Theaetetus - The Socratic Dialogue by Plato

what is the definition of knowledge what is the examined life how does the act of Life compare with the contemplative life these are among the main subjects of theaters a dialogue supposedly read out from a scroll by a servant but presented here by its three main participants Socrates theodorus and the young mathematician theaters Euclid opens the dialogue meeting terpsion in front of Euclid's house in megura it ends with Socrates mentioning that he has to leave to face a charge brought by melitus have you only just arrived from the country terpsian no I came some time

ago and I have been in the Agra looking for you and wondering that I could not find you but I was not in the city where then as I was going down to the harbor I met theatitis he was being carried up to Athens from the Army at Corinth Was he alive or dead he was scarcely alive he has been badly wounded but he was suffering even more from the sickness which is broken out in the Army the dysentery you mean yes alas what a loss he will be yes he is a noble fellow only

today I heard some people highly praising his behavior in this very battle no wonder I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else of him but why did he go on instead of stopping at megura he wanted to get home although I entreated and advised him to remain he would not listen to me so I set him on his way and turned back and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him and thought how remarkably this like all his predictions had been fulfilled I believe that he had seen him a little before his own

death when theatitos was a youth and he had a memorable conversation with him which he repeated to me when I came to Athens he was full of admiration of his genius and said that he would most certainly be a great man if he lived the prophecy has certainly been fulfilled but what was the conversation can you tell me no indeed not offhand but I took notes of it as soon as I got home these I filled up from memory writing them out of pleasure and whenever I went to Athens I asked Socrates about any point

which I had forgotten and on my return I made Corrections thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down I remember you told me and I have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing but have put off doing so and now why should we not read it through having just come from the country I should greatly like to rest I too shall be very glad of arrest for I went with theatitis as far as iranium let us go in then and while we are opposing the servant shall read to us very

good here is the role terpsian I may observe that I have introduced Socrates not as narrating to me but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned these were theodorus the geometrician of Cyrene and theatisis I have omitted for the sake of convenience the interlocutory words I said I remarked which he used when he spoke with himself and again he agreed or disagreed in the answer lest the repetition of them should be Troublesome quite right Euclid and now boy you may take the role and read Socrates said if I cared enough about the cyrenians

theodorus I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world but I am more interested in our own Athenian Youth and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well I observe them as far as I can myself and I inquire of anyone whom they follow and I see that a great many of them follow you in which they're quite right considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways tell me then if you have met with anyone who is good for anything yes Socrates

I have become acquainted with one very remarkable Athenian youth whom I commend you as well worthy of your attention if he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him unless you should suppose that I was in love with him but he is no Beauty and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes although these features are less marked in him than in you seeing then that he has no personal attractions I may freely say that in all

my acquaintance which is very large I never knew anyone who is his equal and natural gifts for he is a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivaled and he's exceedingly gentle and also the most courageous of men there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other and should scarcely have thought possible for those who like him have quick and ready and retentive wits have generally also quit tempers they are ships without ballast and go darting about and are mad rather than courageous and the steadier sort when they

have to face study prove stupid and cannot remember whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in The Path of Knowledge and inquiry and he's full of gentleness flowing on silently like a river of oil at his age it is wonderful that is good news whose son is he the name of his father I have forgotten but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us he and his companions have been anointing themselves in the outer court and now they seem to have finished and are coming towards us look and see

whether you know him I know the youth but I do not know his name he is the son of euphronius the sunian who was himself an eminent man and such another as his son is according to your account of him I believe that he left a considerable Fortune theaters Socrates is his name but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of Trustees notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal he must be a fine fellow tell him to come and sit by me I will come hither theatitis and sit by Socrates by all means

theaters in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face for theodorus says that we are alike and yet of each of us held in his hands a liar and he said that they were tuned alike should we at once take his word theatitis or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician we should ask and if we found that he was we should take his word and if not not true and if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us

we should inquire whether he who says it we're alike is a painter or not certainly we should and is theodorus a painter I never heard that he was is he a geometrician of course he is Socrates and is he an astronomer and calculator and musician and in general an educated man I think so if then he remarks on a similarity in our persons either by way of Praise or blame there is no particular reason why we should attend to him I should say not but if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental

endowments of either us then he who hears the Praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised and he again should be willing to exhibit himself very true Socrates then now is the time my dear theaters for me to examine and for you to exhibit since although theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing never did I hear him praise anyone as he has been praising you I am glad to hear it Socrates but what if he was only ingest Nays here Doris is not given to jesting and I cannot allow

you to retract your consent on any such pretense as that if you do you will have to swear to his words and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him do not be shy then but stand to your word I suppose I must if you wish it in the first place I should like to ask what you learn of theodorus something of geometry perhaps yes and astronomy and Harmony and calculation I do my best yes my boy and so do I and my desire is to learn of him or of

anybody who seems to understand these things and I get on pretty well in general but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to Aid me in investigating will you answer me a question is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn of course and by wisdom the wise are wise yes and is that different in any way from knowledge what wisdom are not men wise in that which they know certainly they are then wisdom and knowledge are the same yes here in lies the difficulty which I can never solve

to my satisfaction what is knowledge can we answer that question what say you which of us will speak first whoever misses shall sit down as it a game of ball and shall be donkey as the boys say he who laughs out his competitors in the game without missing shall be our King and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases why is there no reply I hope theodorus that I'm not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable the

reverse of rudeness Socrates but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows for the truth is that I'm unused to your game of question and answer and I'm too old to learn the young will be more suitable and they will improve more than I shall for youth is always able to improve and so having made a beginning with theatitis I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off do you hear theaters what theodorus says the philosopher whom you would not like to disobey and whose word ought

to be a command to a young man bids me interrogate you take courage then and nobly say what you think that knowledge is well Socrates I will answer as you and he bid me and if I make a mistake you will doubtless correct me we will if we can then I think that the Sciences which I learned from theodorus geometry and those which you just now mentioned are knowledge and I would include the art of the cobbler and other Craftsmen these each and all of them are knowledge too much theatitis too much the nobility and

liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things when I am asking for one simple thing what do you mean Socrates perhaps nothing I will endeavor however to explain what I believe to be my meaning when you speak of cobbling you mean the art or science of making shoes just so and when you speak of carpentering you mean the art of making wooden implements I do in both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts true but that theatitis was not the point of my question we wanted to know

not the subjects nor yet the number of the Arts or Sciences before we were not going to count them but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract am I not right perfectly right let me offer an illustration suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing for example what is clay and we were to reply that there is a clay of Potters there is a clay of oven makers there is a clay of brick makers would not the answer be ridiculous truly in the first place there

would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of clay merely because we added of the Image Makers or of any other workers how can a man understand the name of anything when he does not know the nature of it he cannot then he who does not know what science or knowledge is has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes none nor of any other signs no and when a man is asked what science or knowledge is to give an answer the name

of some art or science is ridiculous for the question is what is knowledge and he replies a knowledge of this or that true moreover he might answer shortly and simply but he makes an enormous circuit for example when asked about the clay he might have said simply that Clay is moistened Earth what sort of clay is not to the point yes Socrates there is no difficulty as you put the question you mean if I'm not mistaken something like what occurred to me and to my friend here your namesake Socrates in a recent discussion what was

that theater theodorus was writing out for us something about Roots such as the roots of three or five showing that they are incommensurable by the unit he selected other examples up to 17 there he stopped now as there are innumerable Roots the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class and did you find such a class I think that we did but I should like to have your opinion let me hear we divided all numbers into two classes those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one

another which we compared to square figures and called Square or equilateral numbers that was one class very good the intermediate numbers such as three and five and every other number which is made up of unequal factors either of a greater multiplied by a less or of a less multiplied by a greater and when regarded as a figure is contained in unequal sides all these we compared to oblong figures and called them oblong numbers capital and what followed the lines or sides which have for their squares the equilateral plane numbers were called by us lengths or

magnitudes and the lines which are the roots of or whose squares are equal to the oblong numbers were called powers or Roots the reason of this Latin name being that they are commensurable with the former that is with the so-called lengths or magnitudes not in a linear measurement but in the value of the superficial content of their squares and the same about solids excellent my boys I think that you fully justify the Praises of theodorus and that he will not be found guilty of false witness but I am unable Socrates to give you a similar

answer about knowledge which is what you appear to want and therefore theodorus is a deceiver after all well but if someone were to praise you for running and to say that he never met your equal among boys and afterwards you are beaten in a race by a grown-up man who was a great Runner would the praise be any the less true certainly not and is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter has just now said is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way by Heaven

they should be the top of all Perfection well then be of good cheer do not say that theodorus was mistaken about you but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge as well as of other things I am eager enough Socrates if that would bring to light the truth come you made a good beginning just now let your own answer about Roots be your model and as you comprehend them all in one class try and bring them many sorts of knowledge under one definition I can assure you Socrates that I have tried very

often when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give nor hear of anyone who answers as you would have him and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety these are the pangs of Labor my dear theatitis you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth I do not know Socrates I only say what I feel and have you never heard simpleton that I am the son of a midwife Brave and Burly whose name was Fina

riti yes I have um that I myself practice Midwifery no never let me tell you that I do though my friend but you must not reveal the secret as the world in general have not found me out and therefore they only say of me that I am the strangest of Mortals and drive men to their wit's end did you ever hear that too yes shall I tell you the Reason by all means bear in mind the whole business of The Midwives and then you will see my meaning better no woman as you are probably aware

who is still able to conceive and bear attends other women but only those who are past bearing yes I know the reason of this is said to be that Artemis the goddess of childbirth is not a mother and she honors those who are like herself but she could not allow the baron to be midwife lives because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear I dare say and I dare say to or rather I'm absolutely certain that the midwives

know better than others who is pregnant and who is not very true and by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will they can make those bare who have a difficulty in bearing and if they think fit they can smother the embryo in the womb they can did you ever remark that they're also most cunning matchmakers and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood no never then let me tell you that this is their greatest Pride more than

cutting the umbilical cord and if you reflect you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited yes the same art and do you suppose that with women the cases otherwise I should think not certainly not but midwives are respectable women who have a character to lose and they avoid this department of their profession because they're afraid of being called procuresses which is a name given to those who join together man and

woman in an unlawful and unscientific way and yet the true Midwife is also the true and only Matchmaker clearly such are the midwives whose task is a very important one but not so important as mine for women do not bring into the world at one time real children and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them if they did then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of Midwifery you would think so indeed I should well my art of Midwifery is in most respects

like theirs but differs in that I attend men and not women and look after their souls when they are in labor and not after their bodies and the Triumph of my art is in Thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth and like The Midwives I am Barren under approach which is often made against me that I ask questions of others and have not Bewitched to answer them myself is very just the reason is that the god compels me to

