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hello and welcome to CSS I'm John alterman senior vice president bner binsky chair in Global Security and geost strategy and director of the Middle East program I could not be more pleased to welcome you today to a discussion about China in the Middle East and I'll be joined by three really special colleagues first my friend and colleague Jude Blanchett uh is also my neighbor in EN joining offices he holds the Freeman chair in China studies here at csis before joining CSS in 2019 he was the engagement director at the conference board's China Center for economics

and business in Beijing where he led the center's research on China's political involvement environment yunsun is senior fellow co-director of the East Asia program and director of the China program at the Simson Center here in Washington and a colleague uh where I've been in several conferences on China in the Middle East Rick Waters uh is managing director of the China practice at the Eurasia group of political risk consultant firm he spent almost three decades as us Diplomat covering both the Middle East and Asia where our paths often crossed before he left the state department in

2023 he helped create and lead the Department's office of China coordination known informally as China House and served as Deputy assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan the the work that I have done on China in the Middle East uh forms some of the basis of this conversation I recently published a report uh the middle east's view of the China model uh which came out uh a few months ago some of the work in that came out in an article in Survival on the China model in the Middle East in the April and May

issue uh Washington quarterly in the fall published uh an article entitled China's us-driven Middle East strategy and I testified before the US China econom IC and Security review Commission on China in the Middle East last April you can find links to those articles on the CSS website and I hope on the event page uh that you're watching now um to the three of you thank you so much and thank you for joining me welcome to this conversation as people who think a lot about Chinese foreign policy how often does the Middle East come up how

Central is the Middle East to the way the Chinese think about their Global interests and think about the world Jude why don't we start with you well first of all John thanks for having me and appreciate you letting me beam in from a satellite office here in Montgomery County Maryland um and congratulations on the report I I know we're going to have a chance to talk about it but let me just say at the at the front end how rich and rewarding I found it a topic I thought I had somewhat of a handle on

your report indicates how much more there really is to explore about this important topic um but very quickly I would say you certainly have seen chinese's interest in the Middle East grow in significant proportion over the last decade I think part of this is is based on um as you uh referenced throughout your report how Central strategic competition with the United States is to how the Chinese conceptualize their interests how they should expand them how they should build new relationships but beyond that there's also just a functional imperative for China seeking to build greater inroads

in the Middle East and that's just based on pure raw economics uh I think China sees the Middle East even as it talks about energy transition even as China pumps significant amounts of money into building out its ability to produce batteries uh solar technology wind technology they are still heavily relying on hydrocarbons and uh the Middle East remains vitally important for that in fact more so as China has become concerned about what it sees as a US effort to contain uh the country and toward its development building out these relationships uh especially ones based on

critical inputs like like energy are are all the more important I think later we'll talk about access of upheaval uh attempts to uh undermine us Le International order all of that matters but I should just say that uh from a a baseline Primal Instinct I think Beijing is thinking about it relationship in the Middle East on on very transactional terms and you we were talking just before we went on that that China approaches Africa a little bit differently than it approaches the Middle East how would you capture that well if you look at China's engagement

with Africa and the Middle East both have a strong element of economic cooperation economic transaction but in the case of Africa I would say China comes from a um maybe condescending is a is a wrong word but China C comes as a superior partner in the region because China has the financing China has the technical advantage and China also believes that it has experience in terms of Economic Development and also domestic governance so when China comes to Africa there's a strong element of let us share how we made it work and how this can be

successful in your country as well but you you rarely see that in the case of Middle East it's more of a would say a transaction transactional relationship but on equal footing the Chinese don't pretend to be the teachers or the lecturers of the of Middle Eastern countries in fact if you look at the framing in the Chinese diplomatic Playbook a lot of times the Chinese diplomats will refer to the term they call it Mutual learning uh of great civilizations so China is a great civilization Middle East also has great civilizations so let's learn and cooperate

with each other so I would say that's a very different element in terms of China's relationship with with the Middle East another factor is I think the Chinese have very clear understanding from the very beginning that not all Middle Eastern countries are in need of Chinese financing and they are more of a CL clian um of uh of Chinese technology and Chinese products in terms uh rather than the recipient of Chinese assistance so I think that's also another element that shaped the Chinese thinking that when they look at Middle East busy Partners they don't necessarily

see countries that uh deeply in need of China's help Rick you've both looked at China's activity around the world but you've also been engaged in the Middle East for decades you've been looking at China how have you seen this changing over time and I guess I'm particularly interested in how you think China's changed the way it engages in the Middle East over the last say 5 to 10 years well I got my start with this issue in the '90s when China was first looking at a very transactional level at buying us defense technology from Israel

and that was a complicated period which I know you were a part of in the Bush Administration I think that transactional period it's Diversified over the past 25 years into areas that go beyond energy into technology but now I think it's it's increasingly over the past say 5 to six years been subsumed by the geopolitical overlay and so I think both things Remain the dependence on hydrocarbons the complementarity between the Chinese economy and Gulf economies less so with Egypt and the desire by the Chinese to diversify a transactional level into the tech space where they

