Clausewitz-Pour gagner la paix

Clausewitz, to win the peace. We looked at Sun Tzu in a previous session, which concluded with a teaser regarding a mysterious author, namely Clausewitz. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are frequently linked, and often juxtaposed.

Nevertheless, they remain strategy's two greatest thinkers. Often the name Clausewitz is viewed as a somewhat anachronistic theorist because of today's societal, social and technological developments. A name associated with perilous thinker who ushered in the systematisation of war—of absolute war.

Similar to our session on Sun Tzu, today we'll look back at this author through his ideas and texts. And Fabrice Ravel will join us for this task. -Hello, Fabrice.

-Hello, Olivier. Hello, everyone. Fabrice, today we'll try to gauge how Clausewitz has shaped contemporary thought with developments, deviations and, ultimately, an an understanding of who he actually was.

Clausewitz wanted to write a book that would not get lost on some dusty shelf after a few years, but something anyone interested in the subject could pick up again and again. In his biography on Clausewitz, Bruno Colson readily commented that he was sure he had something important to say and wanted to create something that would carve out a lasting legacy. On the back cover, Bruno Colson even points out that Clausewitz belongs to a category of illustrious unknowns concealed by the quality of his work.

Allow me to start with this somewhat paradoxical concept—as an overview. We're clearly dealing with something rather unique and can even say that Vom Kriege (On War), a 900-page posthumous work published in 1832, succeeds precisely because it has never been forgotten. It has always had something to contribute and yet, the work has overshadowed its author.

I should say straight away that this is a major aspect of our session, because we'll actually have the opportunity to show that we can't really understand the work without knowing the author. Olivier, I'd like to round off my initial remarks by pointing out that a great many people have gone on to use his ideas. The most obvious is Helmuth von Moltke, a Prussian field marshal who was also a cadet between 1823 and 1826 at the Berlin Kriegsakademie, when Carl von Clausewitz was the director.

It might be a little surprising to find out that he is called Moltke the Elder, which I point out because the younger one was renowned for securing victories against Austria in 1866 and then against France in 1870 and 1871. That gives us a bit of a clue as to how Clausewitz's thinking might have influenced both military and political thinking. It may even be more surprising to learn that General Võ Nguyên Giáp, who led the Vietnamese forces against the French and then the USA, acknowledged that he had read the book.

It gets even more surprising: Lenin quotes him and Mao Zedong frequently cites him in his military writings. And what if I told you an underlined English copy was found in a secret al-Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan? We can top that with the US Army, which has systematically made it part of the West Point reading programme.

The Pentagon even gave lectures on it in 2015. I believe you now have a better idea of the extent of the thinking that seems to influence so many people regardless of the country or persuasion. We should nevertheless recognise the obvious echoes of a well known, worn out phrase that extends far beyond the simple military sphere, spilling into the political dimension, popularised as: War is the continuation of politics by other means.

It resonates terribly, of course, because it suggests —if you misinterpret or mistranslate it, I should add—that not only does it validate war, it endorses war, it encourages war, and it almost makes war the ultimate goal of life. Perhaps we should return to a more faithful translation of Clausewitz's thinking, as found in two letters he wrote in 1807 to the German General Von Roeder. The wording in the translation Bruno Colson uses in his biography (p.

348 in the French version) differs: war is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means. A little careful scrutiny will reveal some important nuances in this regard. Otherwise, especially from a later reading of history, we might be tempted to see Sun Tzu as a sort of fox capable of achieving victory without having to wage war, whereas Clausewitz is the lion who would generate and systematise war.

Sun Tzu thus achieves victory without ever entering conflict, while Clausewitz enters conflict without ever achieving victory. I hope you have noticed that the conditional tense is very important here. I noticed a lot of key elements.

You used the term illustrious unknown according to Bruno Colson. There's also a Prussian element. These elements shaped Clausewitz's personality and philosophy.

We have to see it in a given environment and historical period. Clausewitz was Prussian. That's something very special for several reasons.

