country  ask us why we have been fighting here.

Our answer is as such: the communist threat is  worldwide; in order to crush this threat, we have to fulfil our duty. ” (Brown Turkey 97) Some in the US command are concerned these contributions, who often lack  weapons, support or logistics, could become burdensome, although they provide  an important degree of international legitimacy. But international forces will take  time to arrive.

US occupation forces in Japan rush to South Korea under General  MacArthur – now commander of all UN forces. US occupation troops, however, are unprepared.  Post-WWII demobilisation reduced the US Army from 89 divisions to just 10 and  many of these are understrength, lack infantry firepower, and poorly trained.

When Task Force Smith, a token US force, meets the KPA at Osan on July 5, the North Koreans quickly  rout it. US troops’ main anti-tank infantry weapon, the M9A1 Bazooka, performs poorly against  KPA T-34s. The US then hurries new 3.

5-inch ‘Super Bazookas’ to the battlefield, but before they  arrive KPA armour strikes the US 24th Division: “As daylight broke we heard this loud  clanking noise. . .

We understood now what was happening – their tanks were coming. . .

The  tanks continued to roll down the road towards us. We had no way of stopping them. .

.  I heard the new CO, Colonel Martin, tried to take on one of the tanks with a bazooka.  The tank scored a direct hit on the colonel, and he was killed on the spot.

” (Hastings 83) By late July, the KPA pushes the 24th out of Taejon, and even the newly arrived 1st Cavalry  Division – largely an infantry force - cannot hold the line. US and ROK forces frequently outnumber  the KPA spearheads, but ROK reinforcements are often rapidly raised recruits, and the US army is  designed to fight with large supporting elements that are rare in Korea. They do have air power,  but a lack of forward air controllers limits its usefulness.

In 17 days of fighting, the  24th Division loses 30% of its strength. Refugees are also in danger, and UN fears of KPA  infiltration amongst refugees leads to civilian casualties. UN aircraft sometimes strafe or bomb  them and between July 25-29 1950, US troops kill up to potentially 400 South Korean refugees  around a bridge at No Gun Ri likely because of these fears .

A South Korean investigation claims  US officers gave orders for troops and aircraft to fire on refugee columns and provide US reports  from July 1950 as evidence. But an official US investigation claimed no formal order was given. By August, North Korean forces push UN units to the Naktong River and the Pusan Perimeter  defensive line.

As UN reinforcements, including the British 27 Brigade arrive, the  KPA continually attempts to breach the line. UN forces are now organized under the US Eighth  Army and by late August, they have a five-to-one advantage in armour – including M-26 Pershing  tanks - and air superiority. By September 12, the KPA assault is burnt out.

Meanwhile in occupied southern cities, enthusiasm for reunification sours in  the face of Communist political violence: “In the beginning, it was an atmosphere of  unrestrained joy, of true liberation. . .

‘Long Live the Fatherland! ’. .

. We still did not realise  that this was a catastrophe for us. .

. In the days that followed, we heard that the communists  were rounding up “reactionaries”. Slowly, the atmosphere of terror set in.

” (Hastings 103/104) The UN estimates Northern forces murder 26,000 South Koreans by September 1950. But southern cities will not be occupied much  longer. As the KPA assault slows at Pusan, General MacArthur launches an ambitious  operation to decisively turn the tide.

The western port of Inchon serves Seoul  and is a vital strategic target. MacArthur believes an amphibious landing behind KPA  lines could stop North Korea in its tracks: “It will be like an electric fan. You  go the wall and pull the plug out, and the fan will stop.

When  we get well ashore at Inchon, the North Koreans will have no choice but  to pull out, or surrender. ” (Hastings 117) But Inchon’s major variance in tidal height  provides only a three-hour window on September 15 for landing. MacArthur is undeterred  and orders the newly formed X Corps ashore.

The landing is an immediate success, partly  because even though the KPA likely know of it, they lack forces to repel it. US troops secure  Wolmi-Do Island in the morning, then hit Inchon in the evening to light resistance. By the end  of the day, X Corps has seized most of Inchon.