now I think look at the gulf both as a market for their Tech but also as a source of investment in areas where us restrictions are closing and the gulf country's heft in Washington might allow them to do some sort of a hedge I think the newer element though and this isn't unique to the Middle East is how the shift in the Chinese leadership's view of their primary concern being the US and the strategic competition by our frame that overlay increasingly I think affects their behavior and we've seen that especially since October 7th 2022 in

the tech base the the UAE has recently seen to tried to signal that it is heavily weighted toward the United States and away from China Saudi Arabia seems to be not in that same space but perhaps considering it um does that represent in your view a success for the United States a defeat for China or some clever operating by the Gulf States as they try to navigate great power competition I think probably more the latter I think the Gulf States um will together with China see how far they can get until the US uses its

leverage and I think that's what we saw in the g42 case that if the US is at the Forefront of advanced AI which is still the case for now the US has the ability through defensive measures like export controls to force that choice and so the emiratis you know accepted that bargain perhaps reluctantly but I think that we should expect that particularly the Saudis in the UA and their Sovereign wealth funds and their National development strategies will look to invite both countries Tech stxs to the extent that they're able to coexist within the same country

and I think the US and China will tussle and struggle um China advocating for the inclusion of its Tech stack and the US applying defensive controls where they exist um I'm wondering if if then China sees the United States trying to exclude it from the Middle East or or trying to ham in China how is that how was what Rick's described perceived from the Chinese perspective is it seen as hostile is it seen as it's fair it's what competition is I'm not sure whether y or Jude is is better for this you were muted of

course I am because it has to I think that's a great question um John so I think one point is just to say that um I don't think we can overestimate the extent to which uh a competitive framework with the United States impacts how B how China sees lots of bilateral and Regional relations that that overlays everything I don't think it subsumes everything and China is still able to look at specific transactional uh elements of of specific bilateral and Regional relationships but I think in this um it it overlays everything and that um uh that

has become strong certainly since the Trump presidency but but even going with through the Biden Administration the second is I think China is also trying to figure out where the play Space is as the United States relationship with the Middle East uh evolves I guess we should say politely and and you have to imagine I think we all know it in this room but often times we can overestimate the extent to which China sees the full chessboard just think about the view from Beijing right now and the number of variables it is having to navigate

right um there was a lot of rhetoric when right after the Biden administration's um somewhat halfhazard withdraw from Afghanistan that essentially this is going to open up vast new vistas of strategic play space for the Chinese and and you didn't hear the Chinese saying the same thing publicly there might have been some gloating about it but there was this quiet sense of unease that now essentially with the United States out of Afghanistan um Beijing wasn't entirely sure how developments would would progress the Communist Party likes uh predictability more than anything um and so you start

out with Afghanistan you move through uh the houes in in the Red Sea you now have October 7th um and the burgeoning conflict with with Iran and and Lebanon um Beijing will look for angles and Bank shots in in all of these but I think it's also important to remember that there's a lot going on that the Chinese are deeply uncertain about and maybe we can talk about it later just even think about their relationship with Iran since some of the Strategic um uh gains that Israel has had with with the pager attack uh Nel's

death you're already I think over the last week or so starting to see Beijing at the margin recalibrate its approach Visa V Iran and there are some tentative green shoots of of Beijing uh towards Israel because I think they're again now wondering the horse they backed in Iran wasn't quite as strong as they wanted so that is a long way of saying they certainly have a plan but Beijing is dealing with an awful lot of contingency in the Middle East right now that is making it challenging for them to find a straight through line and

let me ask y you you wrote an article about how Afghanistan was an example of China sort of filling into the vacuum when the United States pulled out that that this was uh China looking for a way to maybe strike some deals do some Medi what are the parts of China's presence in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal that you think represent China's Ambitions for its role in the Middle East and how do you think it might be different um if we look at how China approached uh Afghanistan since us withdrawal I would say regionalism is

a is a key word you see that China organizes a foreign ministers meeting of Afghanistan's neighbor a mechanism that means regularly to discuss what region and especially the neighbors of Afghanistan can do um I think the mechanism was first set up in the prevention of a potential implosion of Afghanistan they were afraid that there will be millions of refugees um leaving exiting Afghanistan and flowing into uh neighboring countries which was a concern that was shared by uh by most of the Afghanistan's neighbors so that mechanism we have seen that has played some role in terms

of for example economic engagement assistance provided to Afghanistan since Taliban took over and now I think they're definitely morphing towards the direction of what would be a regional economic engagement plan looks like but of course there are preconditions um including um the taliban's attitude towards Islamic organizations that are still being hovered in uh inside the country so there there are conditions but you definitely see a Chinese attitude morphing away from the previous sole focus on um on terrorism that now they're talking more about uh economic cooperation economic opportunities and what the region can come together