The first, as Christopher Clark points out in his introduction to The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947. The English version of this book essentially points us in the right direction: Iron Kingdom. The impression that you get from an iron nation already something quite remarkable.

There are a number of indications of this. Christopher Clark begins his introduction by stating that on 25 February 1947, representatives of the Allied occupation authorities in Berlin signed a law abolishing the state of Prussia. Since then, Prussia belonged to history.

He goes on to point out that of all the great powers of the 18th and 19th centuries, Prussia is the only one to have disappeared. Let the peculiarity of that sink in for a brief moment. Why would this 1947 law, introduced by the Allies, ban Prussia?

It's essentially a law banning the Prussian government and all its authorities. The perception was that German militarism originated in Prussia. Prussia is seen as following a unique historical trajectory known as the Sonderweg, a term hotly debated among German historians.

We should understand this to mean that Prussia as a state was nurtured or cultivated by a special path that deviated from the classic paths of development in European societies, which would have gradually broken away from classic monarchies and the old systems, gradually returning to liberalism and democracy. Thus, in contrast with this path, Germany's singular path was steeped in authority and military dimensions. That said, let's look back back at Clark’s Introduction.

In 2002, an inconspicuous Social Democratic minister in the Brandenburg state government achieved instant notoriety in a debate over a proposed merger of the city of Berlin with the federal state of Brandenburg. He argued that ‘BerlinBrandenburg’ was cumbersome, why not simply call it ‘Prussia’? This sparked a polemic debate throughout Germany in series of articles and discussions.

One article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung came with the headline: Prussia Poisons Us. We're clearly dealing with something very special here, because you can now sense that this goes beyond nationality, it's a state of mind. This state of mind will prove essential to understand Clausewitz's thinking.

I'll share Mirabeau's thoughts from 1788: Prussia is not a state with an army, it is an army with a nation. That can be clarified even further when we see the looming shadow of Nazism, which renders this mistrust of Clausewitz's approach even more tangible, to a point of vilification and even censure or opprobrium. In other words, this Prussian spirit infuses Clausewitz's thinking and we should thus be wary of him and his writings.

What other forms of criticism have been levelled at this author? I'd like to refer to them as 4 attenuations, since they are basically caveats that we should perhaps keep our distance. Four attenuations.

I'll start by saying that we'll first need to remove all that baggage. You may already sense the direction we're heading. I'll take them one by one.

Firstly, of course, in light of Germany's historical prospects in the following years. Some will point out that Clausewitz was a preliminary stage, a sort of prelude to everything that was to become Germany's military history. What's more, we can even say that his thinking under the phrase cited earlier—we'll come back to that— will effectively lead to an approach that systematises war, as it becomes increasingly intense, increasingly absolute and increasingly total, culminating with the thinking of General Erich Ludendorff, one of two great field marshals who commanded the Imperial German Army in WWI, though Ludendorff —we should recall, since it entails all the opprobrium I mentioned earlier— also accompanied Hitler in the Munich putsch of November 1923.

Here's where the ramifications become clearly hazardous. Erich Ludendorff eventually wrote a book called Total War, in which he says it is necessary to to seek out the very limits of logic and also that it is essential to prioritise all the forces of the State and nation, even in times of peace, in order to prepare for war. That said, I should point out that it is already a misinterpretation.

Firstly, because when you read Marshal Ludendorff's works properly (and you should read them), he immediately claims to go much further than Clausewitz. I almost feel sorry for him. He also hastened to say something very important, namely that it is the military that must constrain politics, not politics that must lead the military.

If we look closer at what this means, and we'll have the opportunity later, I hope, in this session, it's the complete opposite of what Clausewitz proposed. Ironically enough, the officers of the German General Staff in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were the ones who misunderstood his thinking the most. Now to the second attenuation, which you could even call it a modern attenuation.

Because obviously, the book, its title, On War, the famous quote, its purpose. . .

it could lead one to think that its primary, or even sole, purpose is to wage war. On top of that, a systematisation of war in the age of the atom and nuclear weapons becomes absolutely impossible, which means that, all of a sudden, we are compelled to reject Clausewitz. In his book Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre, Philosopher René Girard says as much.