be a midwife but does not allow me to bring forth and therefore I am not myself at all wise nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul but those who converse with me profit some of them appeared dull enough at first but afterwards as our acquaintance ripens if the God is gracious to them they all make astonishing progress and this in the opinion of others as well as in their own it is quite clear that they never learned anything from me the many fine discoveries to which they

cling are of their own making but to me and the god they owe their delivery and the proof of my words is that many of them in their ignorance either in their self-conceit despising me or falling under the influence of others have gone away too soon and Have Not only lost the children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up but have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil Communications being fonder of lies and Shams than of the truth and they have at last ended by seeing themselves as others

see them to be great fools aristides the son of lysimicus is one of them and there are many others the truance often return to me and beg that I would consult with them again they are ready to go to me on their knees and then if my familiar allows which is not always the case I receive them and they begin to grow again dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who consort with me just like the pangs of women and childbirth night and day they're full of

perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women so much for them and there are others theatitis who come to me apparently having nothing in them and as I know that they have no need of my art I coax them into marrying someone and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good many of them I have given away to prolicus and many to other inspired sages I tell you this long story friends theaters because I suspect as indeed you seem to think yourself that you

are in labor great with some conception come to me then who I'm a midwife son and myself a midwife and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you and if I abstract and expose your firstborn because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you're formed as a vain Shadow do not quarrel with me on that account as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them for I have actually known some who are ready to bite me when I deprive them of a darling Folly they did

not perceive that I acted from Goodwill not knowing that no God is the enemy of man that was not within the range of their ideas neither am I their enemy in all this but it would be wrong for me to admit falsehood or to stifle the truth once more than Thea teachers I repeat my old question what is knowledge and do not say that you cannot tell but quit yourself like a man and by the help of God you will be able to tell at any rate Socrates after such an exhortation I should be ashamed

of not trying to do my best now he who knows perceives what he knows and as far as I can see it present knowledge is perception bravely said boy that is the way in which you should express your opinion and now let us examine together this conception of yours and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind egg you say that knowledge is perception yes well you have delivered yourself of a very important Doctrine about knowledge it is indeed the opinion of protagoras who has another way of expressing it man he says

is the measure of all things of the existence of things that are and of the non-existence of things that are not you have read him oh yes again and again does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you and to me such as they appear to me and that you and I are men yes he says so a wise man is not likely to to talk nonsense let us try to understand him the same wind is blowing and yet one of us may be cold and the other not or

one may be slightly and the other very cold quite true now is the wind regarded not in relation to us but absolutely cold or not or are we to say with protagoras that the wind is cold to him who is cold and not to him who is not I suppose the last then it must appear so to each of them yes and appears to him means the same as he perceives through then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold and in similar instances for things appear or maybe supposed to be to

each one such as he perceives them yes then perception is always of existence and being the same as knowledge is unerring clearly in the name of The Graces what An Almighty wise man protagoras must have been he spoke these things in a parable to the common herd like you and me but told the truth his truth in secret to his own disciples what do you mean Socrates I'm about to speak of a high argument in which all things are said to be relative you cannot rightly call Anything by any name such as great or small

heavy or light for the great will be small and the heavy light there is no single thing or quality but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another which becoming is by us incorrectly called being but is really becoming for nothing ever is but all things are becoming some of all philosophers protagoras heraclitus and pedicles and the rest of them one after another and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this some of the great masters of either kind of poetry epiharmus the prince of

comedy and Homer of tragedy when the latter sings of ocean went sprang the gods and mother tethus does he not mean that all things are The Offspring of flux and motion I think so and who could take up arms against such a great Army having Homer for its General and not appear ridiculous who indeed Socrates yes their titties and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming and inactivity of not being and Destruction for fire and warmth which are supposed to be the

parent and guardian of all other things are born of movement and of friction which is a kind of motion is not this the origin of fire it is and the race of animals is generated in the same way certainly and is not the bodily habits spoiled by rest and idleness but preserved for a long time Time by motion and exercise through and what of the mental habit is not the soul informed and improved and preserved by study and attention which are motions but when at rest which in the soul only means want of attention and

study is uninformed and speedily forgets whatever she has learned true then motion is a good and rest and evil to the soul as well as to the body clearly I may add that breathless calm Stillness and the like waste and impair while wind and storm preserve and the pulmonary argument of all which I strongly urge is the golden chain in Homer by which he means the sun thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go around in their orbits all things human and divine are and are preserved but if they were chained

up and their motion ceased then all things would be destroyed and as the saying is turned upside down I believe Socrates that you have truly explained end his meaning then now apply his Doctrine to perception my good friend and first of all to Vision that's what you call white color is not in your eyes and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them and you must not assign any place to it for if it had position it would be and be at rest and there would be no process of becoming then what is

color Let Us carry the principle which has just been affirmed that nothing is self-existent and then we shall see that white black and every other color arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion and that what we call color is in each case neither the active nor the passive element but something which passes between them and is peculiar to each recipient are you quite certain that the several colors appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you far from it or that anything appears the same to you as to

another man are you so profoundly convinced of this rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you because you are never exactly the same the latter and if that was which I compare myself in size or which I apprehend by touch were great or white or hot it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed nor again if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot could this went unchanged from within become Changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing

the fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradict actions as protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark how and of All Sorts do you mean a little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning here are six dice which are more by a half when compared with four and fewer by a half than Twelve there are more and also fewer how can you or anyone maintain the contrary very true well then suppose the protagoras or someone asks whether anything can become

greater or more if not by increasing how would you answer him theaters I should say no Socrates if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer Capital excellent spoken like an oracle my boy and if you reply yes there will be a case for euripides for our tongue will be unconvinced but not our mind very true the Thoroughbred sophists who know all but can be known about the mind and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits would have had

a regular sparring match over this and would have knocked their arguments together finally but you and I who have no professional aims only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles whether they are consistent with each or not yes that would be my desire and mine too but since this is our feeling and there is plenty of time why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are if I'm not mistaken they will be described by us as follows first

that nothing can become greater or less either in number or magnitude while remaining equal to itself would you agree yes secondly that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything but only equality quite true thirdly that what was not before cannot be afterwards without becoming and having become yes truly these three axioms if I'm not mistaken are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice or again in such cases this if I were to say that I who am of a certain height and taller than you

may within a year without gaining or losing in height be not so tall not that I should have lost but that you would have increased in such a case I am afterwards what I once was not and yet I have not become for I could not have become without becoming neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height and I could give you 10 000 examples of similar contradictions if we admit them at all I believe that you follow me to your teachers and for I suspect that you have thought of these

questions before now yes Socrates and I'm amazed when I think of them by the gods I am and I want to know what on Earth they mean and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them I see my dear theatitis that theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher for Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher and philosophy begins in wonder he was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris the messenger of Heaven is the child of Thomas Wonder but do you

begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to protagoras not as yet then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden truth of a famous man or school to be sure I shall be very much obliged take a look around then and see that none of the initiated are listening now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands and who will not allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have

real existence yes indeed Socrates they are very hard and impenetrable Mortals yes my boy outer barbarians far more ingenious are the Brethren whose Mysteries I'm about to reveal to you their first principle is that all motion and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend there is nothing but motion which has two forms one active and the other passive both in Endless number and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny endless in number having two forms sense and the object of sense

which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at the same moment the senses are variously named hearing seeing smelling there is the sense of heat cold pleasure pain desire fear and many more which have names as well as innumerable others which are without them each has its Kindred object each variety of color has a corresponding variety of sight and so with sound and hearing and with the rest of the senses and the objects akin to them do you see theatitis the bearings of this Tale on the preceding argument indeed I do not then

attend and I will try to finish the story the purport is that all these things are in motion as I was saying and that this motion is of two kinds a slower and a quicker and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them and so they beget but what is begotten is swifter for it is carried to and fro and moves from place to place apply this to sense when the I and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and The Sensation go natural

with it which could not have been given by either of them going elsewhere then while the site is Flowing from the eye whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the color and so the eye is fulfilled with sight and really sees and becomes not sight but a seeing eye and the object which combined to form the color is fulfilled with whiteness and becomes not whiteness but a white thing with a wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be colored white and this is true of all sensible objects hard

warm and the like which are similarly to be regarded as I was saying before not as having any absolute existence but as B all of them of whatever kind generated by Motion in their intercourse with one another for of the agent and patient as existing in separation no trustworthy conception as they say can be formed for the agent has no existence until United with the patient and the patient has no existence until United with the agent and that which by uniting with something becomes an agent by meeting with some other thing is converted into a

patient and from all these considerations as I said at first there arises a general reflection that there is no one self-existent thing but everything is becoming and in relation and being must be altogether abolished although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the term but great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word something or belonging to something or to me or this or that or any other detaining name to be used in the language of nature all things are being created and

destroyed coming into being and passing into new forms nor can any name fix or detain them pu attempts to fix them is easily refuted and this should be the way of speaking not only of particulars but of Aggregates such Aggregates as are expressed in the word man or stone or any other name of an animal or of a class OC teachers are not these speculation sweet as honey and do not like the taste of them in the mouth I do not know what to say Socrates for indeed I cannot make out whether you are giving

your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out you forget my friend that I neither know nor profess to know anything of these matters you are the person who is in labor I am the barren Midwife and this is why I soothe you and offer you one good thing after another that you may taste them and I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day when this has been accomplished then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind egg or real

and genuine birth therefore keep up your spirits and answer like a man what you think ask me then once more is it your opinion that nothing is but what becomes the good and the noble as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning when I hear you discoursing in this style I think that there is a great deal in what you say and I'm very ready to ascend let us not leave the argument unfinished then for the Still Remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases

in particular about Madness and the various illusions of hearing and sight or of other senses for you know that in all these cases the Essie Pacific Theory appears to be unmistakably refuted since in dreams and delusions we certainly have false perceptions and far from saying that everything is which appears we should rather say that nothing is which appears very true Socrates but then my boy how can anyone contend that knowledge is perception or that's to every man what appears is I am afraid to say Socrates that I have nothing to answer because you rebuked me

just now for making this excuse but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that Mad Men or dreamers think truly when they imagine some of them that they are gods and others that they can fly and are flying in their sleep do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena notably about dreaming and waking what question a question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask how can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping and all our thoughts are a dream or whether we're awake and talking to one

another in the waking state indeed Socrates I do not know how to prove the one any more than the other for in both cases the facts precisely correspond and there's no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have been talking to one another in a dream and when in a dream we seem to be narrating dreams the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing you see then that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised since there may even be a doubt whether we're awake or in a dream and as