in terms of uh in terms of working with with Afghanistan just this past week we saw the resumption of the China Afghanistan Railway um happened I believe it was Friday or Saturday and the Chinese sead word the Chinese analyst definitely see that a sign of China moving forward with more economic engagement with with Taliban regime despite the fact that a diplomatic recognition of the regime has not yet happened China has already made it quite clear at least in private chanels they won't be the first they won't be the last but they will be one of

the first Rick is is somebody who is a both a diplomat out in the field and also a senior official in Washington um how do you see China approaching the tasks of diplomacy sort of this multilateral structures is it profoundly different from the United States uh contrasting with the United States but has important elements of similarity as a as somebody who did US diplomacy what's the same and what's really different well I think one one element of it which is similar to what China has done in other regions is they tend to create dedicated structures

that that position them to deal with countries on a bilateral basis maybe under a plurilateral grouping where they can deal with it from a position of advantage and so you know you mentioned some of the ones in South Asia in the Middle East you have the the Arab League mechanism and you've also got one with the GCC I think in a more practical level what I noticed and I I don't mean this in an overly judgmental sense is that the depth for Better or For Worse that us diplomats and policy makers had in the Middle

East the Chinese lack their surface area is much more transactional it was business relationships in the Gulf that is changing but I think when you look back to the period when shun ping first put forward his four-point Palestinian proposal you know you didn't have kind of Martin indix and Dennis Ross's with deep relationships with the key players that informed that document it was much more of kind of a Topline Declaration of principles meant more for a geopolitical purpose than anything and I think that that is one piece that is changing I'll I'll just end by

saying that when I look at the evolution of their diplomacy on issues like Palestinian Rec reconciliation or perhaps the Iran Syria deal they are learning their depth is growing they're they're starting to train mediators they're they're trying to build deeper ties but I still think they have a long way to go before they have that intuitive understanding of the region uh outside of the areas they've been involved where their diplomacy could become more active and involved if they made that choice I guess the question also is what their ambition is to do with their diplomacy

whether they they think that mediation is going to get wins and what a win would look like in those circumstances well I mean I think up until now they've had the advantage of being a classical IR hedging state in the sense that they benefited from the existing order without having to make significant Investments so great for the US to be the security provider external security while we sell you domestic security equipment but I think where things are changing I mean to judee's point a second ago is the Chinese also I think are ultimately a status

quo power they're not interested in a disruptive or escalatory environment that affects their interests and so I do think they can be a bit reactive when it comes to how to use use their leverage with Iran and others when they feel things are getting out of hand and I guess the question is whether some of this mediation is meant to throw shade on us mediation and how that how that plays out in a regional environment with there any number of opportunities for mediation because there's so much conflict J Jude you're you're nodding vigorously yeah well

I was going to say there's a a forest and a trees Dynamic to this um at a macro level I think an important story to be tracking which transcends Middle Eastern concerns and extends through Europe and over to the Indo Pacific is Beijing is attempting to tell a a a a new story even more effectively and that new story is there is a order breaking down and this is an order that the United States in the west have built and run for the better part of 70 years but but it is atrophying it is dis

integrating and we the the uh the International Community outside of the United States and its cold war Lackey are watching disruption and instability in the Middle East which is caused by wink wink Israel um we are watching uh insecurity in Europe which was caused by NATO and we're now seeing the United States bring this instability out into the Indo Pacific which is why Beijing is warning about an Asian NATO even though there is not as far as I can tell anyone ad ating for a article 5 like Treaty Organization and I think one of the

reasons they're doing this is simply trying to leverage this concern that is and the actual flash points around the world to say that we the Chinese are are are bringing new Solutions uh and answers to this so you see this with Chinese articulating the Global Security initiative the global development initiative now scratch the GSI the Global Security initiative or try to peer into it and there still is not much by way of details but I think that's largely besides the point by putting out peace plans for a Palestinian issue for putting out peace plans for

Europe Beijing is trying to sort of say as one order dies one order is taking hold and and we the Chinese are are part of building it now to Rick's point though this is a bit of difficult trigonometry because functionally speaking I think China would um very much like to see elements of the existing order pertain and endure so this is this is as the Chinese say trying to see progress amid stability I mean I I think they're looking to sort of make marginal advances in rewriting this macro Narrative of the international order but doing

so in a very calibrated way that again looking at China's relationship with Iran right now I think it's pretty clear that they are are trying very hard not to give the Iranians a green light to retaliate retaliate against the Israelis it's not because they've become a friend of Israel but you know go back to some of the the primordial reasons for China's interest in the Middle East they do not need to see a massive spike in Energy prices right now especially while their economy is doing pretty weakly so this is a a a as close