It now pushes towards Seoul, while simultaneously,  the Eighth Army in the Pusan Perimeter breaks out. With the KPA’s rear threatened, they start a mass  retreat. US troops enter Seoul on September 25, as KPA forces conduct rear-guard  actions.

As frontlines rapidly change, both sides carry out atrocities, including the  execution of prisoners and political opponents. By September 27, X Corps recaptures most the  city and links up with Eighth Army, trapping KPA units. Only around 25,000 make it back to  the 38th Parallel.

With the KPA retreating, MacArthur demands to pursue them across the  Parallel. Some UN allies, especially Britain, are concerned about potential Chinese intervention. But with ROK forces already preparing to cross, Truman grants permission by late September. 

MacArthur can cross the Parallel, although only ROK forces can operate near the Chinese border. The situation alarms Beijing. Mao sees Korea’s unification under a US-backed government  as a potential prelude to US attack.

Maintaining North Korea is therefore  an important buffer to US aggression. The US intervention in the Taiwanese Straits has  already heightened tensions and signalled – from a Chinese perspective – US hostility. “For us the Korean question is not simply a question concerning Korea, it is related to the  Taiwan issue.

. . From the information we got, they wanted to calm China first  and after occupying North Korea, they will come to attack China.

” (Yufan 103) By October, Mao has decided to intervene and believes fighting in Korea’s narrow geography  would be advantageous to China. Soon roughly Chinese 225,000 troops near the border. Mao  warns the US via Indian diplomats that he will not tolerate non-Korean troops  near the Yalu River, but they ignore him.

US intelligence chief Major General Charles  Willoughby thinks a Chinese attack is unlikely. In early October, ROK forces cross the Parallel,  followed by Eighth Army on October 9. Its target is the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. 

Meanwhile, X Corps – now its own independent command under Lieutenant General Edward Almond –  is redeployed in the east. It plans to launch an amphibious assault at Wonsan, but mines will delay  the operation until long after it’s been captured by ROK troops on land. On October 19, Eighth Army  seizes Pyongyang and crosses the Taedong river.

The KPA continues to fight rearguard actions  but is forced back towards the Yalu River. On October 24 MacArthur lifts restrictions on non-ROK  forces as forward elements push further north. The Yalu River, the Chinese border, and Korean  unification are now in sight for the UN.

But soon, their forward units encounter  stronger resistance and a new enemy. On October 25, units of the Chinese People’s  Volunteer Army move to trap advance ROK forces reaching the Yalu River. Then between November  1 and 3, they attack the 8th Cavalry Regiment and II ROK Corps around Unsan.

Using mortars  and rockets, Chinese troops break up US units and attack them in isolated groups. The Chinese  overrun US positions, and a general rout begins: “There was just mass hysteria on the position.  It was every man for himself.

The shooting was terrific, there were Chinese shouting everywhere,  I didn’t know which way to go. In the end, I just ran with the crowd. We just ran and ran  until the bugles grew fainter.

” (Hastings 150 ) In the 1st Cavalry Division’s first clash  with the Chinese, they lose 1,481 killed, wounded and captured. However, by November 6, the Chinese attacks abruptly end. MacArthur  now claims the Chinese attacks were not a serious attempt at intervention.

He plans a new  advance and predicts victory before Christmas. Part of this plan includes an advance by X Corps  in the east. In early November , X Corps lands at Iwon and pushes towards the Yalu and  the strategically important Chongjin, also known as Chosin, reservoir.

The decision  to separate Eighth Army and X Corps commands is controversial, especially considering  mountains hinder east-west communication. But General Almond – a protege of MacArthur’s -  is eager to maintain his independence. Supported by ROK troops, forward elements of the 7th  Division reach the Yalu on November 21.

On November 25, UN forces open MacArthur’s  final offensive. But the very next day, 200,000 Chinese troops under General Peng  Dehuai counterattack. The Chinese know the two main UN forces are separated and aim to,  at the very least, eject them from North Korea and preserve it as a friendly buffer state.