The title itself is telling, since he clearly considers that it's no longer possible. Girard suggests that Clausewitz's ideas are less perilous as the human soul and its unquenchable desire for power and war, and that therefore, ironically, Clausewitz's constructed thinking may actually be a key to contain or prevent such an aspiration. I use the term Aspiration in both meanings of the word, i.

e. ambition, but also the process of being drawn in, like a breath, into war. This argument is thus no longer appropriate.

A third argument would consist in saying that, ultimately, Clausewitz remained unknown and produced a highly theoretical treatise because he was never in a position other than to command global armies himself, reporting major victories and becoming such an emblematic figure that he would have left an obvious mark on history. This argument simply doesn't hold up when you look at the facts of his life. Let's do just that.

It's quite remarkable to see that Clausewitz joined the army at the age of 13. He saw action in the post-revolutionary wars against France from 1792 onwards. He was chief of staff of certain army corps in the Prussian campaign and also volunteered to join the Russians in 1812 rather than remain loyal to the King of Prussia.

Which may also explain why he didn't have the career and talent that everyone and his contemporaries thought he should have had. I'll make one final remark, which should cap off this reflection, on 6 March 1832, he was placed in command of several army corps and 140,000 men. In short, this argument just doesn't hold water.

The fourth argument may come as a surprise, as it comes from one of our esteemed strategists, Liddell Hart. This is especially astonishing because, to put it mildly, Liddell Hart has no bias against Germany. It's thus all the more shocking to find him among Clausewitz's detractors rather than as a proponent of his theories.

His intense and harsh criticism makes it all the more astounding. It's almost condescending because, in fact, Liddell Hart believed that Clausewitz held a major misunderstanding —so we should all be careful, even when your name is Liddell Hart—, because he misunderstood Napoleon's work and substituted the spirit of manoeuvre with the sole aspect of pure concentration. Something very serious with Liddell Hart (please refer to our session on Sun Tzu) instead of the indirect approach, he favours for a direct, systematic approach, with the largest forces possible.

Liddell Hart's approach is clearly still very much affected, and legitimately so, by the butchery of WWI, assaults on trenches defended by very modern weapons, and somewhere along the line, he can't help but blame Clausewitz for this approach. Bear in mind that Blitzkrieg may mean concentrating forces, but it also means encouraging manoeuvre to ensure that the force is concentrated on the opponent's weakest point. That would correspond much better to Clausewitz.

There's a second, corresponding aspect: Clausewitz favoured defence, and that's a point we'll come back to. Clausewitz did not seek to impose war. It's a fairly innovative and open approach.

He sought to adapt to a future war imposed on him. There's a difference. I'll comment on it as a transition.

Boxing in Clausewitz perhaps quite simply renders it impossible to grasp the scope of his thought. You said Clausewitz favoured defence and even countered the arguments that were lodged against him. Can we move on to the arguments that would show the influence and strategic importance of Clausewitz?

In light of everything mentioned, and the number of people who have criticised or scorned him, I could simply point out that merely mentioning them suffices to realise the apparent and virtually indisputable aura that Clausewitz holds. We obviously don't need to dwell any further on that point. But yes, there is a very important point to be raised here, it seems to me, and it should be tackled in three subpoints, which I'll break down straight away, especially as the third one is quite substantial.

Firstly, Clausewitz's work is remarkably difficult to grasp or understand. Next, we should try and understand why this work by Clausewitz is so difficult to understand. Metaphorically speaking, I'd even argue that the complexity of deciphering his message is proportional to the extensive length of his 900-page book.

That there already says something. To overcome this difficulty, we should think in terms of method, which Clausewitz appreciated very much, in the spirit of 19th-century philosophers, as you, Olivier, should appreciate. We'll first need to lean on two authors to highlight the extent of the scope.