to 3D chess as you get in terms of the number of interests that China is trying to advance I mean we can talk about how well they're doing it but I think that that macro story is an important overlay over some of these more tactical considerations of the Chinese well arguably the sort of version 1.0 of this was the belt and Road initiative which got tremendous attention certainly in the Middle East as every country in the Middle East Saw itself as the Hub of the Belton Road initiative in the region U you certainly had the

the the launch of the Asian infrastructure Investment Bank um but we keep hearing the Chinese don't really have the capital to support these that that Belton Road projects have really diminished aib seems to have disappeared at at least for my Consciousness U has China abandoned these ref finded these initiatives learn from these initiatives how do we think about those initiatives as we think about China's longer term objectives RI yeah I was uh in Beijing actually for the last belt and Road Forum uh to be fair I didn't make it to the Forum I was stuck

in traffic the whole time but I mention this because it what was clear to me is that from China's perspective the belt and Road initiative is not going away I think there was a little bit of a false demise During the covid period when lending dipped precipitously but if you look at the numbers now it's back up close to where it was in 2018 but the composition has changed and I think this is the big difference it's moved away from Big Ticket infrastructure to smaller projects it has an institutionalized Secretariat and it's I think increasingly

reflecting the lessons they have learned from the excesses of the early period so in the Middle East I think you know digital Health Renewables creating markets for these products creating the ability to leverage those economic relationships to give influence in standard setting bodies I think this is more of how conceptually the brri will look going forward and that is very consistent with their overall economic interests and you that fits with your concept that the the Chinese are um targeted directed or learning or adapting uh much more Dynamic and I think a lot of people in

the United States often see China which is China has a direction and then has an indomitable March toward a predetermined destination it well China St does right well BR is shining's signature Flagship foreign strategy so I agree with Rick it's not not going to go away the Chinese will never declare Bri has ended or B has succeeded or Bri has failed that's not going to happen so we're going to see some morph thing from different stages from the beginning uh there was a lot of white elephants big infrastructure hard infrastructure oriented approach to then um

more towards the capacity building focused on trade especially in the case of Middle East and and um and Africa focus on the bilateral trade facilitation and trade promot motion but now we're seeing even more Market SE segmentation so uh in terms of the b in the Middle East you have to look at specific countries right in Iran B looks very different from UAE which also looks very different from from Saudi so I would say that China has differentiated within thei and have different um priorities and different approaches towards different country UAE is seing as China's

for example um hub for regional trade a lot of the Chinese export go to go to UAE first and then disperse among the region and then Saudi we see bigger uh T ticket items like cooperation with um the what they call the alignment of China's Bri and uh Saudi Arabia's blueprint 20 230 yeah so we see that for different countries there are definitely different priorities than for countries that are poor for example like in Jordan or Syria or um even some of the countries in North Africa for that matter we see that the Chinese BR

approach is still more leaning towards a traditional approach focused on trade facilitation agricultural capacity building um so I would say that different countries are um are are having different priorities so Jude you and I have talked at various points in the last several years about sort of what the Communist party is thinking and and and its internal Dynamics how much of the Chinese approach to the Middle East and the Chin's approach to to competition with the United States do you think is a reflection of Xi Jinping personally uh how much of it is a consequence

of the the correlation of Economic and other forces around the world and as if China goes through an economic dip as it may if it had a different leadership do you think China would be likely to take a different approach to these issues or do you think there sort of there is ideological uh uniformity among the leadership that that that she has been able to forge and there aren't really alternative voices um great question honest answerers I don't know but um I would say I could easily imagine a completely different leadership group in Beijing and

us having approximately the same orientation of policy towards the Middle East right there's nothing that feels this feels classically um Chinese interest driven approach to diplomacy and and interestingly one where um I I Feel Like The Narrative of axis of upheaval finds that it it uh it runs up a bit against the the rocks of reality in terms of how the Chinese are quick to calibrate and recalibrate um their interests based on who they think the stronger power is who they need to build a good relationship with to have influence in the region they are

for all intents and purposes blind to regime type ideologies matters uh you can't understand Chinese policy making without understanding ideology um but here I imagine if if uh we we had a different set of leaders I just I struggled to see how things would be that different because so many of the specific bilateral strategies work here makes sense given the the prior of what China needs to accomplish diplomatically and in terms of energy policy I should also if I can actually just link this up to the last question on BR what's interesting about that is