In the opening attacks against Eighth Army, Chinese troops outflank UN positions and  establish roadblocks. One attack nearly cuts off the US 2nd Division as Turkish troops  try to relieve it. But the 2nd Division makes a dash through Chinese roadblocks to Eighth  Army lines – later dubbed “the Death Ride”.

By November 30, the 2nd Division suffers 4,500  casualties and loses much of its equipment. Meanwhile, in the east, Chinese troops now strike  vulnerable supply routes of the US advances around Chongjin. Facing 12 Chinese divisions  overall, Almond tries to maintain the offensive, but the Chinese ambush and badly damage a relief  column of US and British Royal Marines heading for the critical base at Hagaru.

Lieutenant  Colonel Don Faith, commanding US troops east of the reservoir, messages Almond: “Unless someone can help us, I don’t have much hope that anybody’s  going to get out of this. ” (Hastings 184) Faith is killed shortly afterwards. Both US  columns try to fall back to the base at Hagaru, often through Chinese roadblocks.

They have  the advantage of air support, including napalm, but struggle in sub-zero conditions.  Of the 2,500 men of Task Force Faith, only 385 make it to Hagaru in fighting condition. By December 6, the entire X Corps is moving back to Hungnam for evacuation.

Marine  commander Oliver Smith reassures reporters: “Gentlemen, we are not retreating. We are merely  advancing in another direction. ” (Hastings 187) With all available aircraft covering the  retreat and dropping additional supplies, UN troops fight their way through along the roads. 

The bridge at Funchilin Pass has been blown, so UN planes paradrop new bridge sections .  The column limps into Hungnam, where a maritime operation evacuates 105,000 UN troops, 18,400  vehicles and 98,000 refugees by December 24 . UN troops then wreck the port with demolitions  and naval gunfire to deny it to the enemy.

The sudden reversal comes as a shock to MacArthur  and the wider UN forces. Almost immediately, UN troops report being physically overwhelmed by huge waves of Chinese infantry,  but the reality is more complex. Chinese human waves attack do occur,  especially later in the war.

British soldier and actor Michael Caine later recalls one: “The searchlights sprang into life and there in front of us a terrifying tableau was illuminated.  Thousands of Chinese advancing towards our positions led by a troop of demonic trumpet  players. .

. The first wave of Chinese committed suicide by hurling themselves onto our barbed  wire, so their bodies could be used as a bridge for the troops following. ” ( Caine memoir) However, some historians argue Chinese forces rarely significantly outnumbered UN  troops early in the war and such suicidal tactics are exaggerated.

After all, many of the  first assault troops are some of China’s best, and it makes no sense to waste them. Instead, Chinese units use many tactics to dislocate enemy positions.  Almost exclusively attacking at night, they blow whistles and horns to communicate  and for psychological impact by making it appear Chinese troops are more numerous or  have outflanked UN positions.

Chinese troops use an assortment of Second World War weapons,  mostly captured Japanese and Nationalist Chinese models, but also Soviet imports such as the  PPsh-41. As they lack armour and artillery, they make wide use of mortar and  grenade assaults. Prior to attacks, the Chinese discuss the plans – and their  political significance – in large meetings, allowing for better tactical preparation.

Furthermore, many Chinese troops are experienced veterans of the 2nd Sino-Japanese and  Chinese Civil War. Although western sources often see Chinese behaviour as resulting purely  from indoctrination or coercion – which did likely play a role - some Chinese  soldiers are sincerely motivated by recent victories . Li Hua, a 23-year-old  who had been a soldier since 16, recalls: “We felt pretty confident, because  we had just beaten the Kuomintang, with all their support from the Americans.

We  expected to do the same to Syngman Rhee’s people. We weren’t very wrong. They were a pushover  compared with the Japanese.