I mean the scope of Clausewitz's thought. One author to understand the work and another to understand his life, which is essential to interpreting the work. To interpret the work, there's Raymond Aron, who wrote the exceptionally magnificent, two-volume book Clausewitz: Philosopher of War.

Page 10 in Raymond Aron's introduction addresses the oft-misinterpreted expression on war. There is already an immediate warning shot, but he's clear from the outset, again on page 26, where he states that anyone who fails to understand that politics must direct operations, equates absolute war with total war, and presents absolute war as an objective or ultimate goal in itself, is not interpreting but falsifying Clausewitz. That’s from the renowned Raymond Aron.

That should suffice to take any approach to Clausewitz very carefully. But why? Because his work is not finished.

Clausewitz began writing it between 1816 and 1818 (the start date is not easily determined) and stopped in 1830. This really suggests that we are dealing with work and ideas over virtually 12 to 14 years. Another difficulty is that the book was published by his wife, occasional muse and confidante, Marie, with whom he wrote a lot.

This is very important to know. Marie published his work posthumously in 1832. Towards the end of his life, Clausewitz even admitted in some of his letters that: 'For the moment, it's just a shapeless mass'.

He only reworked the first two books, to be understood as major chapters, I'll come back to that. This book is thus an unfinished work, written over a span of 14 years, with no definitive order that needed restructuring after his death. The task proves all the more difficult by the fact that some pages bear no handwritten indication of the date they were written.

That's a crucial element. Surely, Olivier, we both know that. Because a book representing 14 years of intellectual work must contain ideas that have evolved and been refined, and even refocused on a certain number of aspects.

Obviously, it would seem that the later documents are closer to a more mature insight into Clausewitz's ideology. We are thus confronted with something extremely complex. That's why we must delve into Clausewitz's mind.

There are only two ways to do that: knowing his life and his writings. To find out more about his life and writings, I recommend Bruno Colson's biography, simply entitled Clausewitz. I should stop to point out that our Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique series rarely addresses such works of art.

The quality of the narrative, accuracy of the events and the ability to reproduce not just a life, but also the thinking that went into it, is so high that I think Bruno Colson has succeeded in producing a biography that is on a par with Clausewitz's thinking. In other words, I would suggest that all our audience members first explore this biography before diving into On War. From this perspective, things get fairly interesting.

We could thus start by trying to sketch a portrait, perhaps with a few touches. Without looking, after the war against Napoleon, Clausewitz disapproved of turning schools into barracks. Interesting.

It's also worth noting that Clausewitz and Hegel were contemporaries. In fact, it goes a bit further, Hegel was his neighbour. Even if it's debatable whether Hegel's ideas influenced his own, we do know that they rubbed shoulders.

Just as we know that Clausewitz (rather surprising for a Prussian general) took a philosophy course in Berlin in 1825. It's equally amazing to note that he read the letters and correspondence of Goethe and Schiller, the memoirs of Napoleon's secretary, De Bourrienne, Montesquieu and Machiavelli's Prince. In a letter Clausewitz sent in 1807, he proved that he had read Voltaire by agreeing with him in that Frederick II spit on Machiavelli's prince the better to disgust the others.

Extraordinary cleverness, because you have to understand that it implies that Frederick II actually considered Machiavelli to be a very good writer. I would recommend the session we had on Frederick II to understand the refined mind with whom we're linking Clausewitz. Clearly, we haven't truly captured the classic image of a military figure, not one you'd expect, but we can continue.

Because when you look at Clausewitz's campaigns, Bruno Colson captures how, during the campaign of 1812, Clausewitz was very marked, impressed, and even touched by the extent of the suffering that affected the troops, with the dead and wounded, the harshness of the climate and the retreat from Russia that would be imposed on Napoleon. He's clearly upset with that, and suffering. This serves as evidence of a certain sensitivity.

Put simply, Bruno Colson portrays him as a gentle, bucolic, sentimental, considerate soul who enjoyed strolling through the countryside. It's one surprise after another, right? He took great joy in making those he cared about happy.