our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true and during one half of our Lives we affirm the truth of the one and during the other half of the other and are equally confident of both most true and may not the same be said of Madness and other disorders the difference is only that the times are not equal certainly and is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time that would be in

many ways ridiculous but can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true I do not think that I can listen then to a statement of the other side of the argument which is made by the champions of appearance they would say as I imagine can that which is holy other than something have the same quality as that from which it differs and observes it is that the word other means not partially but holy other certainly putting the question as you do that which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in

any other way be the same and must therefore be admitted to be unlike true if then anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another when it becomes like we call it the same when unlike other certainly were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite and patients many and infinite yes and also the different combinations will produce results which are not the same but different certainly let us take you and me or anything as an example there is Socrates in health and Socrates sick are they like or unlike you mean to

compare Socrates in health as a whole and Socrates in sickness as a whole exactly that is my meaning I answer they are unlike and if unlike they are other certainly and would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking or in any of the states which we were mentioning I should all agents have a different patient in Socrates accordingly as he is well or ill of course and I who am the patient and that which is the agent will produce something different in each of the two cases certainly the wine which I drink

when I'm in health appears sweet and pleasant to me true for as has been already acknowledged the patient and the agent meet together and produce sweetness and perception of sweetness which are in simultaneous motion and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue certainly day that has been already acknowledged but when I am sick the wine really acts upon another and a different person yes

the combination of the draft of wine and the Socrates who are sick produces quite another result which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the wine which becomes not bitterness but something bitter as I myself become not perception but percipient true there is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception for another object would give another perception and would make the percipient other and different nor can that object which affects me meeting another subject produce the same or become similar for

that too would produce another result from another subject and become different true neither can I myself have this sensation nor the object by itself this quality certainly not when I was receive I must become percipient of something there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing the object whether it becomes Sweet Bitter or of any other quality must have relation to a percipient nothing can become sweet which is sweet to No One certainly not then the inference is that we the agent and patient are or become in relation to one another there is

a law which binds us one to the other but not to any other existence nor each of us to himself and therefore we can only be bound to one another so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else but he must not say or allow anyone else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely such as our conclusion very true Socrates then if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other I

and no other am the precipient of it of course then my perception is true to me being Inseparable from my own being and as protagoras says to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me I suppose so how then did I never ER and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming can I fail of knowing that which I perceive you can ask then you were quite right and affirming that knowledge is only perception and the meaning turns out to be the same whether with Homer and

heraclitus and all that company you say that all is motion and flux or with the Great Sage protagoras that man is the measure of all things or with theatitis that given these premises perception is knowledge am I not right theotages and is not this your newborn child of which I have delivered you what say you I cannot but agree Socrates then this is the child however he may turn out which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world and now that he is born we must run round the Hearth with him and see

whether he's worth the rearing or is only a wind egg and a sham is he to be reared in any case and not exposed or will you bear to see him rejected and not get into a passion if I take away your firstborn see a cheatus will not be angry for he is very good-natured but tell me Socrates in Heaven's name is this after all not the truth you theodorus are a lover of theories and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of them and can easily pull one out which will overthrow

its predecessor but you do not see that in reality none of these theories come from me they all come from him who talks with me I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another and to receive them in a spirit of fairness and now I shall say nothing myself but shall Endeavor to elicit something from our young friend do as you say Socrates is your quite right shall I tell you theodors what amazes me in your acquaintance protagoras what is it I am Charmed with his doctrine that what appears is to

each one but I wonder that he did not begin his book on truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation is the measure of all things then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were referencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole not to speak of his fellow men or would not this a producer of a powering effect for if truth is only sensation

and no man can discern another's feelings better than he or has any Superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false but each as we have several times repeated is to himself the sole judge and everything that he judges is true and right why my friend should protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction and deserve to be well paid and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him if each one is the measure of his own wisdom must he not be talking ad captain in all this I say nothing of

the ridiculous predicament in which my own Midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed for the attempt to supervise or refute the Notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly if to each man his own are right and this must be the case if protagoras's truth is the real truth and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book he was a friend of mine Socrates as you were saying and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips nor can

I oppose you when I agree with you please then to take theotetus again he seemed to answer very nicely if you were to go into a Spartan palestra theodorus would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers some of them making a poor figure if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own person why not Socrates if they would allow me as I think you will in consideration of my age and stiffness let some more Supple youth try fall with you and do not drag me into

the gymnasium your will is my will theodorus as the proverbial philosopher say and therefore I will return to the sage theatitis tell me theatitis in reference to what I was saying are you not lost in Wonder like myself when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the level of the wisest of men or indeed of the Gods for you would assume the measure of protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men certainly I should and I confess to you that I am lost in Wonder at first hearing I was

quite satisfied with the doctrine that whatever appears is to each one but now the face of things has changed bye my dear boy you're young and therefore your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments protagoras or someone speaking on his behalf will doubtless say in reply good people young and old you meet and Harang and bring in the gods whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes which is a telling argument with a multitude

but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer all is probability with you and yet surely you and theodorus had better reflect whether you're disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance he or any other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in Geometry would not be worth an ace but neither you nor we Socrates would be satisfied with such arguments then you and theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way yes in quite another way and the way we'll be

to ask for the perception is or is not the same as knowledge for this was the real point of our argument and with a view to this we raised did we not these many strange questions certainly shall we say that we know everything which we see and hear for example shall we say that Not Having learned we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us or should we say that we not only hear but know what they're saying or again if we see letters which we do not understand shall we say

that we do not see them or shall we ever that seeing them we must know them we shall say Socrates that we know what we actually see and hear of them that is to say we see and know the figure and color of the letters and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them but we do not perceive by sight and hearing or know that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them Capital Theater and about this there shall be no dispute because I want you to grow but there is another

difficulty coming which you will also have to repulse what is it someone will say can a man who has ever known anything and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers the I have I fear a tedious way of putting a simple question which is only whether a man who has learned and remembers can fail to know impossible Socrates this opposition is monstrous am I talking nonsense then think is not seeing perceiving and is not sight perception true and if our

recent definition holds every man knows that which he has seen yes and you would admits that there is such a thing as memory yes and is memory of something or of nothing of something surely of things learned and perceived that is suddenly often a man remembers that which he has seen true and if he closed his eyes would he forget who Socrates would dare to say so but we must say so if the previous argument is to be maintained what do you mean I'm not quite sure that I understand you though I have a strong

suspicion that you are right as thus he who sees knows as we say that which he sees for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same certainly but he who saw and has knowledge of that which he saw remembers when he closes his eyes that which he no longer sees true and seeing is knowing and therefore not seeing is not knowing very true then the inference is that a man may have attained the knowledge of something which he may remember and yet not know because he does not see and this has been

affirmed by us to be a monstrous supposition most true thus then the assertion that knowledge and perception are one involves a manifest impossibility yes then they must be distinguished I suppose that they must once more we shall have to begin and ask what is knowledge and yet Thea teaches what are we going to do about what like a good for nothing without having won the victory we walk away from the argument and Crow how do you mean after the manner of disputers we were satisfied with mere verbal consistency and were well pleased if in this

way we could gain an advantage although professing not to be mirroristics but philosophers I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the era of that ingenious class of persons I do not as yet understand you then I will try to explain myself just now we asked the question whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see and then he would at the same time remember and not know but this was an impossibility

and so the protagorean Fable came to naught and yours also who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception true and yet my friend I rather suspect that the result would have been different to protagoras who was the father of the first of the two brats had been alive he would have had a great deal to say on their behalf but he is dead and we insult over his orphan child and even the Guardians whom he left and of whom our friend theodorus is one are unwilling to give any help and therefore I suppose that

I must take up his cause myself and see Justice Done not I Socrates but rather kalius the son of hyponicus is Guardian of his orphans I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to Geometry nevertheless I shall be grateful to you if you assist him a very good theodorus you shall see how I will come to the rescue if a person does not attend the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument he may be involved even in Greater paradoxes than these shall I explain this matter to you or to theatitis

but to both of us and let the younger answer he will incur less disgrace if he is discomforted then now let me ask the awful question which is this can a man know and also not know that which he knows how shall we answer to your teachers he cannot I should say he can if you maintain that seeing is knowing when you are imprisoned in a well as the saying is and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which she has

closed how will you answer the inevitable man I should answer not with that eye but with the other then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time yes in a certain sense none of that he will reply I do not ask or bid you answer in what sense you know but only whether you know that which you do not know you have been proved to see that which you do not see and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing and that not seeing is not knowing I leave you to

draw the inference yes the inference is the contradictory of my assertion yes my Marvel and there might have been yet worse things in store for you if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge and whether you can know near but not at a distance or know the same thing with more or less intensity and so on Without End such questions might have been put to you by a light-armed mercenary who argued for pay he would have Lain and wait for you and when you took

up the position that sense is knowledge he would have made an assault upon hearing smelling and the other senses he would have shown you no mercy and while you are lost in envient admiration of his wisdom he would have got you into his net out of which you would not have escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sun to be paid for your release well you ask and how will protagoras reinforce his position shall I answer for him by all means he will repeat all those things which we have been urging on

his behalf and then he will close with us in disdain and say the worthy Socrates asked a little boy whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing and the boy said no because he was frightened and could not see what was coming and then Socrates made fun of poor me the truth is oh slatenly Socrates that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine and the person asked is found tripping if he has answered as I should have answered then I am refuted but if he answers something else then he

is refuted and not I what do you really suppose that anyone would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time I surely not or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing or if he is afraid of making this admission would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike or would he admit that a man is one at all and not

rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words but oh my good sir he will say come to the argument in a more generous spirit and either show if you can that our Sensations are not relative and individual or if you admit them to be so prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes or if you will have the word is to the the individual only as your talk about pigs and baboons you are yourself behaving like

a pig and you teach your Heroes to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner but this is not to your credit but I declare that the truth is as I have written and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as different things are and appear to him and I'm far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and

are to a man into Goods which are and appear to him and I would beg you not to press my words in the letter but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them remember what has been already said that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter and to the man in health the opposite of bitter now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is

foolish and the healthy man because he has another is wise but the one state requires to be changed into the other the worse into the better as in education a change of state has to be affected and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which The Physician works by the aid of drugs not that anyone ever made another sink truly who previously thought falsely for no one can think what is not or think anything different from that which he feels and this is also true but as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of Kindred

nature so I can see that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts and these which the inexperienced call true I maintain to be only better and not truer than others and oh my dear Socrates I do not call Wise Men tadpoles far from it I say that they are the Physicians of the human body and the husbandmen of plants for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants and Infuse into them good and healthy Sensations I and true ones and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of

the evil to seem just to States for whatever appears to say to be just and fair so long as it is regarded as such is just and fair to it But the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil both in appearance and in reality and in like manner the sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man and deserves to be well paid by them and so one man is wiser than another and no one thinks falsely and you whether you will or not