” (Hastings 163) Meanwhile, US morale plummets as they stick to  their rigid training, which does not include all-round defence and relies heavily on  vehicles . The result by the end of 1950, is the complete collapse of the UN  position north of the 38th Parallel. British Private Albert Varley later recalls: “It was a proper shambles, a  right cock-up.

” (Hastings 200) The winter conditions affect soldiers and refugees  alike. Although the frozen Han River allows for withdrawal, it also limits Seoul’s defence. Debate  rages in UN capitals about whether they should leave Korea altogether.

MacArthur requests Chinese  Nationalist troops from Taiwan join UN forces, and develops bombing lists for Chinese cities,  including with atomic weapons. Truman turns down his requests but with domestic and international  prestige at stake, the US stays in Korea. There is also tension within the alliance,  and some criticise MacArthur command and inadequate American training .

British  General Sir Robert Mansergh reports home: “The reason for this is primarily because  of the American lack of determination and their inability. . .

to stand and fight. . .

. Their  training is quite unsuited to that type of country or war and, in spite of lessons learnt, they  will not get clear of their vehicles. .

. They have never studied or been taught defence.  They appear only to have studied mechanised and mechanical advances at great speed.

. . . 

Americans. . .

feel very naked when anybody threatens their flank or rear. ” (Hastings 208) On December 23, General Walker dies in a traffic accident and is replaced by WWII US airborne  commander General Matthew Ridgway . A veteran of Sicily, Italy and Normandy, Ridgway favours the  offensive but admits the training problems – so he implements new training, including  all-round defence and dismounted combat.

But new methods take time. On January  3, UN forces leave Seoul for stronger positions 60 kilometers south. It’s a success for Communist forces, but China is exhausted.

Its non-mechanised  logistics, including porters and pack animals, struggle to maintain the offensive. Supplies  are running low, and many Chinese troops depend on captured UN equipment and supplies: “We quickly got used to American biscuits and rice, but we never cared for tomato juice.  We were particularly glad to get carbines, because we found rifles too heavy to carry. 

Without the American sleeping bags and overcoats we captured, I am not sure we could have  gone on. Two-thirds of our casualties were from the cold that winter. .

. ” (Hastings 206/207) By early 1951, roughly 486,000 Chinese and KPA forces face off against 365,000 UN troops . After  containing a Chinese offensive in January, Ridgway goes on the offensive in February and March.

By  March 15, Operation RIPPER recaptures Seoul – the fourth time it has changed hands in 10 months.  Communist troops pull back to the 38th Parallel. MacArthur now calls for resources  for another massive push north, but there is little political will in the UN  coalition, which mostly wants negotiations.

To MacArthur, talks are unacceptable and in  early April, he makes unauthorised public statements favouring an attack on China .  Privately, he also encourages using nuclear weapons to create an irradiated barrier along  the Yalu. The Joint Chiefs of Staff refuse, and Truman is tired of his general’s public  criticism and escalatory strategy.

On April 11 Truman dismisses MacArthur and replaces him  with Ridgway. The move gets a mixed response in South Korea but relieves many UN allies. UN command orders Ridgway to hold the line along the 38th Parallel in anticipation of  a Chinese Spring offensive.

And on April 22, Communist forces launch their biggest offensive  yet, with the main attack aiming for Seoul. A significant force clashes against the British  29 Infantry Brigade on the Imjin River. Exposed on poorly prepared positions, British and  supporting Belgian troops try to hold several hill tops against repeated Chinese assault.

After British commander Thomas Brodie describes the situation as “a bit sticky”, US 3rd Division  commander Major General Robert H. Soule orders the 29th Brigade to hold on. This is commonly  cited as an example of cultural miscommunication: “When Tom told Corps that his  position was ‘a bit sticky, they simply did not grasp that in British Army  parlance, that meant ‘critical.

’” (Hastings 261) Under frequent night attack, most British  and Belgian units fall back. However, the Gloucestershire Regiment on Hill  235 becomes separated from the main force and repeated attempts by Filipino and  British tanks to reach them fail. Instead, US I Corps orders a general withdrawal along  the entire UN line.