Raymond Aron confirms Clausewitz's romanticism, because Aron would say that he was the symbol of a generation capable of combining rationalism and romanticism, which, moreover, is much more German than Prussian. German: as captured by Madame de Staël, who wrote the literary essay On Germany, Madame de Staël, who also wrote the novel Corinne. In his own writings, Clausewitz said he had read it, which, moreover, we see in the sensibility of the main character or hero.

Never-ending surprises. He consorted with Madame de Staël for 2 months on his return from the 1806 defeat. Clausewitz is certainly a far cry from the archetypal mechanical Prussian officer played by Von Stroheim in Renoir's 1937 film La Grande Illusion, or Marshal Lyautey's infamous saying, which, even if it doesn't directly concern Prussian officers, indirectly leaves a sort of image linked to them: When the heels click, I see the brains shutting down.

After this sketch, you can't really say that about Clausewitz, now can you? We have just begun to understand Clausewitz's thinking through the biographical part and thus the complex man behind the strategist. Maybe now's a good time to address the text to understand Clausewitz's key concepts and overall philosophy, and we will naturally think in terms of geopolitics about the meaning of war and peace.

You're thus asking me to summarise. In short, to summarise the 900-page book On War, which has been the subject of so many interpretations, in just a few minutes in one Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique session. I almost want to say: Olivier, thank you for.

. . - The invitation?

The proposal or invitation as you put it. There's only one thing to start with, that On War consists of 128 chapters divided into eight main books, of which the first two are the most important. The titles alone indicate the topics clearly: The Nature of War and The Theory of War.

It's thus important to understand that we're not going to have a manual that is locked into concepts and certainties or one that advises all its readers to follow a pre-established path that will, without a doubt, systematically lead us to victory. Quite the opposite. In other words, Clausewitz aimed to point out many ideas already present in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and here, to put it clearly, he made an all-out attack on a strategist called Jomini, who would say that you could take a kind of doctrinal position with a kind of intelligence that would consist of saying: All you need to do to win is apply certain precepts.

Clausewitz said: No, that's impossible. It seems to me that Clausewitz's thinking was triggered by a shock, namely defeat at the hands of the French in 1806, which appears elsewhere in his writings. In Notes on Prussia in Her Grand Catastrophe of 1806, Clausewitz wrote that he believed Prussia's defeat was inevitable, as it was too engrossed in the memories of the victorious Frederick the Great or Frederick the Unique, but no longer reflected on them at all.

Rather, it only repeated like a parrot, in terms of both parades and manoeuvres. Clausewitz is quite interesting because it means that we're not looking at a reactionary conservative frame of mind. He went completely against the grain in his time.

That's a kind of intellectual courage. It's important to understand that, at the turn of the 19th century, we were living in a society that we understood to be rather heavy-handed in terms of authority and legitimacy. So there's a shock.

And Clausewitz, now set to be one of the main architects for reforming the Prussian army, like Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, must be heard. He stood up to a whole idea that believed it could systematise a system and said: No, that just won't work. Instead, he will seek to understand the main rationale, perhaps a kind of definition, so that it can better adapt.

Obviously, if we had to choose between all the concepts he proposes, some of them are very interesting, not because, once again, they have to be applied systemically, but because they are always significant in a war or a conflict, regardless of when they should be engaged. First of all, there is the fog of war, since Clausewitz. .

. (what a comparison with Sun Tzu in terms of information, I hasten to add), since Clausewitz said you must start by dispelling the fog of war in which the general, or any authority at all, is immersed. Which just goes to show, and all the concepts support this, that it's particularly futile to rely on some preset or default strategy, because by definition, you must start by knowing what your environment is like.

There's a second point which is interesting and needs some translation: the term friction. Friction is visible once you have prepared a plan, which is still essential, but as soon as you start to apply it, you then see all the logic that goes far beyond the military aspects that could be put in place in terms of management or even running a business. That's why Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are taught at Harvard, I hasten to add.