must endure to be a measure on these foundations the argument stands firm which you Socrates May if you please overthrow by an opposite argument or if you like you may put questions to me a method to which no intelligent person will object quite the reverse but I must beg you to put fair questions for there is a great inconsistency in saying that you have a Zeal for virtue and then always behaving unfairly an argument the unfairness of which I complain is that you do not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic the disputer May trip up

as opponent as often as he likes and make fun but the dialectician will be in Earnest and only correct is adversary when necessary telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault or that of the company which he has previously kept if you do so your adversary will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself and not on you he will follow and love you and will hate himself and escape from himself into philosophy in order that he may become different from what he was but the other mode

of arguing which is practiced by the many will have just the opposite effect on him and as he grows older instead of turning philosopher he will come to hate philosophy I would recommend you therefore as I said before not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper but to find out in a friendly and congenial Spirit what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion and that to every individual and state what appears is in this manner you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different but you

will not argue as you were just now doing from the customer use of names and Words which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of ways causing infinite perplexity to one another such theodorus is the very slight help which I'm able to offer to your old friend had he been living he would have helped himself in a far more glorious style now you are jesting Socrates indeed your defense of him has been most valorous thank you my friend and I hope that you observe protagoras bidding us be serious as the text man is the measure of

all things was a solemn one and he approached us with making a boy the medium of discourse and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument he also declared that we made a joke of him how could I fail to observe all that Socrates well and shall we do as he says by all means but if his wishes are to be regarded you and I must take up the argument and in all seriousness and ask and answer one another for you see that the rest of us are nothing but boys in

no other way can we escape the imputation that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are making fun with boys well but he's not teachers better able to follow a philosophical inquiry than a great many men who have long beards yes theodorus but not better than you and therefore pleased not to imagine the time to defend by every means in my power your departed friend and that you are to defend nothing and nobody at any rate my good man do not Shear off until we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams or

whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry and the other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them he who is sitting by who Socrates will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument and when I said just now that you would excuse me and not like the Spartans compel me to strip and fight I was talking nonsense I should rather compare you to skiron who threw travelers from the rocks for the Spartans rule is strip or depart but you seem to go about your work more

after the fashion of antiers you will not allow anyone who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him and he has been compelled to try a fall with you in argument there theodorous you have hit off precisely the nature of my complaint but I am even more pugnacious than the Giants of old for I have met with no end of Heroes many are Heracles many of Theseus Mighty in words has broken my head and nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise which inspires me like a passion please then to try a fall with

me whereby you will do yourself good as well as me I consent lead me with you will for I know that you are like Destiny no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for him but I am not disposed to go further than you suggest once will be enough and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly I will do my best to avoid that error in the first place let us return to our old objection and see whether we were right in

blaming and taking offense at protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom although he admitted that there was a better and worse and that in respect of this some who as he said were the wise excelled others very true Hans protagoras been living and answered for himself instead of our answering for him there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument but as he is not here and someone may accuse us of speaking without Authority on his behalf had we not better come to a

clearer agreement about his meaning and for a great deal maybe at stake true then let us obtain not through any third person but from his own statement and in the fewest words possible the basis of agreement in what way in this way his words are what seems to a man is to him yes so he says and aren't we protagoras uttering the opinion of man or rather of all mankind when we say that everyone thinks himself wiser than other men in some things and they're inferior in others in the are of danger when they are

in Perils of war or of the sea or of sickness do they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods and expect salvation from them only because they Excel them in knowledge is not the world full of men in their several Employments who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to Rule now in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them at least in their own opinion certainly and wisdom is assumed

by them to be true thought and ignorance to be false opinion exactly how then protagoras would you have us treat the argument shall we say that the opinions of men are always true or sometimes true and sometimes false in either case the result is the same and their opinions are not always true but sometimes true and sometimes false for tell me theodorus do you suppose that you yourself or any other follower of protagoras would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion the thing is incredible Socrates and yet that absurdity is

necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things how sure why suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true and declare your opinion to me let us assume as he argues that this is true to you now if so you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or Judgment of yours or that we judge you always to have a true opinion but are there not thousands upon thousands who whenever you form a judgment take up arms against you

and are of an opposite judgment and opinion deeming that you judge falsely yes indeed Socrates thousands and tens of thousands as Homer says who give me a world of trouble well but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others no other inference seems to be possible and how about protagoras himself if neither he nor the multitude thought as indeed they do not think that man is the measure of All Things Must it not follow that the truth of which protagoras wrote would be true to

no one but if you suppose that he himself thought this and that the multitude does not agree with him you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true that would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion and the best of the joke is that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false for he admits that the opinions of all men are true certainly and does he not allow that his

own opinion is false if he admits that the opinion of those who think IM false is true of course whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely they do not And he as may be inferred from his writings agrees that this opinion is also true clearly then all mankind beginning with protagoras will contend or rather I should say that he will allow when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion protagoras I say will himself allow that neither a dog nor an ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has

not learned am I not right yes and the truth of protagoras being doubted by all will be true neither to himself nor also anyone else I think Socrates that we are running my old friend too hard but I do not know that we are going beyond the truth doubtless as he is older he may be expected to be wiser than we are and if he could only just get his head out of the world below he would have overthrown both of us again and again me for talking nonsense and you for ascending to me and

have been off and underground in a Trice but as he is not within call we must make the best use of our own faculties such as they are and speak out what appears to us to be true and one thing which no one will deny is that there are great differences in the understandings of men in that opinion I quite agree and is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of protagoras was that most things and all immediate Sensations such as hot dry sweet are only

such as they appear if however difference of opinion is to be allowed at all surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease for every woman child or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves I quite agree or again in politics while affirming that just and unjust honorable and disgraceful holy and Unholy are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another still the followers

of protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counselor better than another they will scarcely venture to maintain that what a city enacts in the belief that it is expedient will always be really expedient but in the other case I mean when they speak of justice and Injustice piety and impiety they are confident that in nature these have no existence or Essence of their own the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement and as long as

the agreement lasts and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with protagoras here arises a new question theodorus which threatens to be more serious than the last unless Socrates we have plenty of leisure that is true and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I've often made that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and speak in court how natural is this what do you mean I mean to say that those who've been trained in philosophy

and liberal Pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts in such places as a free man is in breeding unlike a slave in what is the different scene in the Leisure spoken of by you which a Freeman can always command he has his talk out in peace and like ourselves he warned as it will from one subject to another and from a second to a third if the fancy takes him he begins again as we are doing now caring not with his words are many or few

his only aim is to attain the truth the lawyer is always in a hurry there is the water of the klepsidra driving him on and not allowing him to expatiate at will and there is his adversary standing over him enforcing his rights the indictment which in their phraseology has turned the affidavit is recited at the time and from this he must not deviate he is a servant and is continually disputing about a fellow servant before his master who is seated and has the cause in his hands the trial is never about some indifferent matter but

always concerns himself and often the race is for his life the consequence has been that he has become keen and shrewd he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him indeed but his soul is small and unrighteous his condition which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards has deprived him of growth and uprightness and Independence dangers and fears which were too much for his truth and honesty Came Upon him in early years when the tenderness of Youth was unequal to them and he has been driven into crooked ways

from the first he has practiced deception and retaliation and has become stunted and warped and so he is passed out of Youth into manhood having no soundness in him and is now as he thinks a master in wisdom such is the lawyer theodorus will you have the companion picture of the philosopher who is of our Brotherhood or shall we return to the argument do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim nay Socrates not until we have finished what we are about for you truly said that we belong to a Brotherhood which

is free and are not the Servants of the argument but the argument is our servant and must wait our Leisure who is our judge or where is The Spectator having any right to censor or control us as he might The Poets then as this is your wish I will describe the leaders for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort in the first place the Lords of philosophy have never from their youth upwards known their way to the Agora or the dicastery or the council or any other political assembly they neither see nor

hear the laws or decrees as they are called of the State written or recited the eagerness of political Societies in the attainment of officer clubs and banquets and Revels and singing maidens do not enter even into their dreams whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city what disgrace may have descended to anyone from his ancestors male or female are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell as they say how many pints are contained in the ocean neither is he conscious of his ignorance before he does not

hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation but the truth is that the outer form of him only is in the city his mind disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things is flying all abroad as pindar says measuring Earth and Heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety but not condescending to anything which is Within Reach what do you mean Socrates I will illustrate my meaning theodorus by the jest which the clever witty thracian handmade

is said to have made about thales when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars she said that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven that he could not see what was before his feet this is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers for the philosopher is Holy acquainted with his next door neighbor he is ignorance not only of what he is doing but he hardly knows whether he's a man or an animal he is searching into the essence of man and busy in

inquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other I think that you understand me theodorus I do and what you say is true and thus my friend on every occasion private as well as public as I said at first when he appears in a law courts or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes he is the jest not only of thracian handmaids but of the general herd tumbling into Worlds and every sort of disaster through his inexperience

his awkwardness is fearful and gives the impression of imbecility when he is reviled he is nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries for he knows no scandals of anyone and they do not interest him and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness and when others are being praised and glorified in the Simplicity of his heart he cannot help going to fits of laughter so that she seems to be a downright idiot when he hears a tyrant or a king eulogized he fancies that he is listening to the Praises of

some keeper of cattle a swine herd or Shepherd or perhaps a Cowherd who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them and he remarks that the creature whom they tend and out of whom they squeeze the wealth is of a less tractable and more Insidious nature then again he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any Shepherd for he is no leisure and he is surrounded by a wall which is his Mountain pen hearing of enormous landed Proprietors of 10 000 acres and more our philosopher

deems this to be a trifle because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth and when they sing the Praises of family and say that someone is a gentleman because he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow Vision in those who utter them and who are not educated enough to look at the whole nor to consider that every man has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors and among them have been rich and poor Kings and slaves Helens and barbarians innumerable and when

people Pride themselves on having a pedigree of 25 ancestors which goes back to Heracles the son of amphitian he cannot understand their Poverty of ideas why are they unable to calculate that amphitian had a 25th ancestor who might have been anybody and was such as Fortune made him and he had a 50th and so on he amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless Vanity now in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar partly because he is thought to

despise them and also because he is ignorant of what is before him and always at a loss that his very true Socrates but oh my friend when he draws the other into upper air and gets him out of his pleas and rejoined us into the contemplation of justice and Injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things or from the common places about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government and of human happiness and misery in general what they are

and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other when that narrow Keen little legal mind is called to account about all this he gives the philosopher his revenge for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging once he looks down into space which is a strange experience to him he being dismayed and lost and stammering broken words is laughed at not by thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons for they have no eye for the situation but by every man who has not been brought up a Slave such are the

two characters theodorus the one of the free man who has been trained in Liberty and Leisure whom you call the philosopher him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task such as packing up bed clothes or flavoring a source or falling speech the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman still less with the music of discourse can he him the true life

a right which is lived by Immortals or men blessed of Heaven if you could only persuade everybody's Socrates as you do me of the truth of your words there would be more peace and fewer evils among men evils theodorus can never pass away father must always remain something which is antagonistic to good having no place among the gods in heaven of necessity they hover around the Mortal nature and this Earthly sphere wherefore we ought to fly away from Earth to Heaven as quickly as we can and to fly away is to become like God as

far as this is possible and to become like him is to become holy just and wise but oh my friend you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid Vice not merely an order that a man may seem to be good which is the reason given by the world and in my judgment is only a repetition of an old wives Fable whereas the truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous he is perfect righteousness and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him herein is seen the

true cleverness of a man and also his nothingness and want of manhood for to know this is true wisdom and virtue and ignorance of this is Manifest Folly and vice all other kinds of wisdom or cleverness which seem only such as the wisdom of politicians or the wisdom of the Arts are coarse and vulgar the unrighteous man or the seir and doer of Unholy things had far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his rotary is clever for men glory in their shame they fancy that they hear others saying of them These Are Not