British headquarters lets Gloucestershire commander Lieutenant Colonel James  Carne decide whether to breakout or surrender. When British Centurian tanks arrive to cover  the withdrawal, attacking Chinese and retreating British soldiers climb onto them. The tanks then  machine-gun each other to clear the attackers.

By April 25, all UN forces except the  Gloucestershire Regiment have withdrawn. The surviving Glosters now attempt to  breakout, but only the remains of D Company make it back to UN lines. Chinese  troops overrun and capture the remaining “Glosters”.

British casualties are around  1,000 although they claim to inflict 10,000. The Battle of Imjin River is often understood  in Britain as a heroic last stand that blunts the Chinese offensive. Others though, describe  it as a wasteful example of miscommunication, since the 29 Brigade could have fought  from much stronger positions to its rear.

Despite the Chinese success at  Imjin, the spring offensives fails, marking a decisive moment in the war. Kim and Rhee  push their stronger allies for more offensives, but neither side will attempt another  major offensive to reunify Korea. Instead, China and the UN settle in for a  war of attrition – and negotiations.

Talks start at on July 10, 1951 , but they make  little progress. UN negotiators claim the KPA and Chinese won’t compromise on key issues,  such as ceasefire lines. By early August, the talking literally stops – on August 10,  negotiators just stare at each other for 2 hours and 11 minutes.

By August 22 talks are over. Meanwhile, fighting continues along a stalemated frontline and in the air. The UN enjoyed air superiority in the opening days of the war.

Piston-driven  WW2 era planes, like Mustangs , Corsairs and Seafires quickly eliminate the small North  Korean air force. After Chinese intervention, UN aircraft conduct interdiction air strikes, but  struggle against unmechanised Chinese logistics. Although the Soviet Union refuses to directly  intervene, it does provide trainers, pilots and aircraft, including its new MiG-15 jet fighter. 

Its appearance in November 1950 causes alarm in the US, who send their own jet fighters,  like F-80 Shooting Stars and F-86 Sabres. Both Soviet and UN pilots are under restrictions.  Soviet pilots patrol the Yalu in what becomes known as Mig-Alley but have orders not to  intercept UN aircraft unless attacked.

Meanwhile, UN pilots aren’t allowed to cross into  Chinese airspace. Both sides break the rules and soon jet-on-jet dogfights take place. Technologically, the MiG-15 is superior to early US jets like the F-80: it has a higher ceiling,  tighter turn, and heavier armament.

The F-86 Sabre is more of a match, especially at low  altitude, but there aren’t that many of them. A more important factor is pilot training.  UN pilots, many with WWII experience , have a decisive edge, especially over Chinese  and Korean pilots.

Soviet pilots are also limited by communication issues. Often  flying with Chinese or Korean wingmen, Soviet pilots rely on translated phrases written  on clipboards. Although as one veteran recalled, in combat, they simply shout in Russian.

Overall, dogfights are rare and although air-to-air kills do occur, it’s hard to  verify claims. The Soviet Union claims the first air-to-air jet kill on November 1, with  a MiG-15 downing an F-80. The US claim the jet was downed by flak, and say they scored the  first jet kill on November 8 by an F-80C or, alternatively, November 9 by a Navy F9F Panther. 

Ultimately, UN pilots claim 792 MiGs shot down during the war. The Soviets say they downed  1,000 UN jet aircraft, although the actual figure is likely closer to 350. In any case,  Soviet sources claim most UN air victories are against Chinese or Korean flown MiGs and Soviet  pilots have a two-to-one kill advantage over the UN.

Captain Nikolay Vorobyov recalls a victory: “I levelled off behind the trailing Sabre and closed in to about 100m. . .

The Sabre started  banking right and I followed him. My third burst went to his right, and the fourth burst  hit him when he flew into it. .

. One 37mm cannon shell went into the tail pipe. Debris and  wreckage sailed past me as the enemy plane caught fire and fell away.