Clausewitz said: when it comes to friction, you must totally accept and admit that from the very moment you intend to get down to the nitty-gritty, your plan is already practically obsolete because you are going to be confronted with events that are unpredictable and unforeseen, and you'll need to adapt to them. Friction is therefore a dimension we'll have to integrate. A very interesting third element is the element of the great captain.

Napoleon has obviously left his mark. Clausewitz remarks by raising a quite interesting question: How can you have a dogmatic approach when facing such a military genius? If you do that, you are already doomed to lose, because obviously, the hallmark of a military genius is unpredictability and not following the rules.

The fourth point is fortitude. This fundamental point is one that is not emphasised enough. Clausewitz actually understood this.

For this point, I'd like to use a phrase taken out of a page in on of the illustrated encyclopaedias by Liliane and Fred Funcken that we brought up during the session on Frederick II: We're coming out of 18th century lace warfare, something like the Battle of Fontenoy: 'Gentle Englishmen, please fire first'. That sort of war would come off a bit odd today, to say the least. Clausewitz understood that such wars were over.

The revolutionary spirit had ushered in enthusiasm, whereas before, soldiers needed conditioning in drills, they almost had to be trained. But here, in fact, they have courage, they have a dimension, a dynamic that is far superior because they have enthusiasm and, as Clausewitz will say, interestingly enough: even fanaticism. We should understand that Clausewitz is not asking for this.

That's a real contradiction. Clausewitz points out that in the face of a war like this, you'll need to adapt, but that's not the same thing at all. You have to adapt to that.

This leads us to a definition of war that will help us broaden our thinking. For Clausewitz, it's revealing: war is a chameleon. It's a chameleon because war takes on a certain number of parameters and elements that influence it as it happens, which already suggests that, to put it plainly, we can find ourselves in very different situations, which only justifies the need to think ahead.

There's also something akin to a trinity. This trinity entails, a war that 1) is essentially violent, in the philosophical sense of the term; 2) subject to the vagaries and unknowns of war and chance; and yet 3) must always be conducted under the authority of politics. An understanding of these three parameters will help get a better grasp on how to interpret Clausewitz in more global terms, linked to international relations and geopolitics.

You have clearly summarised Clausewitz in three points, but there are many different interpretations. Which ones would stand out from the rest? We can get as close as we'll ever get to an objective interpretation of Clausewitz by avoiding anachronism arising from a priori thinking, one that would lead us to a major misunderstanding.

The anachronism that is too often and shamefully used, particularly because it vindicates those who urge us to use it, entails inscribing Clausewitz's philosophy in the fact that it was naturally extended by Nazism, which took pride in it, boasted about it, claimed it and even sought to appropriate it. However, it is worth noting the irony in drawing from such a period so long ago in the past, as Clausewitz lived from 1780 to 1831. Therefore, to accuse him of having been a huge vector of a way of thinking a century later is to base oneself on events after the event to feed an immense a priori presumption, one that leads us to a major misunderstanding.

Let's turn back to the expression: War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by other means. This formulation is very important, firstly in its negative construction. Because listening carefully to it, what do you notice?

You notice that war is subject to politics twice. For the first time, war is subject to politics, which we should understand. The term 'continuation' is pivotal.

If war is the continuation of politics, it's because, in Clausewitz's mind, you have to have tried everything beforehand. We must have put in place every possible logic in terms of diplomacy, exchanges and perhaps a little pressure. But war can only be the last resort when all else fails.

But what we're saying is not the same thing. Similarly, if war is simply the continuation of politics by other means, then to win a war you need to have a political objective. War does not exist in itself.

War is not some kind of fantasy projected onto itself. There are some astonishing examples. Take two American interventions in particular, first Vietnam between 1954 and 1974, then Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021.

It's simple: the US army is racking up victories. The American army won nothing but victories. But ultimately, the Americans leave.

But why? Because essentially, war is a chameleon, and your strategy should adapt to the situation. In a counter-insurgency war, the key is to win hearts, not wars.

And that was the major mistake there. Because we're actually going to need to end the war with a political objective. It looks like we are moving towards a perspective that underscores Clausewitz's relevance in the contemporary world and that we can indeed take him with us into even more global logics.