Mere good for nothing persons mere burdens of the Earth but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it for they do not know the penalty of Injustice which above all things they ought to know not stripes and death as they suppose which evil doers often Escape but a penalty which cannot be escaped what is that there are two patterns eternally set before them the one blessed and divine

the other Godless and wretched but they do not see them or perceive that in their utter Folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other by reason of their evil deeds and the penalties that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like and if we tell them that unless they depart from their cunning the place of Innocence will not receive them after death and that here on Earth they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves and with evil friends when they hear this

they in their Superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots very true Socrates too true my friend as I well know there is however one peculiarity in their case when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy if they have the courage to hear the argument out and do not run away they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves their rhetoric Fades away and they become helpless as children these however aren't digressions from which we must now desist or they will overflow and drown the original argument to which

if you please we will now return for my part Socrates I would rather have the digressions for at my age I find them easier to follow but if you wish let us go back to the argument had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the Perpetual flux who say that things are as they seem to each one were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just were just to the state which imposed them while they were in force this was especially asserted of justice but as to the good

no one had any longer the Hardy Hood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these while they were in force were really good he who said so would be playing with the name good and would not touch the real question it would be a mockery would it not certainly it would he ought not to speak the name but of the thing which is contemplated under the name right whatever be the term used the good or expedient is the aim of legislation and as far as she has an

opinion the state imposes all laws with the view to the greatest expediency can legislation have any other aim certainly not but is the aim attained always do not mistakes often happen yes I think that there are mistakes the possibility of error will be more distinctly recognized if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient Falls that whole class has to do with the future and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after time which in other words is the future very true suppose

now that we ask protagoras or one of his disciples a question oh protagoras we will say to him man is as you declare the measure of all things white heavy light of all such things he is the judge for he is the Criterion of them in himself and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be he thinks what is and is true to himself health is it not so yes and do you extend your Doctrine protagoras as we shall further say to the Future as well as to the present and

has he the Criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be and do things always happen to him as he expected for example take the case of heat when an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever and that this kind of heat is coming on and another person who is a physician thinks the contrary whose opinion is likely to prove right or are they both right he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment and not have a fever in the physician's judgment how ludicrous

and the vine grower if I'm not mistaken is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the Vintage which is not yet gathered than the heart player certainly abandoned musical composition the musician will know better than the training Master what the training Master himself will Hereafter think harmonious or the reverse of course and the cook will be a better judge than the guest who is not a cook of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing but we can

say that everyone will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future nay would you not protagoras better guess which arguments in a court would convince any one of us than the ordinary man certainly Socrates he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect to be sure friend who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him if he had really persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any

other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than everyone could for himself who indeed and legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future and everyone will admit that states in passing laws must often fail of their highest interests quite true then we may fairly argue against your master but he must admit one man to be wiser than another and that the wiser is measure but I who know nothing am not at all obliged to accept the honor which the advocate of protagoras was just now forcing

upon me whether I would or not of being a measure of anything that is the best refutation of him Socrates although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others who give the LIE direct to his own opinion there are many ways theodorus in which the doctrine that every opinion of every man is true may be refuted but there's more difficulty in proving that states of feeling which are present to a man and out of which arise Sensations and opinions in accordance with them are also untrue and very likely I have

been talking nonsense about them for they may be unassailable and those who say that there is clear evidence of them and that they are matters of knowledge May probably be right in which case our friend theatitis was not so far from The Mark when he identified perception and knowledge and therefore let us draw nearer as the advocate of protagoras desires and give the truth of the universal flux a ring is the theory sound or not at any rate no small war is Raging about it and there are a combination not a few no small War

indeed for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides the Disciples of heraclitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine then we are the more bands my dear theodorus to examine the question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves certainly we are about these speculations of heraclitus which as you say are as old as Homer or even older still the Ephesians themselves who profess to know them are downright mad and you cannot talk with them on the subject for in accordance with their textbooks they are always in motion but as for dwelling upon

an argument or a question and quietly asking and answering in turn they can no more do so than they can fly or rather the determination of these fellows not to have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation can express if you ask any of them a question he will produce as from a quiver sayings brief and dark and shoot them at you and if you inquire the reason of what he has said you will be hit by some other newfangled word and will make no way with any of

them nor they with one another their great care is not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds conceiving as I imagine that any such principle would be stationary for they are at war with the stationary and do what they can to drive it out everywhere I suppose theodorus that you have only seen them when they were fighting and have never stayed with them in time of Peace for they are no friends of yours and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure as I imagine to those

Disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves disciples my good sir they have none many of their sort are not one another's disciples but they grow up at their own sweet will and get their inspiration anywhere each of them saying of his neighbor that he knows nothing from these men then as I was going to remark you will never get a reason whether with their will or without their will we must take the question out of their hands and make the analysis ourselves as if we were doing geometrical problems quite right too but

us touching their foresight problem have we not heard from the Ancients who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures that Oceanus and tethis the origin of all things are streams and that nothing is at rest and now the moderns in their superior wisdom have declared the same openly that the cobbler two may hear and learn of them and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion Having learned that all is motion he will duly honor his teachers I had almost forgotten the opposite Doctrine theodorus alone being remains

unmoved which is the name for the all this is the language of Parmenides militis and their followers Who start to maintain that all being is one and self-contained and has no place in which to move what shall we do friend with all these people for advancing step by step we have imperceptibly got between the competence and unless we can protect our Retreat we shall pay the penalty of our rashness like the players in the palestra who are caught upon the line and are dragged different ways by the two parties therefore I think that we'd better

Begin by considering Those whom we first accosted the river gods and if we find any truth in them we will help them to pull us over and try to get away from the others but if the partisans of the whole appear to speak more truly we will fly off from the party which would move the immovable to them and if I find that neither of them have anything reasonable to say we shall be in a ridiculous position having so great a conceit of our own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and famous men oh

theodorus do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great nice Socrates not to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say it would be quite intolerable then examine we must since you who are so reluctant to begin are so eager to proceed the nature of motion appears to be the question with which we begin what do they mean when they say that all things are in motion is there any one kind of motion or is I rather inclined to think two I should like to have your opinion

upon this point in addition to my own that I may ER if I must uh in your company tell me then when a thing changes from one place to another all goes round in the same place is not that what is called motion yes then here we have one kind of motion but when a thing remaining on the same spot grows old or becomes black from being white or hard from being soft or undergoes any other change may not this be properly called motion of another kind I think so say rather that it must be

so of motion then there are these two kinds change and motion in place you are right and now having made this distinction let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion and are changed as well as move in place or is one thing moved in both ways and another in one only indeed I do not know what to answer but I think they would say that all things are moved in both ways yes comrade for if not they

would have to say that the same things are in motion and at rest and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest to be sure and if they are to be in motion and nothing is to be devoid of motion all things must always have every sort of motion most true consider a further point did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat whiteness or anything else in some such manner as the following were they not saying that each of them

is moving between the agent and the patient together with a perception and that the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a percipient and the agent aquali instead of equality I suspect that quality may appear as strange and uncouth term to you and that you do not understand the abstract expression then I will take concrete instances I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness but hot and white and the like of other things for I must repeat what I said before that neither the agent nor patient

have any absolute existence but when they come together and generate Sensations and their objects the one becomes a thing of a certain quality and the other a percipient you remember of course we may leave the details of their Theory unexamined but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned are all things in motion and flux yes they will reply and they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished that is to say they move in place and are also changed of course if the motion is to be

perfect if they only moved in place and were not changed we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux exactly but now since not even white continues to Flow White and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another color and is never to be caught standing still can the name of any color be rightly used at all how is that possible Socrates either in the case of this or of any other quality if while we are using the word the object is

escaping in the flux and what would you say of perceptions such as sight and hearing or any other kind of perception is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing certainly not if all things are in motion then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not seeing nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception if all things partake of every kind of motion certainly not yet perception is knowledge so at least theatitis and I were saying very true then when we were asked what is knowledge we know more

answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge I suppose not here then is a fine result we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest but if nothing is at rest every answer upon whatever subject is equally right you may say that a thing is or is not thus or if you prefer becomes thus and if we say becomes we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest quite true Yes theodorus except in saying thus and not thus but you ought not to use the word thus

for there is no Motion in thus or in not thus the maintainers of the Doctrine have as yet no words in which to express themselves and must get a new language I know of no word that will suit them except perhaps know how which is perfectly indefinite yes that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home and so theodorus we have got rid of your friend without asserting to his doctrine that every man is the measure of all things a wise man only is a measure neither can we allow that

knowledge is perception certainly not in the hypothesis of a Perpetual flux unless perchance our friend theatitis is able to convince us that it is very good Socrates and now that the argument about the doctrine of protagoras has been completed I am absolved from answering for this was the agreement not theodorus until you and Socrates have discussed the dog of those who say that all things are at rest as you are proposing you theaters who are a young Rogue must not instigate your elders to a breach of Faith but should prepare to answer Socrates in the

remainder of the argument yes if he wishes but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest invite Socrates to an argument invite Horsemen to the open plane do but ask him and he will answer nevertheless theodorus I'm afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of theaters not comply for what reason my reason is that I have a kind of reverence not so much for malicious and the others who say that all is one and at rest as for the great leader himself Parmenides venerable and awful as in homeric