” (Tonder KWCI 55) UN bombers like the B-29, are vulnerable to both Communist jets and ground fire. The loss of  5-B-29s in August 1951 ends significant daytime bombing raids, although major bombing continues.  The UN’s Operation STRANGLE attempts to cut major Chinese supply routes from 1951 to 1952.

UN air  intelligence claims massive success at the cost of 343 aircraft, although Ridgway is sceptical: “If all the enemy trucks you report as having been destroyed during the past ten days or  so were actual kills, then there would not be a truck left in all of Asia. ” (Mitchell 177) But UN air superiority does mean ground forces experience no air attack, and UN helicopters –  the first to be widely employed in warfare – can operate more freely. Models like the H-13  Sioux or H-19 Chickasaw are used for transport, observation, and medical evacuations to the new  Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals – or MASH.

However, the threat from ground fire, technical  limitations, and inter-service rivalry for limited helicopters means most  medevacs still arrive via ambulances. Although the latest aviation technology  is in the air, on the ground the war is beginning to resemble WWI. Both sides build deep  elaborate trench systems and resort to attrition.

One reason for the static front is the  resumption of negotiations in October 1951. By November, both sides limit themselves  to platoon-sized operations, like trench raids, patrols, and repairing defences along  a fairly static frontline. The Chinese do launch night attacks, but they struggle  against improved UN training and positions.

UN early-warning outposts detect attacks,  while searchlights remove the cover of night: “I had never seen such brilliance in  my life. When they were turned on, the battlefield was not nearly as frightening  for the men. They would look for an enemy on the move and then bring devastating firepower  on the unwelcome visitors.

” (Mitchell 154) Chinese trenches, vulnerable to air attack,  often use camouflage and underground bunkers to protect massing troops and artillery. By  early 1952, Communist troop numbers increase to around 900,000 - 200,000 more than the UN, and  they’ve doubled their artillery compared to 1951. With conditions shifting from extreme cold  in winter, to sweltering heat in summer, frontline troops deal with frostbite, disease  and sagging morale.

The US point system, which rotates troops out after a certain period  of service, also means US combat experience drops as new troops arrive. Meanwhile, the  Chinese and KPA leave their men in place. To improve experience, UN commanders plan  local offensives, which the Chinese vigorously counter.

After UN forces establish a  new series of outposts in summer 1952, the Chinese launch multiple counterattacks.  One mountain ridge, nicknamed Ol’ Baldy, sees extensive combat from June 1952, with parts  of the position changing hands several times. Only in March 1953 do Chinese troops finally  overrun a Columbian unit defending the position.

Colombian officer Alfredo Forero remembers the  night of the Chinese attack: “[T]remendously heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on Old Baldy.  The earth shook as if in an earthquake accompanied by flashing and deafening explosions all around  B Company's position. The fleeting silhouettes of men, weapons and weakened fortifications seemed  ghosts within the enemy bursts.

Cries of anguish and agony mingled with our own and enemy machine  gun rattle. [Next to me Corporal Ernesto Gonzalez Varela] fired his machine gun on an onslaught of  Chinese who came upon us when a bazooka shell hit him on the face, leaving his head tangling on  his back. I thought I was living a nightmare or horror movie until new explosions on my bunker  brought me back to reality.

I encouraged my men and I continued to communicate with machine  guns and gave instructions for a corporal to take out the flamethrower and prepare himself  to shoot the enemy when they appeared. " ( 45% of US casualties occur in  this stalemated phase of the war and as troops continue to die on the  frontline, negotiations progress slowly. By early 1952, the UN is softening its negotiating  position.

Rhee continues to push for reunification but receives little support . Meanwhile,  China wants to demobilise its expensive army and conduct internal reforms. However, there  remains one key problem – prisoners of war.

UN nations want all their prisoners returned,  but some North Korean and Chinese prisoners don’t want to return home . An April 1952 survey  reveals only 70,000 of the 170,000 civil and military prisoners want to return to China or  North Korea. China insists all prisoners be returned to avoid embarrassment.