Bri and your view of it is very much a RAR Shack test for how you think about the Chinese there's there's two stories you could tell about it even as it pertains to the Middle East you know number first story is that Bri shows the capability of the Chinese system to fall on its face they come out big and Brash spending a lot of money buying bowling alleys in pipy New York and find that they've over spent my friend sorry no and no offense to pipy um where I'm from anyway uh um so um uh

you could look at it that way I think the other way to look at it is actually this shows the strengths of the Chinese system because they came out large overspent and then have recalibrated and the BR if you look at BR investments into the Middle East right now in some ways they're much more targeted yes on energy but also on uh uh digital infrastructure um you know trying to support and facilitate a build out as as as Rick was talking about earlier but attempting to build out and support and facilitate Chinese companies Chinese Tech

platforms Chinese technology from integrating itself for integrating itself into the Middle East um uh so I I think both those stories are true the BR was I think gut out over at skis uh and showed many of the weaknesses the Chinese system but again the ability to recalibrate it and we're not talking about Africa but if you look at it spending in Africa on BR or nominally BR you know they're moving into critical areas like um you know rare Earths um critical minerals so so again they're being strategic the the wallet is thinner they're going

to spend less money but as Xi Jinping said at the at the Bri Forum it's you know it's smaller and smarter Investments Rick you're dealing with business folks all the time if the Chinese economy continues to soften and the rest of the world's economy uh continues to strengthen China seems at least proportionately less attractive to both investors around the world but also to to Middle Eastern states um how does that affect China's reach in the Middle East how do you think it's going to affect Chinese behavior in the Middle East well I think in a

couple of ways I mean one the the situation in China right now for many of its companies in say the renewable sector is one of dramatic oversupply and limited profitability so they're looking for external markets and they're seeing the Us close up they're seeing Europe tighten but not close allog together and I think that's where they're centered on the Middle East as a potential kind of safe space both to create new overseas capacity but then to export it abroad and so there's an interesting Confluence between the drying up of of us and many European pools

of capital and China's need for investment funds and their technological knowhow and I think that's coming together in Saudi and in the UAE in particular in sectors like Renewables but how much at a macro level that will really matter I think they're more variables than just the Middle East it will depend on where trade protectionism goes not just in the US and Europe but even among many of China's allies where what has become a very work to this model um is creating trade barriers to those products even among its friends in the bricks um let

me shift years a little bit and and talk um about how Chinese diplomacy has adapted to a very different kind of global environment we we've talked about Jude talked about uh China edging closer to Israel and perhaps away from Iran uh through the the both the war in Gaza and subsequent um Rising conflict between Israel and Iran is is China agile enough to do that or or do you think China is likely to trip Jude as as it tries to to reposition I mean you can always trip forward and and still make progress while falling

on your face so I wouldn't maybe if that's a third possibility um again if I could zoom out a bit this is um we're seeing this Playbook happen in a number of regions right now where you you constantly see this um undulation between charm offensives uh and and overly aggressive chines action which marginalize or or or create setbacks I mean this is just a recurrent pattern of Chinese statecraft that you see in surprising ways that um once the Chinese make a royal screw up or they push too hard or they squeeze too hard that they

can turn on a dime uh and try to recalibrate those relationships I think what's different though is the receptivity to some of the nation states which have been on the adverse end of some of these Chinese actions to to to wanting to recalibrate I mean we're talking about Israel um I I don't know this issue well enough and others will have views but I I would be surprised if based on more than a year now of the Chinese very overtly taking the side of Hamas uh after October 7th that the Israeli public is going to

have much of an appetite to go back to where they were with China in 2018 or 2019 um so I think they are Nimble enough to affect uh calibrations I I think what they might misunder misunderestimate and and I might be borrowing a point from Rick here so if I do please give him copyright but um China can recalibrate very quickly with the leaders uh of many of these nation states in the region but their ability to understand sentiment uh at at the more popular level I think is woefully inept and so um they're looking

at how do we recalibrate with you know Saudi princes with elected leaders but I I think what they underestimate is they have really upset a lot of people certainly in Israel for how quickly they they abandoned Israel after October 7th and made a pivot to try to speak out speak for the the global South right and I think this is a very important aspect is that that China saw Gaza as an opportunity to take up the mantle of the global South saw itself being the the the state that could articulate what billions of people around

the world felt and really instrumentalized this idea of a global South as a way to differentiate itself from the United States and criticize the United States for supporting Israel and I'm just curious how you've seen this Global South concept develop and it seems to me that that if you're talking about trying to nurturing the idea of a China model which I think China has has done at least in the minds of many governments around the world we want to be like China what we want to have that economic growth and stability and all those things

but now there is this Global South the shared resentment the shared sense of disenfranchisement how how has that looked from a China perspective just sort of seizing on the the phrasing identifying with the global south I mean it does feel like something the Chinese are really trying to to breathe even more life into because it serves so Chinese interests and and isolates the United States and its closest allies and and Associates China with the bulk of the the world's population and an increasing fraction of its its economic strength I feel that the global South narrative

in China has a strong element of reframing the International System right when we talk about great power competition between us and China China we're primarily talking about a bipolarization of the of the International System so through this Global sou narrative what the Chinese are trying to reframe is that this competition or this problem is not between us and China as a status quo power or revisionist power in fact it is the global Norse or the developed World represented by the United States versus China which is seeing as a representative of the developing world so in