language he may be called him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit Unworthy of him I met him when he was an old man and I was a mere Youth and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind and I'm afraid that we may not understand his words and maybe so further from understanding his meaning above all I fear that the nature of knowledge which is the main subject of our discussion may be Thrust out slightly by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in Upon Our Feast of discourse if

we let them in besides the question which is now stirring is of immense extent and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way or if treated adequately and at lengths will put into the shade the other question question of knowledge neither the one nor the other can be allowed but I must try by my art of Midwifery to deliver a theatitis of his conceptions about knowledge very well do so if you will then now theater's take another view of the subject you answered that knowledge is perception I did and if anyone were to

ask you with what does a man see black and white colors and with what does he hear high and low sounds you would say if I'm not mistaken with the eyes and with the ears I should the free use of words and phrases rather than minute Precision is generally characteristic of a liberal education and the opposite is pedantic but sometimes Precision is necessary and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness for which is more correct to say that we see or hear with the eyes and

with the ears or through the eyes and through the ears I should say through Socrates rather than with yes my boy for no one can suppose that in each of us as in a sort of Trojan Horse there are perched a number of unconnected senses which do not all meet in some one nature the mind or whatever we please to call it of which they are the instruments and with which through them we perceive objects of sense I agree with you in that opinion the reason why I am thus precise is because I want to

know whether when we perceive black and white through the eyes and again other qualities through other organs we do not perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves and if you're asked you might refer all such perceptions to the body perhaps however I had better allow you to answer for yourself and not interfere tell me then I'll not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet organs of the body of the body certainly and you admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot proceed through another the

object of hearing for example cannot be perceived through sight or the objects of sight through hearing of course not if you have any thought about both of them this common perception cannot come to you either through the one or the other organ it cannot how about sounds and colors in the first place would you admit that they both exist yes and that either of them is different from the other and the same with itself certainly and that both are two and each of them one yes you can further observe whether they are like or unlike

one another and you say but through what do you perceive all this about them for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common let me give you an illustration of the pointed issue if there were any meaning in asking for the sounds and colors are saline or not you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the question it would not be sight or hearing but some other certainly The Faculty of taste very good and now tell me what is the power of which discerns not

only in sensible objects but in all things Universal Notions such as those which are called being and not being and there's others about which we were just asking what organs will you assign for the perception of these Notions you are thinking of being and not being likeness and unlikeness sameness and difference and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense and you mean to ask through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions you follow me excellently theatitis that is precisely what I'm asking indeed

Socrates I cannot answer my only notion is that these unlike objects of sense have no separate organ but that the Mind by a power of her own contemplates the universals in all things you are a beauty theaters and not ugly as theodorus was saying for He Who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good and besides being beautiful you have done me a kindness in releasing me from a very long discussion if you're clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs for that was my own opinion and I

wanted you to agree with me I am quite clear and to what class would you refer being or Essence for this of all our Notions is the most universal I should say to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself and would you say this also of like and unlike same and other yes and would you say the same of the noble and base and of Good and Evil the these are conceived to be Notions which are essentially relative and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present with

the future and does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch yes but their essence of what they are and their opposition to one another and the essential nature of this opposition the soul herself Endeavors to decide for us by the review and comparison of them certainly the simple Sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at Birth to men and animals by nature but their Reflections on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly

gained if they are ever gained by education and long experience assuredly and can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being impossible and can he who misses the truth of anything have a knowledge of that thing he cannot then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense but in reasoning about them in that only and not in the mere impression truth and being can be attained clearly and what do you call the two processes by the same name when there is so great a difference between them that would certainly not be right and what

name would you give to seeing hearing smelling being cold and being hot I should call all of them perceiving what other name can be given to them perception would be the collective name for them certainly which as we say has no part in the attainment of Truth any more than a being certainly not and therefore not in science or knowledge no then perception theaters can never be the same as knowledge or science clearly not Socrates and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception but the original aim of our discussion was

to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not at the same time we have made some progress for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all but in that other process however called in which the mind is alone and engaged with being you mean Socrates if I'm not mistaken what is called thinking or opining you conceive truly and now my friend please to begin again at this point and having wiped out of your memory all that is preceded see if you have arrived at any clearer View and once more say

what is is knowledge I cannot say Socrates that all opinion is knowledge because there may be a false opinion but I will venture to assert that knowledge is true opinion let this then be my reply and if this is Hereafter disproved I must try to find another that is the way in which you ought to answer their teachers and not in your former hesitating strain before if we are bold we shall gain one or two advantages either we shall find what we seek or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we

do not know in either case we shall be richly rewarded and now what are you saying are the two sorts of opinion one true and the other false and do you define knowledge to be the true yes according to my present view is it still worth a while to resume the discussion touching opinion so what are you eluding there is a point which often troubles me and is a great perplexity to me both in regard to myself and others I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer pray

what is it how can I be false opinion that difficulty still troubles the eye of my mind and I'm uncertain whether I shall leave the question or begin over again in a new way Begin Again Socrates at least if you think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so why not you and Theodore is just now remarking very truly that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time you are quite right and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again better a little which is well done

than a great deal imperfectly certainly well and what is the difficulty do we not speak of false opinion and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion as though there were some natural distinction between them we certainly say so all things and everything are either known or not known I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting because they have nothing to do with our present question there can be no doubt Socrates if you exclude these that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing

that point being now determined must we not say that he who has an opinion must have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know he must he who knows cannot but no and he who does not know cannot know of course what should we say then when a man has a false opinion does he think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows and knowing both is he at the same time ignorant of birth that Socrates is impossible but perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know

as some other thing which he does not know for example he knows neither theatitis nor Socrates and yet he fancies that theatitis is Socrates or Socrates the Adidas how can he but surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does not know or what he does not know to be what he knows that would be monstrous where then is false opinion for of all things are either known or unknown there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under this alternative and so false opinion is excluded most true suppose that we remove

the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing into that of being and not being what do you mean may we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks about anything that which is not will necessarily think what is false whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind that again is not unlikely a Socrates then suppose someone to say to is it possible for any man to think that which is not either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else and suppose that we answer

yes he can when he thinks what is not true will that be our answer yes but is there any parallel to this what do you mean can a man see something and yet see nothing impossible but if he sees any one thing he sees something that exists do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things I do not then he who sees one thing sees something which is clearly and he who hears anything hears some one thing and hears that which is yes and he who touches anything touches something

which is one and therefore is that again is true and does not he who thinks think someone thing certainly and does not he who thinks someone thing think something which is I agree then he who thinks of that which is not thinks of nothing clearly and he who thinks of nothing does not think at all obviously then no one can sink that which is not either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else clearly not then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not it would seem so then false

opinion has no existence in us either in the sphere of being or of knowledge certainly not but may not the following be the description of what we express by this name what may we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy a person may make an exchange in his mind and say that one real object is another real object for thus he always thinks that which is but he puts one thing in place of another and missing the aim of his thoughts he may be truly said to have false opinion now

you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth truth when a man puts the base in the place of the noble or the Noble in the place of the base then he has truly false opinion I see theaters that your fear has disappeared and that you are beginning to despise me what makes you say so you think if I'm not mistaken that you're truly false is safe from censure and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow or heavy which is light or any other self-contradictory thing which works

not according to its own nature but according to that of its opposite but I will not insist upon this for I do not wish needlessly to discourage you and are you satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy or the thought of something else I am it is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another true but must not the mind or thinking power which misplaces them have a conception either of both objects or of one of them certainly either together or in succession very good and do you mean by

conceiving the same which I mean what is that I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything I speak of what I scarcely understand but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking asking questions of herself and answering them affirming and denying and when she's arrived at a decision either gradually or by a sudden impulse and has at last agreed and does not doubt this is called her opinion I say then but to form an opinion is to speak and opinion is a word spoken I mean to

oneself and in silence not allowed or to another well thank you I agree then when anyone thinks of one thing as another he is saying to himself that one thing is another yes but do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base or the unjust just War best of all have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another Nate not even in sleep did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even or anything of the kind never and do you suppose that any other man either

in his senses or out of them ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse or the two are one certainly not but if thinking is talking to oneself no one's speaking and thinking of two objects and apprehending them both in his soul will say and think that the one is the other of them and I must add that even you lover of dispute as you are had better let the word other alone that is not insist that one and other are the same I mean to say that no one thinks the

noble to be base or anything of the kind I will give up the word other Socrates and I agree to what you say if a man has both of them in in his thoughts he cannot think that the one of them is the other true neither if he is one of them only in his mind and not the other can he think that one is the other true four we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all then no one who has either both or only one of

the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other and therefore he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense for neither in this any more than in the previous way can false opinion exist in us no but if theatitis this is not admitted we shall be driven into many absurdities what are they I will not tell you until I have endeavored to consider the matter from every point of view for I should be ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the Absurd consequences of

which I speak but if we find the solution and get away from them we may regard them only as the difficulties of others and the ridicule will not attach to us on the other hand if we absolutely fail I suppose that we must be humble and allow the argument to trample us underfoot as the seasick passenger is trampled upon by the Sailor and to do anything to us listen then while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty let me hear I think that we were wrong in denying that

a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know and that there is a way in which such deception is possible you mean to say as I suspected at the time that I may know Socrates and at a distance see someone who is unknown to me and whom I mistake for him then the deception will occur but has not that position been relinquished by us because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know true let us make the assertion in another form which may or

may not have a favorable issue but as we are in a great Strait every argument should be turned over and tested tell me then whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know certainly may and another and another yes I would have you imagine then that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax which is of different sizes in different men harder moister and having more or less Purity in one than another and in some of an intermediate quality I see let

us say that this tablet is a gift of memory the mother of the muses and that's when we wish to remember anything which we have seen or heard or thought in our own minds we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts and in that material receive the impression of them as from the Seal of a ring and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts but when the images are faced or cannot be taken then we forget and do not know very good now when a person has this

knowledge and is considering something which she sees or hears may not false opinion or rise in the following manner in what Manner when he thinks what he knows sometimes to be what he knows and sometimes to be what he does not know we were wrong before in denying the possibility of this and how would you amend the form statement I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which must be excluded one no one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them but has the memorial or

seal of both of them in his mind nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur when he only knows one and does not know and has no impression of the other nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he does not know or that what he does not know is what he knows nor to that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives or that something which she perceives is something which he does not perceive or that something which she does not perceive

is something else which he does not perceive or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives nor again three can he think that something which he knows and perceives and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense is something else which he knows and perceives and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense this last case if possible is still more inconceivable than the others nor for can he think that something which he knows and perceives and of which she has the memorial coinciding with sense is something else which

he knows nor so long as these agree can he think that a thing which he knows and perceives is another thing which he perceives or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive nor again can he suppose that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know all that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is another thing which he does