For President  Truman, the memory of the Yalta agreement, in which large numbers of Soviet prisoners were  repatriated against their will, looms large. But in 1953, there are changes of  leadership. President Dwight D.

Eisenhower is elected president in the US , and Stalin  suddenly dies, thawing relations with the west. Eisenhower campaigned on his reputation as the  victor of WWII, not on any policy regarding Korea – which was not a top voter concern. He wants  to reduce the cost of his conventional forces, and increasing ROK forces in Korea and nuclear  weapons are a way of doing this.

In January 1953, the US tests tactical nuclear artillery, and word  of the tests is leaked to the Chinese via Indian diplomats. The Americans hope to intimidate  China, although it has little effect. In May, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend  nuclear strike options to break deadlock.

In March and April, Chinese troops launch  their final major attack against UN positions. They push back some ROK forces, but UN troops hold  firm. As fighting increases around Pork Chop Hill, the UN also bombs North Korean infrastructure,  including important dams and powerplants.

The fighting has little strategic value, except  to gain an advantage in negotiations. By the time fighting dies down in June and  July, negotiators are nearing a deal. Just how seriously Eisenhower considered nuclear  options, and how effective military coercion was in influencing China, have been debated.

It’s  likely that Soviet disengagement after Stalin’s death, economic cost, nuclear threats, and the  failed offensives influence the Chinese position. On July 27, 1953, three of the four primary  belligerents sign a peace treaty in a ceremony designed to not make any one side appear  the victor. South Korea’s Syngman Rhee only allows it to go ahead under US pressure  and he refuses to sign the armistice, meaning technically a state of war  remains between North and South.

When the ceasefire begins at 10pm, soldiers from  both sides stream into No Man’s Land. Lieutenant Chris Snider of the Canadian Brigade recalls: “The [Chinese] all came out. My God, there were thousands of them, more than  I ever thought possible, on every hill, standing gazing at us.

Some of our people  thought they must have been brought forward specially, to impress us. ” (Hastings 403). The agreement formalises the border between North and South along the front lines and includes  a 4-kilometer wide “demilitarization zone” from which all weapons and troops must be withdrawn.

China allows for all prisoners to decide where they want to go after being processed by a neutral  committee, and 21,839 communist soldiers refuse to return home . This figure does not include an  additional 25,000 unilaterally released by Rhee in an attempt to stop negotiations. Of the 12,773  UN prisoners freed, 325 Koreans, 21 Americans and 1 Briton choose to stay in North Korea.

The US  and UK governments blame Communist brainwashing. As for military losses, South Korea suffers around  613,000 casualties of which 138,000 are killed. US forces lose almost 37,000 killed - around 90%  of non-Korean UN fatalities.

2,000 Commonwealth troops are killed along with 2,000 soldiers from  other UN allies, almost half of them Turkish. Estimating Chinese and North Korean  casualties is harder. Initial American estimates of 1.

5 million Chinese and  North Korean war dead may be exaggerated, and losses are likely closer to 500,000.  Civilian casualties are estimated to be at least around 1 million South and 1. 5 million  North Korean killed, wounded and missing.

The figure may be higher, and historians agree  civilian deaths outstrip military ones. With such high casualties, it has been difficult for some to accept the inconclusive end  of the Korean War. After the conflict, both sides present themselves as the victors  – but did anyone actually win the Korean War?

One argument is that South Korea and the United  Nations Command were victorious by repelling a northern invasion and preventing reunification  under a communist dictatorship . Since they were the defenders initially, a return to the  pre-war status quo was essentially a defensive victory . The South even gained some territory  overall, while the North lost some.

Furthermore, some South Korean historians argue the fact that  1. 26 million Northern civilians and soldiers fled or defected to the South was "a victory in  the competition of systems and legitimacy". Critics of these arguments point out that although  the initial South Korean and UN goal was survival, this shifted by October 1950.