a way when we see China talking about the global sales think there's a natural sense of China being the representative or being the face of global sou fighting a battle against United States on behalf of the widest or the broadest um developing country community so I think that's basically the essence of what the Chinese are trying to rship that this is not about us China this is actually about us versus developing countries that China is trying to fight for but there's a caveat though in China you see this uh there one there at least two

debates on the Global South narrative the first one is is China part of global south or global east if you think about the the um during Co back in 2021 what Shin ping said was well this is a rise of the East and the decline of the West so at that time China did not talk about global cells being China's core mechanism or the core angle that China was trying to aim for and that raises a question it's China really Global South which is the economic term or China is essentially representing global east which is

more seen as a political and ideological uh term so that's one caveat I think the Chinese have tried very hard to deliberate since 2023 which is what China is global South global east that's Russia that's not China we have nothing to do with global east the second caveat is is China really the natural leader of global cells and as in that's a much deeper uh debate even in the Chinese policy Community because there's India there are many countries in the Middle East and there are also countries in Latin America and in Africa each representing a

core corner or a a strong voice within the global South so I think you're absolutely correct that China is still trying to breathe more energy and more ambition into the global South narrative through a coalition of voices and countries that are not satisfied with the global order that in the Chinese narrative defined and dominated by the uh by the developed countries or by the global nors so through coaling with these different Power centers in different continents that represent the global South I think the Chinese are trying to form a broadest Coalition versus United States sound

right Rick yeah it is I think where where I struggle a lot with assessing this question today is you know to what end I think you know you hit on a really important point which is that you China is not the only leader in this Coalition they expand the Bri bricks but they brought in India they you know focus on the se but it's very difficult to see how far those groupings can get the further they can expand because the lowest common denominator becomes less and less what I'm intrigued by though is something John that

you had in your report which was if you go back to the 2016 Arab position paper the Chinese kind of laid their cards on the table about what their their real interest is here at a at a certain level which is defend of their own system defense of their own model and while I do think their Ambitions go beyond that the basic bargain they put forward in that Arab position paper was their Narrative of the one China principle which of course is their their explanation for how Taiwan is an internal conflict and how it should

be treated under international law I think where we're starting to see them really leverage this at a practical level is more in the general assembly or in the Human Rights Commission where the vote count reflect the ability to mobilize um disaffected portions of the global South in a numbers game but how far you can go beyond that into actual uh alternatives to the dollar or you know more meaningful uh plurilateral actions I think very much remains to be seen although it's a little bit like the liliputians Ty down Gulliver yeah you don't have to be

completely successful in all the things you do you just have to encumber the United States and as you point out that the remarkable thing about the Arab strategy paper is it lays out a whole list of things that China will do for Arab states the only request is to recognize the the one China policy for which China expresses its appreciation right it's a it's it's a remarkable bargain seen from the the point of view of of Arab states um and it does seem to me that that China is really good at assessing what countries want

from China it feels to me like the US government is not very good at assessing what people want from the United States is good at telling people what they should get why do you think China it doesn't have the as Rick said we don't have the Nuance the expertise to really understand all these societies but China does seem to be much better as a non-democratic system at understanding what populations and leaders want and the United States which has a system that arguably is totally built on understanding what people want is good at telling people what

they're going to get and not very good at understanding what they want why why do you think that is and Rick I guess well I I would say they're very good at doing that with Elites I mean their their model is exceptional at Elite capture particularly with authoritarian regimes um I think it's less good at at assessing what happens below that level I mean Jude sort of alluded to this point earlier I think a lot of their strategy towards Gaza after October 7th was built around a notion of what would play well among Elites um

but now is I think you know the the foreign Ministry statement that Jude pointed out tells us they're having to recalibrate a little bit sending signals for the first time that Israel does have legitimate security interests and I think some element of their challenge going Beyond an elite capture model is that is what their system is and understands um but it's ALS it also has to do with the way in which their overseas missions operate they're under very strict rules often their diplomats are not allowed to just mingle in society but have to do meetings

in groups of two and this actually has very little to do with their Global strategy and everything to do with the discipline Commission and the the ways in which the CCP manages the internal structures so it makes it hard for them to have a very clear sense of where other power centers in a society might be how Democratic or semi-democratic polities operate or how to engage an authoritarian system after a regime has changed when you when the power dynamics May scramble and you have to reconnect to them although arguing in Libya they did pretty well

they they did that that twostep pretty well well you didn't really push me on the question of how it compares to the US which I will Dodge for now as you were as you were entitled to do Jude do you have do you have views on that yeah and without um without detracting from the skill of the Chinese system at at Elite capture I should also say there's a a simple story to tell here which is uh China understands that the way to the hearts of of the vast majority of of leaders is money yeah

and so this story looks very different I don't think we would be sitting here having a panel discussion about this if if China was the 118th ranked country in the world in terms of economic size and and was the 27th largest trade partner uh with with all of these countries but of course it is the largest trade partner with all these countries and going back to things like the Bri China to have something to offer and so in some sense it is not surprising there's not PRD chess going on it is simply the fact that