not perceive all these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion the only cases of any of which remain are the following what are they if you tell me I may perhaps understand you better but at present I am unable to follow you a person may think that some things which he knows or which he perceives and does not know are some other things which he knows and perceives or that some things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives I understand you less than ever now hear me once

more then I knowing theodorus and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is and also what sort of person theatitis is at one time see them and at another time do not see them and sometimes I touch them and at another time not or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way and at another time not perceive them but still I remember them and know them in my own mind very true then first of all I want you to understand that a man may or may not

perceive sensibly that which he knows true and that which he does not know Will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived that is also true see whether you can follow me better now Socrates can recognize theodorus and theatitis but he sees neither of them nor does he perceive them in any other way he cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that theatitis is theodorus am I not right you are quite right then that was the first case of which I spoke yes the second case was

that I knowing one of you and not knowing the other and perceiving neither can never think him whom I know to be him whom I do not know true in the third case not knowing and not perceiving either of you I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do not know I need not again go over the catalog of excluded cases in which I cannot form a false opinion about you and theodorus either when I know both or when I'm in ignorance of both or when I

know one and not the other and the same of perceiving do you understand me I do the only possibility of erroneous opinion is when knowing you and theodorus and having on the wax and block the impression of both of you given as by a seal but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance I try to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression and to fit this into its own print if I succeed recognition will take place but if I fail and transpose them putting the foot into the wrong shoe that is

to say putting the vision of either of you onto the wrong impression or if my mind like the sight in a mirror which is transferred from right to left ER by reason of some similar affection then heterodoxy and false opinion ensues yes Socrates you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful exactness or again when I know both of you and perceive as well as know one of you but not the other and my knowledge of him does not Accord with perception that was the case put by me just now which you did not understand

no I did not I meant to say that when a person knows and perceives one of you his knowledge coincides with his perception he will never think him to be some other person whom he knows and perceives and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception for that also is a case supposed true but there was an omission of the further case in which as we now say false opinion may arise when knowing both and seeing or having some other sensible perception of both I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation like

a bad Archer I miss and fall wide of the mark and this is called falsehood yes it is rightly so called when therefore perception is present to one of the seals or Impressions but not to the other and the mind fits the Seal of the absent perception on the one which is present in any case of this sort the mind is deceived in a word if our viewers sound there can be no error or deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived but only in things which are known and perceived

in these alone opinion turns and twists about and becomes alternately true and false true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite false when they go awry and crooked and is not that Socrates nobly said nobly yes but wait a little and hear the explanation and then you will say so with more reason for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base undoubtedly and the origin of Truth and error is as follows when the wax in the soul of anyone is deep and abundant and smooth and perfectly tempered then

the Impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the heart of the Soul as Homer says in a parable meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax these I say being pure and clear and having a sufficient depth of wax are also lasting and Minds such as these easily learn and easily retain and are not liable to confusion but have true thoughts for they are plenty of room and having clear impressions of things as we turn them quickly distribute them into their proper places on the Block and such men are called wise

do you agree entirely but when the heart of anyone is Shaggy a quality which the all-wise poet commends or muddy and of impure wax or very soft or very hard then there is a corresponding defect in the mind the softer good at learning but apt to forget and the harder the reverse the Shaggy and rugged and gritty or those who have an admixture of Earth or dung in their composition have the Impressions indistinct as also the hard for there is no depth in them and the soft too are indistinct for their impressions are easily confused

underfaced yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul which has no room these are the natures which have false opinion for when they see or hear or think of anything they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions in their stupidity they confuse them and their apt to see and hear and think amiss and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects and ignorant no man the Socrates can say anything truer than that then now we may admit the existence of false

opinion in US certainly and of true opinion also yes we have at length satisfactory proved Beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion undoubtedly alas theatitis what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond of talking what makes you say so because I'm disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garulity for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always arguing on all sides of a question whose dumbness cannot be convinced instant who will never leave off but what puts you out of heart I am not only out

of heart but in positive despair for I do not know what to answer if anyone were to ask me those Socrates have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither In the comparison of perceptions with one another nor yet in thought but in Union of thought and perception yes I shall say with the complacency of one who thinks that he has made a noble Discovery I see no reason why we should be ashamed of our demonstrations Socrates he will say you mean to argue that the man whom we only think of and do not see

cannot be confused with a horse which we do not see or touch but only think of and do not perceive that I believe to be my meaning I shall reply quite right well then he will say according to that argument the number 11 which is only thought can never be mistaken for 12 which is only thought how would you ask him I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the 11 or 12 which are seen or handled but said no similar mistake can arise between the 11 and 12 which are in the

mind well but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind five and seven I do not mean five or seven men or horses but five or seven in the abstract which as we say are recorded on the wax and block and in which false opinion is held to be impossible did no man ever ask himself how many these numbers make when added together and answer that they are 11 while another thinks that they are 12 or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are 12. suddenly not many would think

that they are 11 and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still for I assume you to be speaking of numbers in general exactly and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the 12 in the wax and block are supposed to be 11. yes that seems to be the case then do we not come back to the old difficulty for he who makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows but this as we said was impossible and afforded an

irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion because otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time as true then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought and thus we're obliged to say either that false opinion does not exist or that a man may not know that which he knows which alternative do you prefer it is hard to determine Socrates and yet the argument will scarcely admit of both

but as we are at our Wit's End suppose that we do a Shameless thing what is it let us attempt to explain the verb to know and why should that be Shameless you seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge of which we are assumed not to know the nature no but I'm well aware and is it not Shameless when we do not know what knowledge is to be explaining the verb to know the truth is theatitis that we have long been infected

with logical impurity thousands of times we have repeated the words we know and do not know and we have or have not science or knowledge as if we could understand what we are saying to one another so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge and at this moment we are using the words we understand we are ignorant as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science because if you avoid these Expressions Socrates how will you ever argue at all I could not being the man I am the case would be different

if I were a true hero of dialectic and oh that such a one were present for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted but seeing that we are no great wits shall I venture to say what knowing is for I think that the attempt may be worth making then by all means Venture and no one shall find fault with you for using the Forbidden terms you have heard the common explanation of the

verb to know I think so but I do not remember it at the moment they explained the word to know as meaning to have knowledge true I should like to make a slight change and say to possess knowledge how do the two expressions differ perhaps there may be no difference but still I should like you to hear my view that you may help me to test it I will if I can I should distinguish having from possessing for example a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear and

then we should say not that he has but that he possesses the Garment it would be the correct expression well may not a man possess and yet not have knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking as you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds doves or any other birds and to be keeping them in an Aviary which she has constructed at home we might save him in one sense that he always has them because he possesses them might we not yes and yet in another sense he has none of them but

they are in his power and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own and can take and have them whenever he likes he can catch any which he likes and let the bird go again and he may do so as often as he pleases true once more then as in what proceeded we made a sort of wax and figment in the mind so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an Aviary of all sorts of birds some flocking together apart from the rest others in

small groups others solitary flying anywhere and everywhere let us imagine such an Avery and what is it to follow we may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge and that when we were children this receptacle was empty whenever a man has gotten undetained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge and this is to know granted and further when anyone wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences and having taken to hold it and again to let

them go how will he Express himself will he describe the catching of them and the original possession in the same words I will make my meaning clearer by an example you admit that there is an art of arithmetic to be sure conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general I follow having the use of the art the arithmetician if I'm not mistaken has the conceptions of number under his hand and can transmit them to another yes and when transmitting them he may be said to teach them

and when receiving to learn them and when receiving to learn them and when having them in possession and therefore said Aviary he may be said to know them exactly attend to what follows must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers for he has the science of all numbers in his mind true and can he reckon abstract numbers in his head or things about him which are numerable of course he can and to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to very true and so he appears to be searching into

something which he knows as if he did not know it for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers you have heard these perplexing questions raised I have may we not pursue the image of the doves and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already and thus when a man has learned and known something long ago he may resume and get hold of the

knowledge which he has long possessed but has not at hand in his mind true that was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering or a grammarian about reading shall we say that although he knows he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows it would be too absurd Socrates shall we say then that he is going to read or number of what he does not know although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers that again would be an absurdity then shall we

say that about names we care nothing anyone May twist and turn the words knowing and learning in any way which he likes but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses and therefore in no case can a man not know that would which he knows but he may get a false opinion about it for he may have the knowledge not of this particular thing but of some other when the various numbers and forms of knowledge

are flying about in the Aviary and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the General Store he takes the wrong one by mistake that is to say when he thought 11 to be 12 he got hold of the bring Dove which he had in his mind when he wanted the pigeon a very rational explanation but when he catches the one which he wants then he is not deceived and has an opinion of what is and thus false and true opinion may exist and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear I dare say

that you agree with me do not yes and so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what he knows for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses whether he be or be not deceived and yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window what is it how can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion what do you mean in the first place how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which

he knows not by reason of ignorance but by reason of his own knowledge and again is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this and this to be another thing but having knowledge present with him in his mind he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know and blindness make him see as that knowledge can make him ignorant perhaps Socrates we have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our Birds whereas there ought to have

been forms of ignorance as well flying about together in the mind and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge and sometimes a form of ignorance and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance but a true one from knowledge about the same thing I cannot help praising you theotages and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words let us Grant what you say then according to you he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion am I right yes he will certainly not think that

he has a false opinion of course not he will think that his opinion is true and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived suddenly then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance clearly and thus after going a long way around we are once more face to face with our original difficulty the hero of dialectic will retort upon us oh my excellent friends he will say laughing if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge can he think that one of them

which he knows is the other which he knows or if he knows neither of them can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not or if he knows one and not the other can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds and which the owner keeps in some other

aviaries or Graven on wax and blocks according to your foolish images and which he may be said to know while he possesses them even though he have them not at hand in his mind and thus in a Perpetual Circle you will be compelled to go round and round and you will make no progress what are we to say in reply theatitis indeed Socrates I do not know what we are to say are not his reproach is just and is not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know

what knowledge is that must be first ascertained then the nature of false opinion I cannot but agree with you Socrates so far as we have yet gone then once more what shall we say that knowledge is for we are not going to lose heart as yet certainly I shall not lose heart if you do not what definition will be most consistent with our former views I cannot think of any but our old ones Socrates what was it knowledge was said by us to be true opinion and true opinion is surely unerring and the results which

follow from it are all Noble and good he who led the way into the river theatitis said the experiment will show and perhaps if we go forward in the search we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for but if we stay where we are nothing will come to light very true let us go forward and try the trail soon comes to an end for a whole profession is against us how is that and what profession do you mean the profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers for these