Because in reality, this sentence makes it clear that the war will have to end, and that to end the war, we will have to be reasonable in our objectives. We can thus use Raymond Aron and Bruno Colson to see the true scope of Clausewitz's vision. Because, moreover, if only in his life, at the end of the Napoleonic epic, which spans right up to the end, after the first abdication in 1814, then the second abdication in 1815 and the Congress of Vienna, Clausewitz surprisingly protested against the peace terms imposed on the adversaries.

He finds them grossly unfair and excessively harsh. He even points out that by setting such strict conditions, we will necessarily only manage to achieve one thing: fuel the spirit of revenge and therefore a continuation of the war, one we will be unable to prevent. Because, in fact, his words are captivating.

There is something very surprising in Clausewitz's thinking. He says: War is never an end in itself. Paradoxically, we only ever fight to bring about peace, some form of peace.

Clausewitz, to imagine peace. It's intriguing to see how we can broaden the horizon to delve into the history of 19th century Prussia. Chapter 8 of Lothar Gall's magnificent biography of Otto von Bismarck is simply entitled 1866.

What is so remarkable about that? After his victory over Franz Joseph's Austrian Empire, Bismarck's demands were very measured. Why?

Because he had no desire to make the Austrian Empire an eternal enemy. His mind is on France. He was thus fairly conciliatory, and, in fact, his conciliatory spirit was proportional to the scale of the victory at Königgrätz that the Prussian armies had won.

This is why the Austrians were so willing to accept the peace. One interesting quip reveals Bismarck's often downplayed, yet slightly sarcastic side. Bismarck says: 'I had to prod the King of Prussia to get the war going, but now I have to stop him to be able to stop the war'.

That's quite extraordinary. Here is an even more telling example. It seems to me that neither Wilson, nor Lloyd George, nor Clemenceau had read Clausewitz.

If they had, the complexion of the peace treaty they drew up, perceived as a diktat by the German population from 1919 onwards, might have been different. A sentiment that will naturally ignite the desire for revenge. There's one final point that should be emphasized: Clausewitz is a realist.

By realist, I mean that he wants to take a practical approach. His contemporaries sometimes failed to understand him since they too were caught up in the density of 19th century events: the Napoleonic wars, the revolutionary wars and the 1848 Springtime of the Peoples. They were evidently trapped within a political, if not ideological, perspective that may have been ahead of its time, where, on the one hand, there were democratic forces, liberal forces, and the forces of insurrection, while on the other hand there were the aristocratic forces, theocratic forces and conservative forces -Metternich for example.

There's the inevitable choice: one or the other, depending on your deepest aspirations. But that's not how Clausewitz sees it at all. Clausewitz tells us: 'No.

It's really a question of truly and concretely understanding the adversary's objectives, dispositions and strengths, because then we can try to work out what actions need to be taken and what strategies need to be devised in relation to these actions, and also anticipate the dangers that threaten us so that we can better deal with them later on'. The continuous focus of this angle renders it increasingly compelling. It's not a question of waging war to destroy the enemy.

Rather, it's a question of waging war to ensure we aren't carried away by our adversary. I believe that this is crucial in today's 21st-century context, where, in the face of events, particularly recent ones, most people seem to make judgments not on objective reasoning but on their political biases. Reading Clausewitz from this point of view would thus seem to be essential.

You have portrayed a more nuanced Clausewitz who is more complex than an oft-portrayed monolithic Clausewitz. Is it even possible to sum up Clausewitz's teaching in perhaps one or two sentences? Carl von Clausewitz.

From his enormous breadth and scope of teaching, you will be able to recall and put into practice what you can interpret depending on your cultural background and initial grasp of his work. Fabrice, I suggest we stop here to invite our audience to rediscover the classics for the knowledge and understanding that will enable us to enrich everything we read. Thank you.

Thank you. We’ve reached the end of this session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique. Thank you, everyone, for following us.