they have a checkbook and are willing to write the correct checks to the right people at the right time that gives them this this capability so it is an asymmetric competition in that sense um U simply because the United States does not have the the bandwidth to operate legally in some of the areas that that China can because we take Serious concerns about corruption China isn't encumbered by that I should also say that China's in some sense the the um the space to create new novel mechanisms for for engaging with third countries um they're just

less encumbered in some sense by bureaucracy than than the United States is so some things like bri would would take the United States probably 78 years to conceptualize and implement but but China was able to push this out pretty quickly so I'm not trying to detract from this there is a sophisticated Playbook that China runs but I think at the heart of this is just important to remember that they're just willing to pay for for influence in a way that the United States government is not legally or bureaucratically capable of um so that that explains

some of this um see broadly U what should the US government be doing uh not so much to combat Chinese influence but to deal with growing Chinese influence in the middle e least um and what should it prioritize is it thinks about a challenge from China to at least untie some of the close relationships the US has established in the Middle East over the last 50 or so years well I leave that question to Rick and and Jude but I can talk about how the Chinese have decided to to proceed in the Middle East despite

the fact um that they do see that there is a a narrative in the US that China is in in the Middle East to displace or replace United States and they also do recognize that their approach in the Middle East is match with push backs not only from uh United States who is still the so security provider in the region but also even from the regional countries Hing strategy does carry a cost right so I think for the for the Chinese what they have decided to focus on is that they decided to focus on the

strength of their own strategy independent from what us may or may do so they're focused on relationship building with individual countries independent of what the US policy with the US pushback and I find that strategy eventually coming to what the Chinese are preparing for after the US election goes back to the the the calling that China should build up its own strengths and build up its own policy in each individual regions instead of making that policy dependent of what the next Administration May or may now do I find that to be um in the end

is is is self reinforcing but um it also reflects as think a reality or recognition in on the Chinese side that there might be very little they can do to shape or to change us perception and US policy towards China in this particular region so they decided to uh move forward with or without the US approval I don't know whether that offers any um does Rick well I can delve back into Middle East policy in a only semi-in way and you can tell me where I'm wrong but I would I would say there are probably

three initial thoughts that I would have one is that the US has been the the security guarantor for the region for all of our lifetimes and yet for that to continue in a way that doesn't require the US constantly being drawn in in terms of personnel and and blood and and actual direct involvement requires something that we need for every other aspect of our China policy too it's fixing the defense procurement system because right now China only sells 5% of the weapons to the region the preference is still for us and for defense support more

broadly particularly in Saudi we have unparalleled relationships and advantages but if our system can't deliver that will be a challenge I think a second broad area has to do with the questions we've tossed around here about how the respective system operate a Chinese Ambassador actually has power over the state owned Enterprises The Lending spets the the full menu of options that are available to the Chinese government whereas a US chief of mission probably can't get confirmed for two years by the Senate and when she or he gets to post it's a negotiation to put it

mildly with usaid or you know an opinionated head of an agency about how to use and deploy us resources and diplomatic bandwidth so I think strengthening the chief admission authorities and getting people to post matters and the final piece which I think does really go beyond um just the middle east region is to have a regional strategy that is not all premised about China it has to really be tailored I think to the the the value proposition in that region including the affirmative economic peace Jude you want to on this all I will add is

um a a great summary of what the US should do at the end of a report written by John alterman uh which calls for establishing a clear set of us priorities making assessment of partner motivations and then I think this this just Echoes what Rick just said crafting a mix of incentives and consequences uh that can shape partner Behavior and the the incentives is is Big here we were just having a discussion on China's ability to zero in on what a given stakeholder needs or wants and and the ability to execute on that um I

I think this is a quote from Henry Kissinger if it's not um he won't be around to challenge it but simply to say uh you know show me an area where the United States is is playing you know it's aame and China is still winning and that is just often not the case it's areas where the United States is is playing its B or C game that China finds avenues for uh for for Advantage here and John this is a space you know extraordinarily well so I'd love to hear your thoughts on this but it

seems to me that China is in some ways operating in an area where the United States vision for what it's trying to do is is a bit confused right now um for for the record I'd never heard Henry Kissinger use the phrase aame so I think that's probably an apocryphal story I heard him say a lot of things but aame is not one of them um let me just ask a final question to you and then I want to leave a moment if you want to ask questions of me what do you think success in

the Middle East looks like for China I mean if if if if they I'm not sure they ever think they're they're going to have won because the game's never over but how if somebody were able to craft a successful Chinese Middle East strategy what would the characteristics of the actions be and what would the characteristics of of Victory do you have a time frame because China's uh carbon strategy does a date to it give me a give me give me options uh like for example they I'm China aimed to achieve the um the pick Omission