persuade Men by their art and make them think whatever they like but they do not teach them do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about of robbery or violence of which they were not eyewitnesses while the little water is flowing in the klepsidra certainly not they can only persuade them and would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion to be sure when therefore judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing

them and not in any other way and when thus judging of them from reports they attain a true opinion about them they judge without knowledge and yet are rightly persuaded if they have judged well certainly and yet oh my friend if true opinion in Law Courts and knowledge are the same the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge and therefore I must infer that they are not the same that is a distinction Socrates which I've heard made by someone else but I had forgotten it he said that true opinion combined with reason was

knowledge but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable such was the singular expression which he used and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable excellent but then how did he distinguish between things which are and are not knowable I wish that she would repeat to me what he said and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale I do not know whether I can recall it but if another

person would tell me I think that I could follow him let me give you then a dream in return for a dream he thought that I too had a dream and I heard in my dream that the Primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded have no reason or explanation you can only name them but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them for in the one case existence in the other non-existence is already implied neither of which must be added if you mean to speak

of this or that thing by itself alone it should not be called itself or that or each or alone or this or the like for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things but are distinct from them whereas if the first elements could be described and had a definition of their own they would be spoken of apart from all else but none of these primeval elements can be defined they can only be named for they have nothing but a name and the things which are compounded of them as they are complex are expressed

by a combination of names for the combination of names is the essence of a definition thus then the elements or letters are only objects of perception and cannot be defined or known but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed and are apprehended by true opinion when therefore anyone one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation you may say that his mind is truly exercised but has no knowledge for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing has no knowledge of that thing but when he adds rational explanation

then he is perfected in knowledge and maybe all that I have been denying of him was that the form in which the dream appeared to you precisely and you allow and maintain that true opinion combined with definition or rational explanation is knowledge exactly then may we assume theatitis that today and in this casual manner we have found a truth which inform at times many wise men have grown old and have not found at any rate Socrates I am satisfied with the present statement which is probably correct for How can there be knowledge apart from definition

and true opinion and yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me what was it what might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all that the elements or letters are unknown but the combination or syllables known and was that wrong we shall soon know for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself use what hostages the letters which are the elements and the syllables which are the combinations he reasoned did he not from the letters of the alphabet yes he did let

us take them and put them to the test or rather test ourselves what was the way in which we learned letters and first of all are we right in saying that syllables have a definition but the letters have no definition I think so I think so too for suppose that someone asks you to spell the first syllable of my name says he says what is saw I should reply s and O that is the definition which you would give of the syllable I should I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the

s but how can anyone Socrates tell the elements of an element I can only reply that s is a consonant a mere noise as of the tongue hissing B and most other letters again are neither vowel sounds nor noises thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined for even the most distinct of them which are the seven vowels have a sound only but no definition at all then I suppose my friend that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge yes I think that we have well but have we been

right in maintaining that the syllables can be known but not the letters I think so and do we mean by a syllable two letters or if there are more all of them or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them I should say that we mean all the letters take the case of the two letters s and O which form the first syllable of my own name must not he who knows the syllable know both of them certainly he knows that is the S and O yes but can he be ignorant of

either singly and yet know both together such a supposition Socrates is monstrous and unmeaning but if he cannot know both without knowing each then if he is ever to know the syllable he must know the letters first and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed yes with wonderful Celerity yes we did not keep watch properly perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters but rather one single idea framed out of them having a separate form distinct from them very true and a more likely notion than the other

take care let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing Theory no indeed let us assume then as we now say that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements of letters or of any other elements very good and it must have no parts why because that which has Parts must be a whole of all the parts or would you say that a whole although formed out of the parts is a single notion different from all the parts I should and would you say that all and

the whole are the same or different I am not certain but as you like me to answer at once I shall Hazard the reply that they are different I approve your Readiness theaters but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer yes the answer is the point according to this new view the whole is supposed to differ from all yes but is there any difference between all in the plural and the all in the singular take the case of number when we say one two three four five six or when

we say twice three or three times two or four and two or three and two and one are we speaking of the same or of different numbers of the same that is of six yes and in each form of expression we spoke of all the six true again in speaking of all in the plural is there not one thing which we express of course there is and that is six yes then in predicating the word all of things measured by number we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural clearly we do again

the number of the acre and the acre are the same are they not yes and the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium yes and the Army is the number of the army and in all similar cases the entire number of anything is the entire thing true and the number of each is the parts of each exactly then as many things as have parts are made up of Parts clearly but all the parts are admitted to be the all if the entire number is the all true then the whole is not made

up of parts for it would be the all if consisting of all the parts that is the inference but is a part a part of anything but the whole oh yes of the all you make a valiant defense theatitis and yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting certainly and is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent but that from which nothing is absent is neither a whole nor all if wanting in anything both equally lose their entirety of nature I now think that there is no difference between a

whole and all but were we not saying that when a thing has Parts all the parts will be a whole and all certainly then as I was saying before must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters and then the letters are not parts of the syllable or that the syllable will be the same as the letters and will therefore be equally known from them you are right and in order to avoid this we suppose it to be different from them yes but if letters are not parts of syllables can you

tell me of any other parts of syllables which are not letters no indeed Socrates for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts quite true theatitis and therefore according to our present view a syllable must surely be some indivisible form true but do you remember my friend that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement that of the first elements out of which all things are compounded there could be no definition because each of them when

taken by itself is uncompounded nor can one rightly attribute to them the words being or this because they are alien and inappropriate words and for this reason the letters or elements were in indefinable and unknown I remember and is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible I can see no other no other reason can be given then is not the syllable in the same case as the letters or elements if it has no parts and is one form to be sure if then a syllable is a whole and has many parts

or letters the letters as well as a syllable must be intelligible and expressible since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole true but if it be one and indivisible then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown and for the same reason I cannot deny that we cannot therefore agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed but not the letter certainly not if we may trust the argument well but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him when you

remember your own experience in learning to read what experience why that in learning you are kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the I and by the ear in order that when you heard them spoken or saw them written you might not be confused by their position very true and is the education of the heart player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note the notes as everyone would allow are the elements or letters of Music exactly then if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to

other symbols and compounds we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject and if someone says that the syllable is was known and the letter unknown we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense exactly and the might be given other proofs of this belief if I'm not mistaken but do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us which is the meaning of the statement that

right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge we must not well and what is the meaning of the term explanation I think that we have a choice of three meanings what are they in the first place the meaning may be manifesting one's thought by The Voice with verbs and nouns Imaging an opinion in the Stream which flows from the lips as in a mirror or water and does not explanation appear to be of this nature certainly he who so manifests his thought is said to explain himself and everyone who

is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything and if so all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge true let us not therefore hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word for perhaps he only intended to say that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing

as for example Socrates as for example when Hessian says that a wagon is made up of a hundred planks now neither you nor I could describe all of them individually but if anyone asked what is a wagon we should be content to answer that a wagon consists of Wheels Axel body rims yolks and our opponent will probably laugh at us just as he would if we profess to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account to the name of theater fetus and yet only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name that would

be true opinion and not Knowledge from knowledge as has been already remarked is not attained until combined with true opinion there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed yes in the same general way we might also have true opinion about a wagon but he who can describe its Essence by an enumeration of a hundred planks adds rational explanation to True opinion and instead of opinion as art and knowledge of the nature of a wagon in that he attains to the whole through the elements and do you not agree in that

view Socrates if you do my friend but I want to know first whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to to be irrational is this your view precisely well and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times assuredly not and do you not remember

that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read you mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables yes to be sure I perfectly remember I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge when a person at the time of learning writes the name of theotitis and thinks he ought to write and does right and e but again meaning to write the name of theodorus thinks that he ought to write and does right and E can we suppose that

he knows the first syllables of your two names we have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge and in like manner he he may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name he may and in that case when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly he has right opinion clearly but although we admit that he has right opinion he will still be without knowledge yes and yet he will have explanation as well as right opinion for he knew the order

of the letters when he wrote and this we admit to the explanation true then my friend there is such a thing as right opinion United with definition or explanation which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge it would seem so and what we fancy to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only but perhaps we had better not say so as yet for whether or not three explanations of knowledge one of which must as we said be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation

and very likely there may be found someone who will not prefer this but the third you are quite right there is still one remaining the first was the image or expression of the Mind in speech the a second which has just been mentioned is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements but what is the third definition there is further the popular notion of telling the Mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others can you give me an example of such a definition as for example

in the case of the sun I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the Earth certainly understand why the reason is as I was just now saying that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing then as many persons affirm you'll get at the definition or explanation of it but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs

I understand you and your account of definition is in my judgment correct but he who having opinion about anything can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion yes that is what we are maintaining nevertheless theaters on a nearer view I find myself quite disappointed the picture which at a distance was not so bad has now become altogether unintelligible what do you mean I will endeavor to explain I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you and if to this I add

your definition then I have knowledge but if not opinion only yes the definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference true but when I had only opinion I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics I suppose not then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another true tell me now how in that case could I have formed a judgment of view any more than of anyone else suppose that I imagine theatitis to be a man who was nose eyes and mouth and every

other member completes how would that enable me to distinguish theaters from theodorus or from some outer Barbarian how could it or if I had further conceived of you not only is having nose and eyes but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me certainly not surely I can have no conception of theotesis until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I've ever seen and until your other peculiarities of a light

distinctness and so when I meet you tomorrow the right opinion will be recalled most true then right opinion implies the perception of differences clearly What then shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion if the meaning is that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing the proposal is ridiculous also we are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them and so we go round and round the revolution of the

skittle or pestle or any other rotatory machine in the same circles is as nothing compared with such a requirement and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind for to add those things which we already have in order that we may learn what we already think is like a soul utterly benighted tell me what were you going to say just now when you ask the question if my boy the argument in speaking of adding the definition had used the word to know and not merely have an opinion of the difference that which

is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end for to know is surely to acquire knowledge true and so when the question is asked what is knowledge this Fair argument will answer right opinion with knowledge knowledge that is of difference for this as the said argument maintains is adding the definition that seems to be true but how utterly foolish when we are asking what is knowledge that the reply should only be right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything and so theater's knowledge is neither sensation nor

true opinion nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to True opinion I suppose not and are you still in labor and travail my dear friend or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth I am sure Socrates that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me and does not my art show that you have brought forth wind and that The Offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up very true what if theatitis you should ever conceive afresh you will be all the

better for the present investigation and if not you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know these are the limits of my art I can no further go nor do I know what are the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages the office of a midwife I like my mother have received from God she delivered women I deliver men but they must be young and Noble unfair and now I have to

go to the porch of the king where I am to meet melitus and his indictment tomorrow morning theodorus I shall hope to see you again at this place