MacArthur and Rhee’s  invasion of the north would have almost certainly resulted in an attempt at reunification had it  been successful. According to this argument, North Korea can also claim a defensive victory.  Although the North’s attempt at reunification failed, preventing its own destruction could be  considered a much more important and existential goal.

Others add that the North’s territorial  gains, including Kaesong, were more economically and strategically valuable, while the South  largely gained sparsely populated mountain areas. Critics of a US victory also argue that the  United States emerged from the war with its self-confidence and pride severely bruised. After  total victory in WWII, Korea was an uncomfortable experience which had far-reaching consequences. 

Eisenhower's move to massive nuclear retaliation as the cornerstone of US security policy,  although also driven by financial concerns, could be interpreted as a shift to the strategic  defensive. Under Eisenhower, the US moves from a policy of pro-actively “rolling back” Communism  to containing it, as well as a shift from conventional to clandestine operations. That has led some to suggest the Soviet Union gained the most from the war.

Although  it supported Kim’s goal of reunification, it did so from a distance and its overall  investment in Korea in terms of material and prestige were low. Soviet confidence was  intact and maybe even reinforced, including in Europe , where it intervened to crush uprisings  in both East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. Chinese historians also point out Chinese gains  from the Korean War.

It cemented its relationship with the Soviet Union (for a time), developed its  great power status, and modernised its military, including tanks and an air force . Since China  never explicitly intervened to reunify Korea, China can also argue to have achieved its primary  strategic goal – preserving a friendly Communist buffer state against US-aligned states in the  Pacific . The Korean experience did not stop China from continuing to support Ho Chi Minh’s communist  forces fighting the French in Indochina , or sending captured US artillery to Viet Minh forces  in 1953 – artillery that would be decisive at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

When France called on  the US to officially intervene on their behalf, Eisenhower refused because he was afraid  of Chinese intervention – though the US did provide France with intelligence, logistics,  equipment, and financial support from 1950. Of course, this position has its opponents too.  They say that just like the US, China shifted to a goal of reunification by late 1950, which  ultimately failed, and that its other gains were not worth the high casualties.

There’s also  an argument that Truman’s decision to block the Taiwanese Straits saved Taiwan from invasion,  ensuring the survival of Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist Chinese republic. This prevented  the Communist Chinese from achieving a much more important strategic objective – ultimate  victory in the Chinese Civil War. Even after the US Seventh Fleet withdrew, China did not  invade Taiwan, perhaps fearing US intervention.

Other less-discussed minor victors may be UN  contributors like Turkey, Greece, Thailand, and the Philippines. With modest contributions  they earned a degree of gratitude from the major western powers which often paved the way for  formal security guarantees. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952, while the US oversaw the  creation of SEATO in 1955 – an ultimately failed version of the alliance in South-East Asia.

In the end, the result of the Korean War is inconclusive. Given the millions killed, it’s  understandable that all parties would try to claim some kind of victory, but these debates  remain largely academic. What is less debatable is that the Korean War’s impact resonates  through the 20th century and up to today.

One of the lasting legacies of the Korean War is  the American test of tactical nuclear weapons and general MacArthur’s idea to use nuclear weapons  on China – which was ultimately avoided. However, this showed where the new Cold War  between the superpowers was headed, and the potential of limitless nuclear energy  wasn’t just relevant for military application. Before his death Josef Stalin had accelerated  the Soviet Nuclear program and the vision of “atomic powered communism” lived on after  him.

If you are interested in this topic, we produced an entire documentary series about  this topic from the first Soviet atom bomb to the atom cities like Prypiat and beyond. And  where can you watch Red Atoms? On Nebula, a streaming platform we’re building together with  other creators, where we don’t have to worry about advertising guidelines or the almighty algorithm. 

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As usual you can find all the  sources for this episode in the video description below. For  more on Southeast Asia after the Second World War, check out our videos on the  Indochina War which was heavily influenced by the events in Korea. If you are watching this video  on Nebula or Patreon, thank you so much for the support, we couldn’t do it without you.

I’m  Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that  knows what it means when things are a bit sticky.