by 2035 and then carbon neutrality by 2060 which means that the Chinese energy dependence on on on on the Middle East is going to change right so you have a time frame what would so give me give me a sort of five year and then a a 15E I was say that in five year um the Chinese will see that their continued energy dependence on the Middle East being a a crucial factor in their strategy towards region I think they were want to maintain a relative Regional peace and stability so that they can continue their

crude import import from the region so the maintenance of the stability in the region will be uh will be a core criteria for the for their middle Easter strategy the success of that strategy in 15 years I think the Chinese would like to see the emergence of some Regional security architecture that would be a displacement or replacement of the current US dominated security security structure I think the Chinese are very keen on fostering the independence with the autonomy of Middle Eastern key players in the region including Saudi including uh Iran including UAE to uh well

not deviate but to think creatively about what the future Regional security AR arit will look like I think the Chinese will be working in that direction RI your view yeah I mean I think depending on which timeline you choose at at at the level of the global order they want an order that's safe for their political system and for their their model of governance and so you know that implies making incremental progress in Shifting the global Coalition both in the UN and specialized agencies and and at a broader level I think economically it you know

they want to flip it from being dependent on hydrocarbons to you know maybe in some ways making them the main supplier of advanced technology and Renewables and I think they're making some Headway along along that road and I think more at at a level of the US China competition they they don't mind if the Middle East is the graveyard of our Empire I mean it's part of the East is rising West is declining narrative and so the more that the US is bogg down and it prevents pivots or rebalances or indopacific strategies from materializing in

a way that threaten their immediate interests so much the better so long as it stops short of outright instability that affects their interests Jude you want to weigh in I think it's all been said Well it has it's been said very well um Jude you asked uh if there will be time to to ask me questions um I think we've left two minutes so I'm I'm open to whatever slings and arrows you want to throw um well thanks um I had a a bunch of questions let me just sort of ask one in in light

of time uh you've been having a lot of discussions with interlocutors in the Middle East as you've been working on this report you know the region well I wanted to go back to something Rick had mentioned about bricks but um more to ask what is your in your conversations with sort of elite in the Middle East how often when they think about their relationship with China does joining multilateral institutions that China is shepherding like Shanghai cooperation organization and Bricks how often does that come up in other words um I can see Beijing beijing's uh objective

in enlarging some of these institutions as a way of creating momentum behind this shift in sort of old International order and new international order but from a a a would be a a a participant in an SEO or a bricks I'm curious your sense of what the value proposition is for some of these countries to potentially join in do do they actually see any there there or is it just a cheap way of essentially signaling to Beijing we're on your side but doesn't actually require much of them yeah I think there there are several things

going on one is they're very wary of being drawn into uh great power competition battles and being the the victims of them so they're very interested in signaling we're not choosing sides we don't want to choose sides uh I think that's sometimes to the Deep frustration of American diplomats who feel you have to choose sides because this is a a moral issue it's about the way that we guarantee Security in the world but there's I think a very deep interest in the Middle East and not choosing sides I don't hear very much frankly about uh

sort of bricks or SEO or any other sort of Institutions I think that the Arab League um has been around since 1945 and has not done much um in the last 80 years to promote Arab Unity which was its goal um I don't think people are looking for more meetings to go to although they'll certainly will go to the meetings I think what they're really interest what seems that to me to be animating people is this notion of a global cell this notion of like-minded states which I think a lot of Arab states think they

could have a leading role helping guide um they like the idea of having alternatives to American hegemony and and US pressure whether it's on economic reform political reform any of social reform I me there's a sense the United States comes in with a whole set of asks which are potentially destabilizing and as we talked about before there's a sense that that China is really a status quo power and the Middle East is full of status quo powers and so to the extent that they can build up this sense of a global South we're not picking

sides but we're pushing back on American hegemony we're having some way to to keep the United States from destabilizing our societies that notion is really attractive I hear a lot more about the global South than I hear about China and I hear the global South being spoken about in remarkably optimistic terms I think there's a sense in which people are are a little uh less hopeful for Chinese economy Chinese investment I have a friend who who used to run a a China investment frund in Kuwait he's now outside of Kuwait and doing other kinds of

investment has nothing to do with China so I think the people who thought they were going to make millions in China have abandoned that but but there is this sense um that the global South could provide huge opportunities um and getting out from under the thumb of the United States even for countries that want to rely on a US security umbrella who have a fundamental strategic orientation toward the United States but having other options and being able to think about you know 80 some OD percent of the world's population more than 50% of the the

global economy and a growing fraction I think that notion is really attractive and China in a very deliberate way it feels to me is pushing the global South Brand without necessarily pushing China and that ends up serving the same purpose and doesn't arouse all the same antibodies um I could do this for about 6 hours and that's not fair to any of you I am so grateful to you for taking an hour to talk with me about these issues I have enjoyed talking about all of them with you before I will look forward to enjoying

talking about these issues with you in the future but for now I just want to say thank you thanks to all of our viewers and we look forward to seeing you again soon thank you thanks johnk [Music] you for